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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary of Research Results
1. Introduction
This thesis considers the optimal dividend and cash holding policies of firms under macroe-
conomic uncertainty from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, as well as the
regulation and resolution of systemically important banks under credit market frictions.
More specifically, we first investigate the regulatory interventions, which include spe-
cial resolution procedures and additional capital requirements for systemically important
banks, and their interactions with the dividend and equity issuance policies of systemically
important banks under financial frictions that are mainly related to capital supply uncer-
tainty. Second, we examine the impact of fluctuations in interest rates and issuance costs
on the optimal dividend policies of firms whose profitability is stationary. Finally, we com-
pare the firm and country specific factors that affect corporate liquidity decisions between
developing and developed country groups. We further study whether the 2007-2009 finan-
cial crisis has a significant impact on cash reserves and their determinants and examine
which industries potentially drive the empirically observed corporate cash holding policies.
2. Summary of Research Results
The dissertation comprises the following three research papers:
(i) Optimal Resolution Procedures and Dividend Policy for Global Systemically Important
Banks,
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(ii) Optimal Dividend Policy with Random Interest Rates (with Erdinc¸ Akyıldırım, Jean-
Charles Rochet, and H. Mete Soner),
(iii) Corporate Cash Holdings in Developing and Developed Markets: Evidence from 2007-
2009 Financial Crisis.
Their content and contribution are summarized in the following subsections.
2.1 Optimal Resolution Procedures and Dividend Policy for Global Sys-
temically Important Banks
Costly government interventions during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 underscored
the necessity of reforms of the existing regulatory tools such as the bail-out or disruptive
bankruptcy of systemically important banks that are in a financially distressed situation.
Following the crisis, bank regulators have adopted special resolution procedures for global
systemically important banks. They now have the power to seize these banks when their
capital falls below some threshold, and to sell them back to new investors after having
restructured them. However, how to combine special resolution procedures with capital
requirements in order to “tame” these institutions is of persistent concern of financial
regulators after the crisis.
The first research article of this dissertation characterizes the optimal intervention thresh-
olds and studies the interactions with the dividend and equity issuance policies of global
systemically important banks. The model incorporates supply side credit market frictions
since the 2007-2009 financial crisis is a recent illustration of a situation of severe capital
supply constraints. In particular, the bank has to search for outside investors in order
to raise new equity and the outside investors only arrive at a stochastic rate. We also
introduce a fixed cost of new equity issuance. Due to this friction, the bank endogenously
chooses a unique capital level via the maximization of the shareholders’ value, below which
the new equity issuance becomes profitable for the bank. On the other hand, the main
regulatory decisions in our framework are twofold. First, the regulator continuously audits
the bank’s capital and intervenes by setting a capital threshold, under which the bank is
restructured. More specifically, every time the bank’s capital drops to a certain nonnega-
tive threshold, the shareholders are expropriated and the regulator restructures the bank
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with the aim of a subsequent re-privatization. Second, the regulator restricts the dividend
payout of the bank, hinging on restructuring costs. The dividend payout and restructuring
thresholds and the bank’s initial capital are policy variables chosen by the regulator via
social welfare maximization.
The main findings of our analysis for the optimal regulatory policy are: First, when the
restructuring costs are high, it is optimal for regulators to impose dividend payout re-
strictions for undercapitalized banks. Second, in states of the economy where the external
capital supply is scarce, these results are aggravated. In particular, regulators intervene
relatively earlier and set stricter dividend payout restrictions. Finally, capital supply
constraints have an important impact on the financing decisions of shareholders. Banks
recapitalize less frequently when the cost of raising equity is high or when the external
capital supply is plentiful. We believe that, overall, our findings make an important step
towards solving the implementation problem of the regulators of the resolution proce-
dures for global systemically important banks and improve our understanding about their
potential adverse effects on shareholders’ financing decisions.
2.2 Optimal Dividend Policy with Random Interest Rates
Following the pioneering works of Jeanblanc-Picque´ & Shiryaev [4] and Radner & Shepp
[6], a substantial literature investigates the optimal dividend policy of a firm, which does
not have access to external financing and produces cash flows that follow an arithmetic
Brownian motion with constant drift and volatility. In that setting, cash is held for pre-
cautionary reasons and the marginal value of cash inside the firm is shown to decrease
with the level of cash reserves. The well-defined dividend payout strategy is then, to
distribute dividends when the cash reserves reach a target level, which depends on the
firm characteristics such as average profitability of the firm, cash flow volatility, and the
interest rate demanded by the shareholders. An interesting extension of this problem is to
examine how the optimal dividend policy changes with the effects of changing macroeco-
nomic conditions. Several recent papers have studied the impact of macroeconomic shocks
on the financial policies of firms. For instance, Cadenillas and Sotomayor [2] study the
optimal dividend policy problem with a setup in which the drift and volatility of the cash
flow process are controlled by a two-state Markov chain representing the regime of the
3
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economy. In addition, Bolton, Chen & Wang [1] study, in a general setup, the impact of
changing macroeconomic conditions on both corporate investment and financial policies.
However, these articles only consider the case where these macroeconomic shocks affect the
profitability of firms but not the financial markets conditions. As shown by Gertler and
Hubbard [3], changing macroeconomic conditions may influence dividend payouts through
the fluctuations in interest rates demanded by investors and the conditions of the credit
market.
The second research article of this dissertation examines the impact of macroeconomic
variables on the dividend policies of firms, even in the absence of fluctuations in their
earning processes. In particular, we study the polar case where the profitability of firms
is stationary, but evolves in a stochastic environment, where interest rates and issuance
costs are governed by an exogenous Markov chain.
We characterize the optimal dividend policy and verify a crucial economic result, that is,
that the firm prefers to distribute more dividends when interest rates are high than when
they are low. This result comes from the fact that the opportunity cost of cash reserves is
higher when the interest rates demanded by investors are high. However, as empirically
observed by Gertler and Hubbard [3], firms indeed tend to pay less dividends during reces-
sions (i.e., when interest rates are high) than during booms (i.e., when interest rates are
low) even after corrected for the changes in the firms’ individual profitability. Therefore,
we incorporate a new equity issuance opportunity for the firm to study the impact of credit
market frictions on our results. We observe that when the fixed cost of raising new equity
(a proxy for the size of financial frictions) is substantially higher during recessions than
during booms, in contrast to the initial results, the firm now prefers to distribute dividends
more often when interest rates are low than they are high. Furthermore, we find that the
stochastic issuing costs allow to get rid of the unfortunate prediction of previous studies
that firms wait until they run out of cash before they issue new equity. This result can be
explained by the market timing effect like in Bolton, Chen & Wang [1]: when the issuing
costs of equity are very high during recessions (so that shareholders refuse to recapitalize
firms when they run out of cash) it becomes optimal to issue new equity in the good state
(i.e., when interest rates are low) even if the firm still has cash reserves, due to the fear
that a recession might occur, leading to the forced closure of a profitable company.
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2.3 Corporate Cash Holdings in Developing and Developed Markets: Ev-
idence from 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
Corporate cash holdings have exhibited a significant increase in the last few decades all
over the world. Although the 2007-2009 financial crisis has decelerated this trend, several
media articles have highlighted, also after the recent crisis, the record cash reserves of firms
from different economies. Following Opler et al. [5], the empirical literature has established
various determinants of cash holdings and motives for holding cash. However, the existing
literature works mostly with US data or small samples from European countries. Although
the variations in agency costs and the firm specific characteristics across countries may
affect corporate liquidity decisions, there is no study, to the best of our knowledge, that
compares the factors that affect corporate liquidity decisions for different country groups.
To fill in this gap, the third research article of this dissertation compares the firm and
country specific factors that affect cash policies of firms between 23 developing and 26
developed countries over the period 1995-2011. We further study whether the 2007-2009
financial crisis has a significant impact on cash reserves and their determinants. Finally, we
perform an industry analysis to examine which industries potentially drive the empirically
observed corporate cash holdings in developing versus developed countries.
The main findings of this paper are: First, average cash holdings follow a positive trend
and firms tend to have target cash levels in both developing and developed countries. The
adjustment speed of the cash holdings to the target levels is relatively higher for firms
in developed countries. In both country groups, high-tech and utilities firms hold the
highest and lowest cash ratios, respectively. Manufacturing firms exhibit relatively lower
cash ratios than the developing and developed sample averages.
Second, after the 2007-2009 financial crisis, average cash holdings increase in the developing
countries but decrease below crisis values in the developed countries. Manufacturing firms
seem to be the main drivers for the increase in average cash ratios for developing countries
after the crisis. On the other hand, basic materials and partly high-tech firms dominate
the decrease in average cash ratios for developed countries from the crisis to the post-crisis
period.
Third, in the sample of developing countries, we observe a positive regime shift in the
5
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demand for cash driven by high-tech and partly by manufacturing firms. Moreover, we
detect changes in the relations between firm specific variables and cash holdings from the
pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. These changes are seen mostly for utilities, technology
and manufacturing firms. On the other hand, in the sample of developed countries, we
observe that the decrease in average cash ratios after the crisis is at least partly the result
of a negative regime shift in the demand for cash. This result is driven by the basic
materials, consumer services, and high-tech industries. Furthermore, we observe changes
in the relations between cash holdings and their determinants which are mainly driven by
consumer goods, telecommunications, and technology firms.
Finally, in both country groups, trade-off and pecking order theory related motives play
a crucial role in explaining the determinants of cash holdings in both the pre-crisis and
crisis periods. The agency motives for holding cash are weakly observed in developed
countries over the sample period. However, their impact on cash holdings is relatively
stronger especially after the crisis in developing countries.
To summarize, the contributions of this article to the existing literature are threefold:
First, by employing an exhaustive international dataset, we provide important insights
about the determinants of corporate cash holdings, about the impact of the 2007 − 2009
financial crisis on the cash management policies, and about the variation in agency costs
across developing versus developed countries. Second, we perform an industry analysis,
which provides important insights about the potential drivers of the observed liquidity
policies in our country groups. Finally, in contrast to the previous literature that uses
only OLS regressions, we implement GMM regressions, which are more robust for the
purpose of a target cash level analysis.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Resolution Procedures and Dividend Policy
for Global Systemically Important Banks
I˙brahim Ethem Gu¨ney
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has brought into the attention of regulatory authorities the
massive risks generated by the so-called Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs).1
During the crisis, costly government interventions such as bail-outs of large, complex
banks or other financial institutions2 and the disruptive bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers
or other systemically important financial institutions have been followed by a turmoil in
the world’s financial markets. As a direct reaction to the financial crisis, governments
have agreed on the necessity of reforms of the existing regulations. In particular, the
development of special resolution mechanisms to deal with the distress or even failure of
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) (such as G-SIBs) has been in the
1The term Global Systemically Important Bank refers to a financial institution whose distress or a
close-down has substantial adverse effects on an economy due to its complexity, size, national and global
interconnectedness, and central role as financial intermediary in an economy. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision developed an indicator-based measurement approach to determine which banks are
global systemically important. For each individual bank, the method calculates the weighted average of the
indicator values representing five categories of systemic importance, which are: size, cross-jurisdictional
activity, interconnectedness, substitutability, and complexity. The Financial Stability Board annually
announces the list of G-SIBs with regard to this approach.
2AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are popular examples for the bail-outs during the crisis.
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focus of the joint effort to design, promote and implement reforms of the financial regu-
lations.3 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was
established in the US in July 2010, authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) to step-in and resolve a situation of severe financial distress of a systemically im-
portant financial firm.4 This mechanism should assure a fast stabilization of the financial
firm in order to protect the taxpayers’ rights and the financial system by dispensing from
the necessity of a bail-out and ensuring the continuation of the systemically important
financial intermediary. The key feature is that the FDIC obtains the full power over
the management of the distressed financial institution. In particular, it has the right to
seize, restructure and subsequently sell a G-SIB that is in a financially distressed situ-
ation. In addition, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced Basel III
decisions in September 2010 which focus on increasing the loss absorbing capacity of G-
SIBs by proposing higher capital requirements and by introducing capital surcharges for
these institutions.5 As part of these new regulations, the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
introduced new international standards for effective resolution procedures [9] in Novem-
ber 2011, which also emphasize the more intensive and effective supervision of all G-SIBs.
Finally, European Union (EU) is currently adopting new reforms on the structure of EU
banking sector which aim at eradicating too-big, too-complex, too-interconnected-to-fail
properties embodied by G-SIBs.
One of the main problems that the regulators face in the implementation of these new
policy rules is, however, the actual management of the resolution procedures. That is,
when it is optimal, from a social welfare point of view, that the regulator steps-in, decides
to restructure and subsequently sells a G-SIB. Moreover, from a regulatory point of view,
it is also crucial to prevent G-SIBs from reaching a highly critical situation at all. In order
to do so, it might be optimal to restrict the dividend policy of these banks. Furthermore,
it is unclear whether the new regulatory policy might actually have adverse effects on
shareholders’ financing decisions. In particular, shareholders of the bank might anticipate
the potential restructuring interventions of the regulator and therefore issue new equity
3Since the main focus of this study is on Global Systemically Important Banks, we refer in what follows
only to G-SIBs even though the new regulation apply to systemically important financial institutions in
general.
4See https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf for detail.
5See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm for detail.
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earlier than it would be optimal.
This paper presents a dynamic model that contributes to our understanding about optimal
regulatory intervention policies and their interaction with the optimal financing policies of
G-SIBs. Importantly, the model incorporates also the impact of capital supply constraints.
One main reason why solvency problems of a bank might be exacerbated and potentially
even lead to insolvency, is the capital supply uncertainty. During market downturns and
credit crises, outside investors are not always standing by to finance firms. The 2007-2009
financial crisis is a recent illustration of a situation of severe capital supply constraints.
Therefore, we directly incorporate these constraints in our model by assuming that in-
vestors that are willing to inject fresh equity only arrive at an uncertain (i.e. stochastic)
rate. Decreasing the intensity of investor arrival allows us to directly study the impact
of capital supply constraints on the equity issuance decisions of firms and on the optimal
resolution and dividend payout restriction policies of the regulator.
The main features of the model are as follows. The cash flows of the bank follow an
arithmetic Brownian motion and the bank has a fixed size.6 The regulator continuously
audits the bank’s capital. Depending on the level of the capital, the regulator can de-
cide on the optimal single-point-of-entry for a global systemically important bank. The
regulator endogenously defines a capital threshold under which the bank is restructured.
In particular, every time the bank’s capital falls below a certain nonnegative level, the
shareholders are expropriated, the bank is restructured and privatized by the regulator.7
Another important feature of the model is that we allow the regulator to restrict the
dividend payout policy of the bank depending on the capital. The intuition is that the
interests of the regulator and shareholders potentially run counter to each other since the
shareholders maximize the market value of equity instead of the social welfare that the
regulator aims to maximize. The initial capital of the bank is also endogenously chosen
by the regulator.8 Finally, in addition to the capital supply uncertainty, we introduce a
6For the sake of simplicity, we take the size of the bank to be given in our model. Moreover, we assume
that the bank is systemically important and leave the question of when a bank is to be considered as
systemically important for future research.
7Such a policy has been successfully implemented in Scandinavian countries, in particular in Sweden,
during the banking crises in early 1990′s. Regulators did nationalize almost one third of banks, restructured
and sold them to the private sector with a profit.
8The regulator chooses initial capital, the restructuring and dividend thresholds of the bank with the
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fixed cost of new equity issuance. Due to this model feature, the management of the bank
chooses endogenously the time of the new equity issuance by aiming to maximize the value
of the equity.9
The main findings of our analysis for the optimal regulatory policy are: First, when the
restructuring costs are high, it is optimal for regulators to impose dividend payout restric-
tions for undercapitalized banks. Second, initial capital that should be invested by the
shareholders of the bank is positively related with the restructuring costs. More specifi-
cally, when the restructuring costs are high, regulators require banks to invest higher ini-
tial capital to prevent possible costly restructuring. Third, in states of the economy where
capital supply becomes more scarce these results are aggravated. For instance, regulators
intervene relatively earlier, set stricter dividend payout restrictions and require relatively
higher initial capital of the banks. We further find that capital supply constraints have
an important impact on the financing decisions of shareholders. Banks recapitalize less
frequently when the cost of raising equity is high or when external capital supply is high.
We believe that, overall, our findings make an important step towards solving the prob-
lem of the implementation of the new resolution procedures for G-SIBs and improve our
understanding about their potential adverse effects on shareholders’ financing decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief review of
the literature. We describe our model in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we provide the
characterization of the value function and the restructuring, equity issuance, and payout
policies. Section 2.5 contains the numerical analysis and section 2.6 finally concludes. The
proofs and Figures are gathered in Appendix 2.A and 2.B, respectively.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper builds on recent studies in the corporate finance literature that analyze the
implications of financing constraints on corporate policies by using continuous time models.
We extend these papers by including essential properties that are specific to banks and
characterize the optimal regulatory intervention policies and their interaction with the
objective of social welfare maximization.
9Even though it might be an interesting avenue for future research, we do not consider any moral hazard
problem between managers and equity holders in this work.
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optimal financing policies of G-SIBs under financial frictions that are mainly related to
capital supply uncertainty.
The first strand of the related literature comprises the banking regulation studies that rely
on the ‘valuation approach’. This strand dates back to Merton [18] who derives deposit
insurance costs by utilizing the famous Black-Scholes framework. Merton defines an iso-
morphism between deposit insurance and put options on firm equity and utilizes explicit
formulas from the Black-Scholes model. He extends the framework by incorporating audit-
ing costs and random auditing times in a subsequent paper [19]. Marcus [17] emphasizes
the impact of franchise value and bankruptcy costs to the banks’ policy.10 He concludes
that as the franchise value of the banks decreases (increases), banks become more risk-
loving (risk-averse). Fries et al. [11] investigate optimal bank closure rules and their
implications on deposit insurance pricing in a setting where the regulator continuously
audits. They show that the regulator optimally balances the monitoring and bankruptcy
costs. An optimal closure rule has the feature that, given lower monitoring costs and the
independence of bankruptcy costs and profitability, the regulator postpones the closure
until the bank’s asset value is low enough to decrease the bankruptcy costs. Milne and
Whalley [22] is the closest paper to our study in the banking regulation literature. They
build a model that examines the effects of capital regulation and audit frequency on the
incentives of commercial banks. The model is an extension of the continuous-time capital
structure trade-off model of Milne and Robertson [21] by means of incorporating Poisson
distributed audits of the regulator, which result in either liquidation or restructuring of
the bank, and which are subject to a fixed cost.11 Their analysis shows that the fear of
liquidation provides an incentive for banks to hold an extra capital buffer with respect to
the regulatory threshold. Our paper differs from Milne and Whalley [22] in the following
ways: First, we introduce capital supply uncertainty instead of assuming perfect elasticity
of the capital supply. Second, we assume continuous audit of the regulator and the direct
restructuring of the bank in case of a financial distress. Milne [20] utilizes the incentive
mechanism in Milne and Whalley [22] for examining the banks’ portfolio choice. He shows
10Marcus denotes it as ‘charter value’, which represents the present value of the expected future earnings
that is lost in case of liquidation.
11The paper characterizes the optimal corporate policies in an environment, in which the firm is inelastic
to raise debt or equity and is subject to liquidation when the cash flows drop to a certain level. Therefore,
optimal firm behavior shows a risk aversion, which is negatively correlated with the liquid assets in hand.
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that, given the ex-post penalty of capital requirements violation, the main impact of capital
regulation is reflected as ex-ante incentives of the bank to avoid these capital requirement
breaches. Thus, in contrast to the literature, he proposes strengthening regulatory ex-post
penalties. Bhattacharya et al. [3] analyze optimal closure rules for banks in a regulatory
structure consisting of audit frequency, capital replenishment and closure rules depending
on the risk level of banks. They demonstrate that the excessive risk taking behavior of
solvent banks can be deterred by an optimal combination of capital adequacy, closure and
auditing rules. Decamps, Rochet, and Roger [7] propose a dynamic model to grasp the in-
teraction of the three pillars of Basel II: capital adequacy requirement, supervisory review,
and market discipline. They find that the capital adequacy requirement should be used
as a vehicle to oblige the closure before the bank becomes insolvent. Moreover, when the
cash flows of the bank are not visible without high monitoring costs, the bank should be
required to raise subordinated debt with a cash flow contingent payoff, which yields a cash
flow threshold for auditing. However, their results are contingent on non-volatile market
prices and the independence of regulators from political pressure. Our contribution to the
existing literature in banking regulation is to introduce capital supply uncertainty and
to investigate the impact of this friction to global systemically important banks’ capital
management policies under regulation.
The second strand of the related literature includes the recent corporate finance papers on
financing frictions. In these models, cash hoarding is precautionary due to either external
financing costs or capital supply uncertainty.12 De´camps et al. [6] develop a dynamic
model of cash management with two financial constraints: internal agency frictions and
external financing costs. The model is solved in closed-form and the optimal payout
and equity issuance policies are fully characterized. Implications of financial frictions on
the issuance and dividend policies, corporate cash value, and the stock price dynamics
are presented. In a contemporaneous study, Bolton et al. [4] extend De´camps et al.
[6] by incorporating flexible firm size which allows them to investigate investment in a
dynamic manner. They enhance the existing results by demonstrating that the investment
depends on the ratio of marginal q to the marginal cost of financing. An extension of
12The precautionary motive for holding cash was introduced by the grandfather of modern macroeco-
nomics, Keynes [14]. In the recent literature, e.g., Kim et al. [16], Almeida et al. [1] and Bates et al. [2]
emphasize this motive as well.
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these two papers is the study of Bolton et al. [5], which allows for time varying investment
and stochastic financing opportunities.13 The key observations are: First, during market
downturns or weak financing conditions the firm has a precautionary motive for holding
cash, reduces investment, and postpones pay-outs. However, during favorable market
conditions the firm may rationally time the market and issue equity even when it is not
necessary. The models in previous studies have a common feature that firms always
follow a double barrier policy for issuance and payout. On the contrary, by introducing
capital supply uncertainty and lumpy investment, Hugonnier et al. [12] show that optimal
financing and payout policies of firms may differ from standard double barrier (S,s) policies.
Another appealing result in their study is that smooth-pasting conditions in preceding
papers are necessary but not sufficient. Our model is built on the setup in Hugonnier et
al. [12] without growth option. We adapt the existing setup in Hugonnier et al. [12] to a
continuous time framework for a G-SIB and analyze capital supply effects to the optimal
dividend, equity issuance, and restructuring policies of these institutions.
2.3 Model
We model a bank with capital (equity) (Ct) that collects deposits (D) from the public,
transforms them into risky assets (A), and optimizes its cash buffer (Mt) by retaining
earnings or raising new equity from outside investors. For the sake of simplicity, the
deposit volume is taken as a constant and the interest rate paid to the depositors is
assumed to be zero. Asset value (A) represents the loans and is taken as a constant as
well. Hence, the balance sheet of the bank (book value) is given as
A D
Mt Ct
We have a continuous time model with no agency frictions: the manager acts in the best
interest of shareholders. Shareholders and the manager of the bank are risk neutral and
discount the future at a constant rate r. Uncertainty in the model is described by (Ω,F,P),
a filtered probability space satisfying the usual assumptions.14 Risky Assets (A) of the
13In particular, there exist two states for capital at any point in time: cheap and expensive.
14See Karatzas and Shreve [15] for details.
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bank generate random cash flows that follow an arithmetic Brownian motion
dYt = µdt+ σdBt, (2.3.1)
where µ and σ are constant (mean and volatility of the cash flows), and Bt is a standard
Brownian motion.15 Therefore, the bank may have operating losses, which are financed
through cash reserves. The bank uses additional financing through raising new equity.16
The core financial friction in the model is the capital supply uncertainty. The bank has
to search for outside investors in order to raise new equity. There is no search cost but
the outside investors appear at the jump times of a Poisson process Nt with intensity
λ. Thus, the expected outside financing lag is 1λ years. Raising outside financing has a
fixed cost, F . In particular, to obtain f ≥ 0, the bank has to raise f + F from outside
financiers. Hence, when outside investors arrive, the bank will raise outside equity only if it
is profitable to do so. Shareholders have limited liability and the cash reserves must remain
nonnegative. Dividend payments are chosen subject to these restrictions. Cumulative
dividend payments are expressed by Lt, which is an adapted, nondecreasing, ca`dla`g process
with L0 = 0. The returns on cash reserves are assumed to be zero. Thus, there is an
opportunity cost of holding cash, which makes the liquidity management crucial. In light
of these assumptions, the dynamics of the bank’s cash reserves satisfy
dMt = µdt+ σdBt − dLt + ftdNt, (2.3.2)
where ft denotes the outside fund process, which is nonnegative and predictable. Finally,
the book value of the equity is given by the balance sheet equation as
Ct = Mt +A−D.17
15The rationale behind the choice of arithmetic Brownian motion for the cash flow process is that the
arithmetic Brownian motion fits well to the setup with fixed asset size and it captures the potential
operating losses.
16As shown in the pioneering work of Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Shiryaev [13], any form of debt (straight,
contingent convertible (coco), subordinated, etc.) is sub-optimal in the absence of tax benefits or pub-
lic subsidy, and some asymmetric information and corporate governance problems (moral hazard, asset
substitution, cash flow diversion, etc.).
17The basic setup in our model yields dCt = dMt, which means that one can interpret the regulatory
policies in terms of either capital or reserve requirements.
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The bank is global systemically important: its closure would entail huge cost for the society.
Hence, the regulator adopts a special resolution procedure: every time that the bank’s
capital falls below a certain threshold c ≥ 0, the shareholders are expropriated, the bank is
restructured and privatized by the regulator again. The restructuring threshold c is chosen
by the regulator so as to maximize social welfare at date 0. Define τ := inf{t ≥ 0|Ct = c}.
The bank maximizes the expected present value of future payments to the incumbent
shareholders until the first restructuring time τ , net of claim of the new (outside) investors
on future cash flows by choosing the bank’s payout (L) and financing (f) policies:
Vs(c) = max
(L,f)
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dLt − (ft + 1{ft>0}F )dNt)|C0 = c
]
, (2.3.3)
where Vs is the value function (market value of equity) of the bank. There is a trade-
off for the shareholders in the choice of the optimal dividend policy: When the bank
distributes higher amount of dividends, the shareholders wealth will be higher but the risk
of restructuring will increase. However, if the bank keeps a higher level of cash in the
bank, the shareholders will get few dividends and will be subject to the cost of holding
cash. Therefore, as shown in the extant literature for firms, there exists a target m∗ at
which the marginal cost and benefit of holding cash are equalized, and it becomes optimal
for the shareholders to start paying dividends. This target cash level corresponds to a
capital threshold c∗ = m∗ +A−D.
In addition, at any time t such that Ct < c
∗ and the outside investors arrive, the bank
raises outside funds to bring the capital to c∗ if it is profitable to do so. Considering the
fixed cost (F ), the net gain for the bank from raising outside equity is
(Vs(c
∗)− Vs(c))− (c∗ − c)− F.
Assuming concavity of the value function, V ′s (c∗) = 1 and V ′s (c) ≥ 1, ∀c ≤ c∗ ⇔ Vs(c)− c
is increasing in c.18 Then, taking into account the fixed cost of issuance (F ), the bank
raises outside funds only if the net gain is positive: Vs(c
∗)− c∗ − F > Vs(c)− c.
The left hand side of the above inequality is constant, whereas the right hand side is
18Concavity is proved in Appendix 2.A by adapting the methodology presented in Hugonnier et al. [12]
to our setup.
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increasing in c. Therefore, ∃ c1 < c∗ at which
Vs(c
∗)− c∗ − F = Vs(c1)− c1,
i.e., marginal cost and benefit of raising outside equity are equal. Therefore, the bank
raises outside equity only if c ≤ c1.
On the other hand, the interests of the regulator and shareholders conflict in our framework
since the shareholders maximize the market value of equity (Vs) instead of social welfare
as the regulator does. Hence, we allow the regulator to prohibit dividends until the bank’s
capital reaches another threshold c ≥ c∗. This threshold is chosen by the regulator via
social welfare maximization:
W = max
c0,c,c
E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dLt − (ft + 1{ft>0}F )dNt) + e−rτ [−ξ + c+W ]
]
− c0. (2.3.4)
The interpretation of the above maximization problem is as follows: The regulator initially
gives a licence to the bank to operate. However, shareholders should invest c0 to get this
licence and initialize the bank, which gives them a certain value. The last term in the
expectation represents the expected discounted welfare gain from the next restructuring.
In particular, when the bank’s capital drops to c at time τ , the regulator expropriates
shareholders and restructures the bank by paying the fixed cost (ξ). Moreover, it takes
the bank’s capital (c) at that moment and the continuation welfare of the bank (W )
since the bank is restarted. The below figure summarizes the new issuance policies of the
shareholders and the regulatory policies in different regions:
Figure 2.1: Policies in Different Regions.
In region I, the bank is restructured and privatized by the regulator. Region II is the
financial distress region, in which the bank raises new equity as soon as the new investors
arrive but it is not allowed to distribute dividends. In region III, raising new equity is not
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profitable for the bank anymore and the dividend payout is still forbidden by the regulator.
Finally, the bank distributes excess cash as dividend to the shareholders in region IV.
2.4 Characterization of the Solution
In this section, we characterize the solution of the model. We start with the particular
case, F = ∞, i.e., the option to raise outside equity is never exercised. Then, we’ll move
to the general case with an outside financing option and investigate the optimal dividend,
equity issuance and restructuring policies for a global systemically important bank.
2.4.1 Particular Case: F =∞
We start with a case where the voluntary recapitalization by shareholders is infinitely
costly. Under this circumstance, restructuring and dividend thresholds (c, c) are policy
variables chosen by the regulator. To better evaluate the effects of regulatory policies,
we first investigate the optimal dividend threshold for the shareholders in the case where
regulators do not restrict dividends. In this case, the manager decides on the optimal
dividend policy by maximizing the expected present value of all dividend payouts until
restructuring and the value function of the shareholders, Vs(c | c) := Vs(c) satisfies the
following ordinary differential equation (ODE):
rVs(c) = µV
′
s (c) +
σ2
2
V ′′s (c) (2.4.1)
s.t. Vs(c) = 0, (2.4.2)
V ′s (c
∗) = 1, (2.4.3)
V ′′s (c
∗) = 0. (2.4.4)
The left hand side of 2.4.1 represents the expected return demanded by shareholders. The
first and second terms on the right hand side represent the change in the bank’s value via
expected cash flows and the cash flow volatility, respectively. Condition 2.4.2 says that the
bank’s value is zero at the time of restructuring. Condition 2.4.3 is the smooth-pasting
condition which implies that the marginal value of one dollar inside or outside the bank
are equal at the optimal dividend threshold. Condition 2.4.4 is the super contact condition
proved by Dumas [8] to be necessary and sufficient for optimality. Boundary conditions
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imply that the value of the bank at the optimal dividend threshold equals the first best
value, i.e., Vs(c
∗) = µr . Given c, one can solve the above second order homogenous ODE
explicitly and the proposition 2.4.1 summarizes the results.
Proposition 2.4.1. The value of the bank and the optimal dividend threshold for the
shareholders are given by
Vs(c) =

−η22eη1(c−c
∗)+η21e
η2(c−c∗)
η1η2(η1−η2) , c ≤ c ≤ c∗
Vs(c
∗) + c− c∗, c ≥ c∗
(2.4.5)
c∗ = c+
ln(
η22
η21
)
η1 − η2 , (2.4.6)
where η1,2 =
−µ±
√
µ2+2σ2r
σ2
and Vs(c
∗) = µ/r. 19
Proposition 2.4.1 shows that the optimal dividend threshold c∗ is equal to the restructur-
ing threshold chosen by the regulator plus a constant term that depends on the average
profitability (µ), cash flow volatility (σ), and the discount rate (r).
We now proceed to the regulator’s problem. The restructuring and dividend thresholds of
the bank (c, c) and the initial capital (c0) are assumed to be policy variables chosen by the
regulator so as to maximize social welfare (W ). W is itself the solution of the following
equation
W = max
c0,c,c
V (c0; c, c)− c0 +G(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+W ]. (2.4.7)
As mentioned above, shareholders invest c0 to get the license of the bank, which gives them
a value V (c0; c, c). Hence, V (c0; c, c) − c0 is the revenue raised by the public authorities
when granting the license to shareholders. The last term represents the expected dis-
counted welfare gain from the next restructuring where the function G(c0; c, c) := E[e−rτ ]
is the stochastic discount factor.20 This procedure is repeated to guarantee that the global
systemically important bank operates forever.
19Note that η1 > 0 > η2 and |η1| < |η2|.
20When r varies, this stochastic discount factor corresponds to the Laplace transform of the stopping
time.
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We start by solving V (c0; c, c) := V (c0) and G(c0; c, c) := G(c0). In the region (c, c),
functions V (c0) and G(c0) satisfy the following ODE’s:
rV (c0) = µV
′(c0) +
σ2
2
V ′′(c0)
s.t. V (c) = 0, (2.4.8)
V ′(c) = 1.
rG(c0) = µG
′(c0) +
σ2
2
G′′(c0)
s.t. G(c) = 1, (2.4.9)
G′(c) = 0.
With the same intuition as in the shareholders’ problem, the initial condition in 2.4.8 arises
from the fact that the regulator stops the bank when the capital drops to c. Moreover,
the marginal value of capital will be one for the regulator at the level c, which implies
the boundary condition. On the other hand, the initial condition in 2.4.9 is due to the
fact that the bank will be directly restructured if it starts with the lower threshold level.
In addition, when the bank’s capital is at the level c, small positive changes in the cash
reserves will be suddenly distributed as dividends, which returns the capital back to c.
Therefore, the regulator will be indifferent, which implies the boundary condition. The
closed form solutions of 2.4.8 and 2.4.9 are given in proposition 2.4.2.
Proposition 2.4.2. The closed form solutions for the functions V (c0; c, c) and G(c0; c, c)
are given by
V (c0; c, c) =
eη2(c0−c) − eη1(c0−c)
η2eη2(c−c) − η1eη1(c−c)
, (2.4.10)
G(c0; c, c) =
−η2eη1(c0−c) + η1eη2(c0−c)
η1e−η2(c−c) − η2e−η1(c−c)
(2.4.11)
where η1,2 =
−µ±
√
µ2+2σ2r
σ2
.
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In light of the proposition 2.4.2, we therefore seek the fixed point
WM = max
c0,c,c
H(c0, c, c,WM ), (2.4.12)
where
H(c0, c, c,WM ) ≡ e
η2(c0−c) − eη1(c0−c)
η2eη2(c−c) − η1eη1(c−c)
− c0
+
−η2eη1(c0−c) + η1eη2(c0−c)
η1e−η2(c−c) − η2e−η1(c−c)
[−ξ + c+WM ]. (2.4.13)
Proposition 2.4.3. Let T(W ) = maxc0,c,cH(c0, c, c,W ). Then, T is a contraction map-
ping and 2.4.12 has the unique fixed point WM .
Next, we solve the above fixed point problem iteratively and find the values for the initial
capital, the restructuring and dividend thresholds. The numerical calculations show that
when the voluntary recapitalization is impossible, optimal regulatory policies are:
1. The restructuring threshold is c = A−D.
2. The regulator chooses a (weakly) higher dividend threshold than the shareholders:
c ≥ c∗.
3. When the restructuring cost ξ is higher than a critical value ξ∗ this inequality is
strict.
Our first observation shows that the regulator always waits for the restructuring until the
bank’s capital falls below A-D or equivalently until the cash reserves of the bank drop to
zero. Possible explanations for this result are: First, the regulator continuously audits the
bank’s capital and the intervention of the regulator is immediate in our model. In addition,
bank’s assets and the capital are fully observable and we do not allow for negative jumps
in the cash flow process. Therefore, it may be reasonable for the regulator to wait until the
last point in time due to the possibility that the bank can recover itself from the financial
distress region. The second observation is that when the restructuring cost is lower than
a critical value ξ∗, the optimal dividend thresholds of the regulator and shareholders
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coincide. Hence, the regulator does not put any restriction on dividend payouts. However,
when the restructuring cost is high, i.e., ξ > ξ∗, the regulator prevents shareholders from
distributing dividends until c is reached. Figure 2.2 illustrates the optimal thresholds.
[Insert Figure 2.2 Here]
Figure 2.2 shows that the initial capital (c0) is positively related with the restructuring
cost. In particular, when the restructuring cost is high, the regulator starts the bank with
higher initial capital with an incentive to postpone the next costly restructuring event.
This incentive is not so strong for small restructuring cost levels, which implies lower c0
values. In addition, the regulator starts to install dividend payout restrictions to prevent
the bank from financial distress region and the costly restructuring for high restructuring
cost levels. Figure 2.3 presents the value function of the bank from the perspectives of the
shareholders and the regulator for high restructuring cost levels, i.e., ξ > ξ∗.
[Insert Figure 2.3 Here]
The regulator predicts a relatively lower market value for the bank and hence sets a
relatively higher dividend payout threshold.
2.4.2 General Solution
In the general case, shareholders have the option to raise outside equity when the outside
investors are present and when it is profitable to do so, i.e., c < c1.
21 The outside
financing threshold (c1) is optimally chosen by the shareholders via value maximization.
By contrast, restructuring and dividend thresholds of the bank (c, c) and the initial capital
(c0) are assumed to be policy variables chosen by the regulator. In line with the previous
case, we start by solving the shareholders’ problem in the absence of dividend payout
restrictions. For c ∈ (c, c∗), the shareholders’ value function Vs(c | c) := Vs(c) satisfies the
21Note that the outside investors appear with a Poisson arrival rate λ.
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following ODE:
rVs(c) = µV
′
s (c) +
σ2
2
V ′′s (c) + λmax [Vs(c
∗)− (c∗ − c)− F − Vs(c), 0]
s.t. (2.4.14)
Vs(c) = 0, (2.4.15)
V ′s (c
∗) = 1, (2.4.16)
V ′′s (c
∗) = 0, (2.4.17)
Vs(c1) = Vs(c
∗)− (c∗ − c1)− F, (2.4.18)
where the term in brackets on the right hand side of 2.4.14 represents the expected change
in the bank’s value obtained by raising new equity. In particular, the last term is the
product of the probability that the outside financiers arrive and the surplus from raising
capital to the target level. The last boundary condition is incorporated into the general
problem to reflect the fact that when the bank’s capital is at the level c1, the total surplus
from raising new equity is zero, thus the shareholders are indifferent between raising new
equity or not. Note that the upper bound for the fixed cost of issuance is F ∗ = Vs(c∗)−c∗.
If F > F ∗, it is never optimal to issue new equity for the bank. Therefore, we concentrate
in the following analysis on those cases where F < F ∗. Under the circumstances, the
above problem has different solutions in 3 regions. More specifically, when the bank is in
the financial distress region (i.e., c ∈ (c, c1)), the bank raises outside funds as soon as the
outside financiers appear. On the other hand, when the bank is in the safe region (i.e.,
c ∈ (c1, c∗)), the shareholders never exercise the issuance option even if the investors arrive
since the surplus from raising outside equity is negative. Therefore, the last term in 2.4.14
vanishes. Finally, when the firm has excess cash (i.e., c ∈ [c∗,∞)), the bank distributes
this amount as a dividend. Proposition 2.4.4 presents the closed form solutions for the
value function in different regions and the unique outside financing and dividend thresholds
chosen by the shareholders.
Proposition 2.4.4. The shareholders’ value function with an outside financing option is
a piecewise C2 function, which is given by
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Vs(c) =

µλ
(r+λ)2
+ λ
r+λ
[
µ
r
+ c− c∗ − F ]+ z1eθ1(c−c1) + z2eθ2(c−c1), c < c ≤ c1
−η22eη1(c−c
∗)+η21e
η2(c−c∗)
η1η2(η1−η2) , c1 ≤ c < c∗
Vs(c
∗) + c− c∗, c ≥ c∗
(2.4.19)
where η1, η2 are defined as above, z1, z2 are constants
22, Vs(c
∗) = µ/r, and
θ1,2 =
−µ±√µ2 + 2σ2(r + λ)
σ2
.
In addition, there exist unique constants y∗1 and y∗2 such that the dividend and outside
financing thresholds of the shareholders are given by
c1 = c+ y
∗
2,
c∗ = c+ y∗1 + y
∗
2.
Proposition 2.4.4 shows that the solution of the shareholders’ problem depends only on
the restructuring threshold. In addition, optimal thresholds for raising outside equity and
dividend payouts are linear functions of this threshold.
As a next step, we deal with the regulator’s welfare maximization problem to find the
optimal thresholds. As in the particular case, we assume that the restructuring and
dividend thresholds of the bank (c, c) and the initial capital (c0) are policy variables
chosen by the regulator so as to maximize welfare at each restructuring date:
W = max
c0,c,c
V (c0; c, c)− c0 +G(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+W ].
However, the outside financing threshold (c1) is chosen by shareholders optimally and
incorporated into welfare maximization. We start by solving G(c0; c, c) := G(c0)
23 which
22These coefficients are found uniquely by using the boundary conditions and derived in Appendix 2.A.
23For notational simplicity, we supress (c, c) when we refer to the function G.
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satisfies in the region (c, c) the following ODE:
rG(c0) = µG
′(c0) +
σ2
2
G′′(c0) + λ max [G(c)−G(c0), 0] (2.4.20)
s.t. G(c) = 1,
G′(c) = 0.
The last term in 2.4.20 reflects the impact of raising new equity on the stochastic discount
factor. We will also incorporate the continuity and smooth pasting properties of the
function G at c1 to obtain a closed-form solution. We solve the problem in two regions:
G(c0) =
 G1(c0), c ≤ c0 ≤ c1,G2(c0), c1 ≤ c0 ≤ c.
Proposition 2.4.5. The closed form formula for the function G(c0) is given as follows:
G(c0) =

λk
(r+λ)
+
(
k(q−θ2p)
θ1−θ2
)
e−θ1(c+y
∗
2−c0) +
(
k(q−θ1p)
θ2−θ1
)
e−θ2(c+y
∗
2−c0), c ≤ c0 ≤ c1
η2keη1(c0−c)−η1keη2(c0−c)
η2−η1 , c1 ≤ c0 ≤ c
where k =
1
λ
(r+λ)
+
(
q−θ2p
θ1−θ2
)
e−θ1y∗2 +
(
q−θ1p
θ2−θ1
)
e−θ2y∗2
,
p =
η2e
η1(c−c+y∗2) − η1eη2(c−c+y∗2)
η2 − η1 −
λ
(r + λ)
,
q =
η2η1e
η1(c−c+y∗2) − η1η2eη2(c−c+y∗2)
η2 − η1 .
Secondly, we solve for V (c0; c, c) := V (c0) which satisfies the following ODE in the region
(c, c):
rV (c) = µV ′(c) +
σ2
2
V ′′(c) + λmax[V (c)− (c− c)− F − V (c), 0]
s.t. V (c) = 0,
V ′(c) = 1.
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One should note that the super contact condition is not satisfied at c. This is because c
is chosen by the regulator, not by the shareholders. We solve the problem in two regions
as above:
V (c0) =
 V1(c0), c ≤ c0 ≤ c1,V2(c0), c1 ≤ c0 ≤ c.
Proposition 2.4.6. The closed form formula for the function V (c0) is given as follows:
V (c0) =

e1c0 + e2 + f1e
θ1c0 + f2e
θ2c0 , c ≤ c0 ≤ c1
(1−η2n)eη1(c0−c)−(1−η1n)eη2(c0−c)
(η1−η2) , c1 ≤ c0 ≤ c
where
n =
e−η2(c−c−y∗2) − e−η1(c−c−y∗2) + (η2 − η1)(c− c− y∗2 + F )
η1e−η2(c−c−y
∗
2) − η2e−η1(c−c−y∗2) + (η2 − η1)
,
e1 =
λ
r + λ
,
e2 =
µλ
(r + λ)2
+
λ
r + λ
(n− c− F ),
f1 =
(η1 − θ2)(1− η2n)eη1(c+y∗2−c) − (η2 − θ2)(1− η1n)eη2(c+y∗2−c)
(η1 − η2)(θ1 − θ2)eθ1(c+y∗2)
− [e1(1− θ2(c+ y
∗
2))− θ2e2]
(θ1 − θ2)eθ1(c+y∗2)
,
f2 =
(η1 − θ1)(1− η2n)eη1(c+y∗2−c) − (η2 − θ1)(1− η1n)eη2(c+y∗2−c)
(η1 − η2)(θ2 − θ1)eθ2(c+y∗2)
− [e1(1− θ1(c+ y
∗
2))− θ1e2]
(θ2 − θ1)eθ2(c+y∗2)
.
As a next step, we deal with the regulator’s welfare maximization problem to find the
optimal thresholds (c, c) and the initial capital (c0).
24 The problem is discussed in two
cases since the functions V and G are defined piecewise:
W =
 maxc,c,c0 V1(c0; c, c)− c0 +G1(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+W ], c ≤ c0 ≤ c1maxc,c,c0 V2(c0; c, c)− c0 +G2(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+W ], c1 ≤ c0 ≤ c
24The solution of the welfare maximization exists since the welfare function is continuous and bounded.
This is ensured by the properties of the functions V and G.
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Intuitively, it is not reasonable for the regulator to start the bank in the financial distress
region. Therefore, we are interested in the solution in region 2, i.e., c0 ∈ [c1, c∗]. The
welfare function in this region is denoted by W2. Hence, the regulator maximizes
W2 = max
c,c,c0
(1− η2n)eη1(c0−c) − (1− η1n)eη2(c0−c)
(η1 − η2) − c0
+
η2ke
η1(c0−c) − η1keη2(c0−c)
η2 − η1 [−ξ + c+W2],
s.t. c ≥ c0 > c ≥ 0.
We therefore investigate the fixed point problem:
W2M = max
c0,c,c
H(c0, c, c,W2M ), (2.4.21)
where
H(c0, c, c,W2M ) ≡ (1− η2n)e
η1(c0−c) − (1− η1n)eη2(c0−c)
(η1 − η2) − c0
+
η2ke
η1(c0−c) − η1keη2(c0−c)
η2 − η1 [−ξ + c+W2M ]. (2.4.22)
Proposition 2.4.7. Let T(W2) = maxc0,c,cH(c0, c, c,W2). Then, T is a contraction
mapping and 2.4.21 has the unique fixed point W2M .
As in the particular case, we solve the fixed point problem iteratively and find the numer-
ical solutions of the initial capital, the restructuring and dividend thresholds. When the
voluntary recapitalization is possible, the optimal regulatory policies are found as follows:
1. The restructuring threshold is c = A−D.
2. The regulator chooses a (weakly) higher dividend threshold than the shareholders:
c ≥ c∗.
3. When the restructuring cost ξ is higher than a critical value ξ∗∗ > ξ∗ this inequality
is strict.
Similar to the particular case, where raising outside equity is impossible, the regulator al-
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ways prefers to restructure the bank when the cash reserves fall below zero, or equivalently
when the bank’s capital drops to A-D. As the bank has a voluntary recapitalization option
upon the arrival of the outside investors, the bank may prevent itself from the financial
distress region by raising outside equity. This option and the complete transparency of the
bank’s capital might provide an incentive to the regulator to wait until the last moment.
The main difference from the particular case is that the critical restructuring cost level is
relatively higher in the general case. In particular, the regulator intervenes relatively later.
This result can be explained with the intuition that when the bank has the opportunity to
issue new equity, its ability to prevent itself from financial distress is relatively stronger.
Therefore, the intervention threshold of the regulator is relatively higher.
Figure 2.4 illustrates one example for the initial capital and the optimal dividend thresh-
olds.
[Insert Figure 2.4 Here]
Comparison of Figures 2.2 and 2.4 shows that the divergence of the shareholders’ and the
regulator’s dividend thresholds is relatively smaller when we introduce an outside financing
option. Hence, the regulations are less stringent in the general case due to the relatively
higher probability of the bank’s self-prevention from the costly restructuring by raising
new equity. Another observation is that the regulator starts the bank with relatively lower
initial capital in the general case, which also shows that the opportunity of raising new
equity relaxes the regulations.
Finally, Figure 2.5 presents the value function of the bank for the shareholders and the
regulator in an environment with a voluntary recapitalization option of the bank.
[Insert Figure 2.5 Here]
2.5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we investigate how the optimal thresholds change with respect to the
model parameters: expected profitability of the bank (µ), volatility of the cash flows (σ),
cost of holding cash (r), cost of raising outside equity (F ), and the arrival rate of the
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outside investors (λ). As Figures 2.2 and 2.4 illustrate, the regulator intervenes when the
restructuring cost is higher than a certain threshold. Therefore, we provide figures for
both low and high restructuring cost regimes. We also present comparative statics for the
critical restructuring cost for the regulator.
We start our analysis with the particular case where there is no outside financing option.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate the sensitivity of the optimal dividend thresholds and the
initial capital to the changes in the profitability of the bank, volatility of the cash flows,
and the cost of holding cash.
[Insert Figure 2.6 Here]
When the restructuring cost is low, the regulator does not put any restrictions on the
dividend payouts of the bank. Thus, the optimal dividend thresholds of the shareholders
and the regulator coincide as shown in Figure 2.6. The most salient observation is that the
optimal dividend thresholds have an inverse U-shaped, left-skewed relationship with the
profitability of the bank’s operations. Obviously, when the bank is highly profitable, early
dividend payments can be expected since the risk of financial distress is low. However,
when the bank is scarcely profitable, the surprising result of early dividend payments could
be explained with the intuition that the potential losses from the restructuring is low.25
In addition, the optimal dividend thresholds increase with the volatility of cash flows
since the probability of financial distress is high for banks with more volatile cash flows,
which provides incentives to these institutions to retain earnings and hold more capital
for precautionary reasons. Furthermore, the cost of holding cash is inversely related to
the optimal thresholds. Hence, when the internal cash holdings are very costly, the bank
distributes them as a dividend as soon as possible. The regulator starts the bank with an
initial capital that is closer but smaller than the optimal dividend threshold. Surprisingly,
the difference is small when the bank is more profitable and has less risky cash flows.26
Intuitively, the regulator starts the bank with higher capital when the cost of holding cash
is low.
25See Rochet and Villeneuve [23] for more details.
26Note that the critical restructuring cost changes with the parameter values as given in Figures 2.10 and
2.11. We always take the low restructuring cost as half the amount of the evaluated critical restructuring
cost. This counter-intuitive result may change with different specifications of the restructuring cost values.
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Figure 2.7 provides the comparative statics for the high restructuring cost regime.
[Insert Figure 2.7 Here]
The main observation is that the optimal dividend thresholds of the shareholders and
the regulator diverge. In this case, the regulator forces the bank to retain earnings until
the capital reaches a higher threshold, which aims at preventing the bank from financial
distress. The difference between optimal dividend thresholds is high when the bank is less
profitable or the cash flows of the bank are more risky. Hence, the bank is subject to more
stringent regulations in these cases. Finally, the comparison of Figures 2.6 and 2.7 shows
that the regulator starts the bank with relatively higher capital in the high restructuring
cost regime to prevent the bank from costly restructuring.
Secondly, we move to the general case with the bank’s voluntary recapitalization option
and investigate the comparative statics for the initial capital, optimal dividend and the
outside financing thresholds. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 illustrate the low and high restructuring
cost regimes, respectively.
[Insert Figure 2.8 Here]
[Insert Figure 2.9 Here]
In both regimes, the sensitivity of the optimal dividend thresholds with respect to the
profitability, cash flow volatility and the cost of holding cash parameters are quite similar to
the particular case. However, the optimal dividend thresholds are lower than the particular
case and the divergence of the shareholders’ and the regulator’s dividend thresholds is not
as big as in the particular case. These observations can be explained with the higher
ability of the bank to prevent itself from financial distress region due to the option to
raise outside equity. The novel implications arise with respect to the fixed cost of raising
outside equity and the arrival rate of the outside financiers, which reflect the level of credit
market frictions. The optimal level of capital is positively related with the fixed cost of
raising outside equity. Hence, when the outside financing is very costly, the bank retains
earnings and postpones dividend payouts to utilize the internal capital, which is relatively
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cheaper. The bank distributes dividends earlier when the outside investors appear more
frequently, which can be explained with an easy access to the external market. Results for
the outside financing threshold are threefold. First, when the bank is highly profitable, has
less volatile cash flows, or the cost of holding cash is higher, the manager defers raising new
equity since the risk of financial distress is low. Second, the outside financing threshold is
negatively related with the fixed cost of raising new equity. In particular, the bank prefers
to exercise the outside financing option rarely and lumpy when it is very costly. Third,
the bank waits longer before raising new equity when the outside investors appear more
frequently, i.e., the external capital supply is high, due to lower credit market frictions.
Finally, we consider how the restructuring decisions of the regulator change with respect to
the model parameters. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 illustrate the cases with or without voluntary
recapitalization option, respectively.
[Insert Figure 2.10 Here]
[Insert Figure 2.11 Here]
When there is no outside financing option, the critical restructuring cost for the regulator
increases with the profitability of the bank and decreases with the volatility of the cash
flows and the cost of holding cash. The intuition is that when the bank has higher and
less volatile cash flows, the regulator is relatively less likely to intervene since the risk
of financial distress is low. In addition, when the cost of holding cash is higher, the
intervention region of the regulator becomes larger. These results are still valid when we
introduce an outside financing option. However, the critical restructuring cost is relatively
higher when the bank has the option to raise new equity since the bank’s ability to recover
itself from financial distress is stronger with the outside financing opportunity. Finally,
when the cost of raising new equity is high or the outside investors appear rarely, the critical
restructuring cost is relatively lower since the capital supply frictions have a negative
impact on the bank’s situation, which forces the regulator to intervene earlier.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates optimal resolution procedures and dividend policy for global sys-
temically important banks. For this purpose, we build a dynamic model that considers
the trade-off for regulators when to optimally step-in and restructure a bank and how to
optimally restrict the dividend payout policies of G-SIBs. Moreover, the model incorpo-
rates the interaction of regulatory intervention policies with the equity issuance decisions
of a bank. Importantly, the model features also supply side credit market frictions. This
allows us to analyze capital supply effects on the optimal dividend, equity issuance, and
restructuring policies of G-SIBs. The core financial friction in our model is that the bank
has to search for outside investors in order to raise new equity and the outside investors
only arrive at an uncertain (i.e., a stochastic) rate.
Given this modeling framework, the main suggestions that we derive for an optimal reg-
ulatory policy are twofold. First, the regulator intervenes by setting a capital threshold
under which the bank is restructured. In particular, every time the bank’s capital drops
to a certain nonnegative threshold, the shareholders are expropriated and the regulator
restructures the bank with the aim of a subsequent re-privatization. Second, the regula-
tor imposes dividend payout restrictions to G-SIBs, hinging on restructuring costs. Our
analysis shows that the regulator always restructures the bank when the cash reserves fall
below zero. In addition, when the restructuring costs are high, the regulator prohibits
dividend payouts to prevent a situation of, from a social welfare point of view, costly re-
structuring. Another crucial result is that the bank postpones new equity issuance when
the cost of raising equity is high or when the capital supply is plentiful. Finally, when the
bank is relatively constrained with regard to external capital supply, the regulator inter-
venes earlier, imposes relatively higher dividend thresholds to the bank, and initializes the
bank with higher capital.
Our simple stylized model is a first step to solve the implementation problem of the
regulators of the resolution procedures and to examine their potential adverse effects on
shareholders’ behavior. Further extensions of our model with regard to other regulatory
tools such as contingent capital contracts or the introduction of moral hazard problem are
interesting avenues for future research.
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Appendix 2.A
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Let A be the set of dividend strategies such that Ec
[∫ τ
0 e
−rtdLt
]
< ∞ for all c ≥ c
where τ is the first time that the bank’s capital falls to c and Ec[.] denotes an expectation
conditional on the initial capital C0 = c.
The first step of the proof is to define the dynamic programming equation (DPE) for the
shareholders’ problem, which is given by using standard stochastic optimal control results
(see Fleming and Soner [10] for detail) as
min{rVs(c)− µV ′s (c)−
σ2
2
V ′′s (c), V
′
s (c)− 1} = 0 ∀c > c, (2.6.1)
where Vs(c) = 0.
The second step is to construct a solution (Vˆs) to the system (2.4.1 - 2.4.4), which solves the
dynamic programming equation given by 2.6.1. Since we have a second order homogenous
ordinary differential equation (ODE), we conjecture the following solution form for c ∈
(c, c∗):
Vˆs(c) = α1e
η1c + α2e
η2c,
where αi, i = 1, 2 are constants and η1,2 =
−µ±
√
µ2+2σ2r
σ2
are the roots of the characteristic
equation
σ2
2
η2 + µη − r = 0.
Then, by using boundary conditions 2.4.3 and 2.4.4, we have
α1η1e
η1c∗ + α2η2e
η2c∗ = 1,
α1η
2
1e
η1c∗ + α2η
2
2e
η2c∗ = 0.
38
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Solving the above equations yields
α1 =
−η2
η1(η1 − η2)e
−η1c∗ ,
α2 =
η1
η2(η1 − η2)e
−η2c∗ .
Finally, plugging α1 and α2 into the initial condition 2.4.2 provides the free boundary as
c∗ = c+
ln(
η22
η21
)
η1 − η2 .
Moreover, we conjecture that the function satisfies Vˆs(c) = Vˆs(c
∗) + c − c∗, for c ≥ c∗.
Now, we have to show that the constructed solution solves the DPE, i.e.,
1. Vˆ ′s (c) ≥ 1, ∀c ∈ (c, c∗) and
2. rVˆs(c)− µVˆ ′s (c)− σ
2
2 Vˆ
′′
s (c) ≥ 0, ∀c ≥ c∗.
One can easily see that the conjectured function Vˆs(c) is increasing (since Vˆ
′
s (c) ≥ 0) and
concave (since Vˆ ′′s (c) ≤ 0) in the region (c, c∗) with Vˆ ′s (c∗) = 1. Therefore, Vˆ ′s (c) ≥ 1,
∀c ∈ (c, c∗]. Now, we verify the second condition: ∀c ≥ c∗,
rVˆs(c)− µVˆ ′s (c)−
σ2
2
Vˆ ′′s (c) = r[Vˆs(c
∗) + c− c∗]− µ = r(c− c∗) ≥ 0
since Vˆs(c
∗) = µ/r. Finally, we present the verification step.
Verification Theorem.
Let Vˆs be the constructed function and Vs be the value function. Then,
Vˆs(c) = Vs(c) = Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rtdL∗t
]
,
where
L∗t = sup
{0≤s≤t}
{(c+ µs+ σBs − c∗)+}.
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Proof.
(⇒:) Let L ∈ A be any admissible dividend strategy. Then, by Ito’s formula
d
[
e−rtVˆs(Ct)
]
= e−rt
[
−rVˆs(Ct) + µVˆ ′s (Ct) +
σ2
2
Vˆ ′′s (Ct)
]
dt
+e−rtVˆ ′s (Ct)σdBt − e−rtVˆ ′s (Ct)dLt.
Integrating both sides from 0 to T ∧ τ yields
e−r(T∧τ)Vˆs(CT∧τ ) = Vˆs(c) +
∫ T∧τ
0
e−rt
[
−rVˆs(Ct) + µVˆ ′s (Ct) +
σ2
2
Vˆ ′′s (Ct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
]
dt
≤ 0
+
∫ T∧τ
0
e−rtVˆ ′s (Ct)σdBt︸ ︷︷ ︸−
∫ T∧τ
0
e−rtVˆ ′s (Ct)dLt︸ ︷︷ ︸, (∗)
martingale ≥ 0
where the second term is non-positive and the last term is non-negative due to the DPE.
Then, taking the expectation of both sides and plugging 1 instead of Vˆ ′s into the last term
provide the following inequality:
Vˆs(c) ≥ Ec
[
e−r(T∧τ)Vˆs(CT∧τ )
]
+ Ec
[∫ T∧τ
0
e−rtdLt
]
.
Finally, letting T ↑ ∞ and using Fatou’s lemma we obtain
Vˆs(c) ≥ Ec
[
e−rτ Vˆs(Cτ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
]
+ lim
T→∞
Ec
[∫ T∧τ
0
e−rtdLt
]
= 0
≥ Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rtdLt
]
= Vs(c)
(⇐:) In the second part of the proof we will show that all above inequalities turn into
equalities when we use L∗. More specifically, the second term in (*) vanishes for the divi-
dend strategy L∗, which keeps the bank’s capital in the region (c, c∗] where the expression
in brackets is zero due to the DPE. In addition, L∗ is only activated when Ct = c∗, so
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Vˆ ′s (Ct) = 1 for L∗. Then, we end up with
Vˆs(c) = Ec
[
e−r(T∧τ)Vˆs(C∗T∧τ )
]
+ Ec
[∫ T∧τ
0
e−rtdL∗t
]
.
When T →∞,
lim
T→∞
Ec
[
e−r(T∧τ)Vˆs(C∗T∧τ )
]
= Ec
[
e−r(τ)Vˆs(c)
]
= 0.
Finally, since the function Lt is positive, non-decreasing and bounded from below, letting
T →∞ and using the dominated convergence theorem provide
Vˆs(c) = lim
T→∞
Ec
[∫ T∧τ
0
e−rtdL∗t
]
= Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rtdL∗t
]
= Vs(c).

Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
We start with the function V (c0), which satisfies a second order homogenous ODE having
following solution form:
V (c0) = δ1e
η1c0 + δ2e
η2c0 ,
where η1,2 are defined as above. Then, by using initial and boundary conditions in 2.4.8
we have
δ1 =
e(η2−η1)c
η1eη1c+(η2−η1)c − η2eη2c
,
δ2 =
1
η2eη2c − η1eη1c+(η2−η1)c
.
Plugging δi, i = 1, 2, into the conjectured solution form provides
V (c0) =
e(η2−η1)c+η1c0 − eη2c0
η1eη1c+(η2−η1)c − η2eη2c
=
eη2(c0−c) − eη1(c0−c)
η2eη2(c−c) − η1eη1(c−c)
,
where the last equality holds by multiplying and dividing the right hand side of the previous
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equality by e−η2c.
Secondly, the function G(c0) has the same solution form:
G(c0) = ς1e
η1c0 + ς2e
η2c0 .
Similarly, using the initial and boundary conditions in 2.4.9 yields
ς1 =
η1e
−η1c
η1e(η2−η1)c − η2e(η2−η1)c
,
ς2 =
−η2e(η2−η1)c−η1c
η1e(η2−η1)c − η2e(η2−η1)c
.
Hence, the function G(.) becomes
G(c0) =
−η2e(η2−η1)c+η1(c0−c) − η1eη2c0−η1c
η1e(η2−η1)c − η2e(η2−η1)c
=
−η2eη1(c0−c) + η1eη2(c0−c)
η1e−η2(c−c) − η2e−η1(c−c)
,
where the last equality is satisfied by multiplying and dividing the right hand side of the
previous equality by eη2c−η1c. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3
Consider the complete metric space (R, d) where
d(W1,W2) = |W1 −W2|, ∀W1,W2 ∈ R.
We will show that the real valued function
T(W ) = max
c0,c,c
H(c0, c, c,W ) = max
c0,c,c
V (c0; c, c)− c0 +G(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+W ]
is a contraction mapping in (R, d), i.e. ∃k < 1 such that for all W1,W2 ∈ R we have
|T(W2)− T(W1)| ≤ k|W2 −W1|.
We start by noting that the function G(c0; c, c) = E[e−rτ ] is the stochastic discount factor
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with a range [0, 1]. Let W1 < W2. The function T(W ) is increasing in W since
∂T(W )
∂W
= max
c0,c,c
G(c0; c, c) ≥ 0.
Then, we have T(W1) ≤ T(W2). In addition,
T(W2) = max
c0,c,c
H(c0, c, c,W2)
= max
c0,c,c
V (c0; c, c)− c0 +G(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+W2]
= max
c0,c,c
V (c0; c, c)− c0 +G(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+ (W2 −W1) +W1]
≤ max
c0,c,c
V (c0; c, c)− c0 +G(c0; c, c)[−ξ + c+W1]
+ max
c0,c,c
(W2 −W1)G(c0; c, c)
= T(W1) + (W2 −W1) max
c0,c,c
G(c0; c, c),
where the inequality follows from a basic math inequality:
max
c0,c,c
{f1(c0, c, c) + f2(c0, c, c)} ≤ max
c0,c,c
{f1(c0, c, c)}+ max
c0,c,c
{f2(c0, c, c)},
for all real valued functions f and g. Then, using the increasing property of T(W ) yields
0 ≤ T(W2)− T(W1) ≤ (W2 −W1) max
c0,c,c
G(c0; c, c).
Intuitively, the regulator never starts the bank at zero cash level. Therefore, G(c0; c, c) < 1
for all c0, c, c. Hence, defining k := maxc0,c,cG(c0; c, c) < 1 yields
T(W2)− T(W1) ≤ k(W2 −W1),
or equivalently,
|T(W2)− T(W1)| ≤ k|W2 −W1|,
since the both sides of the previous inequality are positive. One can easily show the above
inequality for W2 < W1 by using exactly the same steps. Therefore, T is a contraction
mapping and has a unique fixed point in R by the Banach Fixed Point Theorem. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.4.4
In this proof, we adapt the methodology given in Hugonnier et al. [12] to our setup. Let
A be the set of dividend and financing strategies such that
Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dLt + ftdNt)
]
<∞, ∀c ≥ c
where τ is the first time that the bank’s capital falls to c and Ec[.] denotes an expectation
conditional on the initial capital C0− = c. We define the following operators:
Lϕ(c) := rϕ(c)− µϕ′(c)− σ
2
2
ϕ′′(c),
Fϕ(c) := max
f≥0
λ{ϕ(c+ f)− ϕ(c)− f − 1{f≥0}F}.
which will be used throughout the proof.
STEP 1
First, we define the dynamic programming equation (DPE) in the general case with outside
financing option by using the singular stochastic control theory (see Fleming and Soner
[10] for detail):
min{LVs(c)−FVs(c), V ′s (c)− 1} = 0, ∀c > c (2.6.2)
with Vs(c) = 0.
STEP 2
Second, we construct a solution (Vˆs) to the system (2.4.14 - 2.4.18). Our conjecture is
that the optimal dividend and financing policies are of threshold forms. Let d ≥ c be a
fixed target capital level for the bank and Vˆs(c) := Vˆs(c; d) denote the value of a bank that
follows the barrier strategy d. We will construct the solution for any target level d, then
we will show that there exists a unique target capital c∗ satisfying Vˆs(c; c∗) = 0. For the
notational simplicity, we supress d when we refer to the conjectured function Vˆs.
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Vˆs(c) is a piecewise-defined function as follows:
Vˆs(c) =

Vˆs1(c), c ≤ c ≤ c1
Vˆs2(c), c1 ≤ c ≤ d
Vˆs2(c) + c− d, c ≥ d
where the functions Vˆs1(c) and Vˆs2(c) represent the constructed solutions in the financial
distress region and the safe region, respectively. In the second region, Vˆs2(c) solves
rVˆs2(c) = µVˆ
′
s2(c) +
σ2
2
Vˆ ′′s2(c) (2.6.3)
s.t.
Vˆs2(c1) = Vˆs2(d)− (d− c1)− F,
Vˆ ′s2(d) = 1,
Vˆ ′′s2(d) = 0.
The closed form solution for Vˆs2 is the same as the value function in the particular case:
Vˆs2(c) =
−η22eη1(c−d) + η21eη2(c−d)
η1η2(η1 − η2) .
On the other hand, Vˆs1(c) solves
(r + λ)Vˆs1(c) = µVˆ
′
s1(c) +
σ2
2
Vˆ ′′s1(c) + λ
(
Vˆs2(d)− (d− c)− F
)
(2.6.4)
s.t. Vˆs1(c) = 0,
Vˆs1(c1) = Vˆs2(c1) = Vˆs2(d)− (d− c1)− F,
Vˆ ′s1(c1) = Vˆ
′
s2(c1).
The general solution form for Vˆs1(c) is given as
Vˆs1(c) = αc+ β︸ ︷︷ ︸+ γ1eθ1c + γ2eθ2c︸ ︷︷ ︸,
Vˆs1p(c) Vˆs1h(c)
where Vˆs1p(c) is the particular solution of 2.6.4, Vˆs1h(c) is the solution of the homogenous
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part of it, and θ1,2 =
−µ±
√
µ2+2σ2(r+λ)
σ2
27 are the roots of the characteristic equation
σ2
2
θ2 + µθ − (r + λ) = 0.
Plugging Vˆs1p(c) into 2.6.4 and equating the constants and the coefficients of c provide
α =
λ
r + λ
,
β =
µλ
(r + λ)2
+
λ
r + λ
[µ
r
− d− F
]
.
We will use the initial and boundary conditions to find γ1, γ2, c1, d:
Vˆs1(c1) ≡ αc1 + β + γ1eθ1c1 + γ2eθ2c1 = µ
r
− d− F + c1
=
η21e
η2(c1−d) − η22eη1(c1−d)
η1η2(η1 − η2) ≡ V2(c1),
where the first and second equalities follow from the definition of c1 and the continuity of
Vˆs, respectively. Define y1 := d− c1 and
ψ(y1) :=
η21e
−η2y1 − η22e−η1y1
η1η2(η1 − η2) + y1 −
µ
r
+ F,
where ψ(0) = F > 0.28 Moreover,
ψ′(y1) =
η1η
2
2e
−η1y1 − η2η21e−η2y1
η1η2(η1 − η2) + 1 ⇒ ψ
′(0) = 0 and ψ′(y1) < 0, ∀y1 > 0.
ψ′′(y1) =
η1η2
η1 − η2 [e
−η2y1 − e−η1y1 ]
⇒ ψ′′(0) = 0, ψ′′(y1) < 0, ∀y1 and lim
y1→∞
ψ(y1) = −∞.
Thus,
∃! y∗1 > 0 s.t. ψ(y∗1) = 0.
Therefore, c1 is monotone increasing in d, i.e., d = c1 +y
∗
1. In addition, the smooth pasting
27θ1 > 0 > θ2 and |θ2| > |θ1|.
28We use η1η2 = − 2rσ2 and η1 + η2 = − 2µσ2 .
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condition at c1 provides
Vˆ ′s1(c1) = α+ θ1γ1e
θ1c1 + θ2γ2e
θ2c1
=
η1e
η2(c1−d) − η2eη1(c1−d)
η1 − η2 = Vˆ
′
s2(c1).
Define z1 := γ1e
θ1c1 and z2 := γ2e
θ2c1 . Then, with the help of boundary conditions, we
obtain a system of linear equations of (z1, z2) as follows:
29
z1 + z2 +
µλ
(r + λ)2
− r
r + λ
(µ
r
− F − y∗1
)
= 0,
θ1z1 + θ2z2 − η1e
−η2y∗1 − η2e−η1y∗1
η1 − η2 +
λ
r + λ
= 0,
where z1 and z2 can be solved uniquely from the above equations as
z1 =
b− θ2a
θ1 − θ2 ,
z2 =
b− θ1a
θ2 − θ1 ,
where
a =
r
r + λ
[
µ
r
− F − y∗1]−
µλ
(r + λ)2
,
b =
η1e
−η2y∗1 − η2e−η1y∗1
η1 − η2 −
λ
r + λ
.
Finally, by using the initial condition we have
z1e
θ1(c−c1) + z2eθ2(c−c1) +
µλ
(r + λ)2
+
λ
r + λ
(µ
r
− y∗1 − c1 + c− F
)
= 0.
Define y2 := c1 − c and
H(y2) := z1e
−θ1y2 + z2e−θ2y2 +
µλ
(r + λ)2
+
λ
r + λ
(µ
r
− y∗1 − y2 − F
)
.
Next, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of the root of H(y2). By the monotone
29Note that z1 and z2 are independent of d.
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increasing property of Vs1(c)
30 we have
V ′s1(c) = α+ γ1θ1e
θ1c + γ2θ2e
θ2c > 0, ∀ c ∈ [c, c1],
where α > 0, θ1 > 0 > θ2 and |θ1| < |θ2|. Using this property, ∀ y2 ≥ 0 we have
H ′(y2) : = −θ1z1e−θ1y2 − θ2z2e−θ2y2 − λ
r + λ
= −θ1γ1eθ1c − θ2γ2eθ2c − α = −V ′s1(c) < 0,
where limy2→∞H ′(y2) = −∞. Thus, H(y2) is monotone decreasing. Moreover, since
F < F ∗ = µr − d, we have
H(0) =
µ
r
− y∗1 − F = Vs1(c1) = Vs2(c1) > 0,
lim
y2→∞
H(y2) = −∞,
which guarantee that
∃! y∗2 s.t. H(y∗2) = 0.
Therefore, the target capital level (d) is uniquely defined as a function of the restructuring
threshold (c), i.e., d = c+ y∗1 + y∗2.
STEP 3
The next step is to show that the constructed solution (Vˆs) solves the DPE (2.6.2) i.e.,
1. Vˆ ′s (c) ≥ 1, ∀c ≥ c and
2. LVˆs(c)−F Vˆs(c) ≥ 0, ∀c ≥ c.
We will first show that the function Vˆs(c) is increasing and concave in the region [c, d],
which will be useful to prove the above two properties.
The function Vˆs2 is increasing and concave in the region [c1, d] since
30We’ll prove this property in the next step of the proof.
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Vˆ ′s2(c) =
η1e
η2(c−d) − η2e−η1(c−d)
η1 − η2 > 1, (= 1 when c = d)
Vˆ ′′s2(c) =
η1η2e
η2(c−d) − η1η2e−η1(c−d)
η1 − η2 < 0 (= 0 when c = d),
by using η1 > 0 > η2 and |η2| > |η1|.
We need to use the following lemmas to show that Vˆs1 is increasing and concave in the
region [c, c1].
Lemma 2.A.1. Consider a function S which is a solution to
−LS(c) + ϕ(c) = 0 (2.6.5)
for some ϕ. Then, S does not have negative local minima if ϕ(c) ≥ 0 and does not have
positive local maxima if ϕ(c) ≤ 0.
Proof. Let ϕ(c) ≥ 0. At the local minimum, S′(c) = 0 and S′′(c) ≥ 0. Then, it folllows
from 2.6.5 that the local minima are non-negative. Similarly, when ϕ(c) ≤ 0, S′(c) = 0 and
S′′(c) ≤ 0 at local maximum. Then, 2.6.5 implies that the local minima are non-positive.
Lemma 2.A.2. Consider a function S which is a solution to 2.6.5 for some ϕ(c) ≤ 0. In
addition, S′(c˜) ≤ 0, S(c˜) ≥ 0 and |S(c˜)| + |S′(c˜)| + |ϕ(c˜)| > 0 for c˜ > c. Then, S(c) > 0
and S′(c) < 0 for all c < c < c˜.
Proof. We first prove the decreasing property. Let S′(c) be not always negative for
c < c < c˜ and let y < c˜ be the largest value at which S′(c) changes sign. Then y is a
positive local maximum, which contradicts the fact that S does not have a positive local
maxima since ϕ(c) ≤ 0 as given in Lemma 2.A.1. Therefore, S is decreasing for c ∈ (c, c˜).
Secondly, since S(c˜) ≥ 0 and S is decreasing, S(c) > 0 for all c < c < c˜.
Lemma 2.A.3. Consider a function S which is a solution to 2.6.5 for some ϕ such that
ϕ′(c) ≤ 0. In addition, S′′(c˜) ≤ 0, S′(c˜) ≥ 0 and |S′(c˜)| + |S′′(c˜)| + |ϕ′(c˜)| > 0 for c˜ > c.
Then, S′(c) > 0 and S′′(c) < 0 for all c < c < c˜.
Proof. Differentiating 2.6.5 yields j = S′ satisfies −Lj(c) +ϕ′(c) = 0. Then, we complete
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the proof by using lemma 2.A.2.
Now, the first and second derivatives of the function Vˆs1 at c1 satisfy
Vˆ ′s1(c1) = Vˆ
′
s2(c1) > 1 (by smooth pasting at c1),
and
Vˆ ′′s1(c1) = θ
2
1z1 + θ
2
2z2
= θ21
(
b− θ2a
θ1 − θ2
)
+ θ22
(
b− θ1a
θ2 − θ1
)
= b(θ2 + θ1)− aθ1θ2
=
−2
σ2
[µb− a(r + λ)]
=
−2
σ2
µ
η1e−η2y∗1 − η2e−η1y∗1
η1 − η2︸ ︷︷ ︸−1
+ r(F + y∗1)

> 1
< 0.
Define
S(c) := Vˆs1(c)− λc
r + λ
− µλ
(r + λ)2
− λ
r + λ
[µ
r
− d− F
]
,
which solves −LS(c) + ϕ(c) = 0 where ϕ(c) := −λS(c). In addition, S′(c1) = Vˆ ′s1(c1) −
λ
r+λ > 0 and S
′′(c1) = Vˆ ′′s1(c1) < 0. Therefore, Lemma 2.A.3 yields
S′(c) > 0 and S′′(c) < 0 ∀c < c1,
which implies
Vˆ ′s1(c) = S
′(c) +
λ
r + λ
> 0 and Vˆ ′′s1(c) = S
′′(c) < 0, ∀c < c1.
Hence, Vˆs1 is increasing and concave in the region [c, c1].
Having proved that the function Vˆs is increasing and concave for c ∈ [c, d] and using the
smooth pasting condition at d provide Vˆ ′s (c) ≥ 1, ∀c ≥ c. Moreover, ∀c ≥ c
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LVˆs(c)−F Vˆs(c) = (LVˆs(c)−F Vˆs(c))1{c<c<d}︸ ︷︷ ︸+(LVˆs(c)−F Vˆs(c))1{c≥d}
= 0 (since Vˆs solves 2.4.14)
= (rVˆs(c)− µ)1{c≥d}
= (r[
µ
r
+ c− d]− µ)1{c≥d}
= r(c− d) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the constructed function Vˆs solves the dynamic programming equation.
STEP 4
Next, we will show that there exists a unique target level c∗ satisfying Vˆs(c; c∗) = 0. For
this purpose, we first need to prove that Vˆs(c; d) is strictly monotone decreasing with
respect to the target level d. Let d1 < d2 and n(c) := Vˆs(c; d1)− Vˆs(c; d2). Then, we have
−Ln(c)− λ(n(c) + d1 − d2) = 0,
and n′(d1) = 1− Vˆ ′s (d1; d2) < 0, n′′(d1) = −Vˆ ′′s (d1; d2) ≥ 0. Then, a direct modification of
Lemma A.2.3 provides that n is monotone decreasing for all c < d1. Finally,
n(d1) = Vˆs(d1; d1)− Vˆs(d1; d2)
= Vˆs(d1; d1)− Vˆs(d2; d2) +
∫ d2
d1
Vˆ ′s (c; d2)dc
≥ Vˆs(d1; d1)− Vˆs(d2; d2) + (d2 − d1)
= d2 − d1 > 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that Vˆ ′s (c; d2) > 1 for c ∈ [d1, d2]. Hence, Vˆs(c; d)
is monotone decreasing in d. Moreover, Vˆs(c; c) =
µ
r > 0 and Vˆs(c;∞) < 0 which imply
that Vˆs(c; c
∗) = 0 has a unique solution.
STEP 5
Finally, we proceed with the verification step.
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Verification Theorem.
Let Vˆs be the constructed function and Vs be the value function. Then,
Vˆs(c) = Vs(c) = Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dL∗t − (f∗t + 1{f∗t >0}F )dNt)
]
,
where L∗t = sup
{0≤s≤t}
{(hs − c∗)+},
f∗t = (c
∗ − Ct)+,
dCt = µdt+ σdBt − dL∗t + f∗t−dNt, C0− = c,
dht = µdt+ σdBt + (c
∗ − ht−)+dNt.
Proof.
(⇒:) Let (L, f) ∈ A be any admissible dividend and financing strategies. Define the
process
Xt = e
−rtVˆs(Ct) +
∫ t
0+
e−ru(dLu − (fu− + 1{fu−>0}F )dNu).
Applying Ito’s formula for semimartingales to Xt yields
31
dXt = e
−rt[−rVˆs(Ct−) + µVˆ ′s (Ct−) +
σ2
2
Vˆ ′′s (Ct−)]dt
+e−rtVˆ ′s (Ct−)σdBt − e−rtVˆ ′s (Ct−)[dLt − ft−dNt]
+e−rt∆Vˆs(Ct−)− e−rtVˆ ′s (Ct−)∆Ct− + e−rt(dLt − (ft− + 1{ft−>0}F )dNt),
where
∆Vˆs(Ct−) = [Vˆs(Ct− + ft−)− Vˆs(Ct−)]dNt + Vˆs(Ct−)− Vˆs(Ct− −∆Lt),
∆Ct− = ∆Lt + ft−dNt,
∆Lt = Lt − Lt−, (jump component of Lt)
Lct = Lt − Σs≤t∆Ls. (continuous part of Lt)
31Note that the function Vˆs(Ct) is C
2 everywhere but at c1. However, the Lebesque measure of t, for
which Ct = c1, is zero. Hence, the value of Vˆ
′′
s (c1) matters little in the follow-up whatever set to be.
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Then, plugging the above definitions into dXt and compensating the Poisson processes
result in
dXt = dQt − e−rtdPt,
where
dQt = e
−rtVˆ ′s (Ct−)σdBt + e
−rt[Vˆs(Ct− + ft−)− Vˆs(Ct−)− (ft− + 1{ft−>0}F )](dNt − λdt)
is a local martingale (since the first term is a Brownian motion and the second term is a
compensated Poisson process) and
dPt = [F Vˆs(Ct−)− λ(Vˆs(Ct− + ft−)− Vˆs(Ct−)− (ft− + 1{ft−>0}F ))]dt
+(Vˆ ′s (Ct−)− 1)dLct + [∆Lt + Vˆs(Ct−)− Vˆs(Ct− −∆Lt)]
is a non-decreasing process since the drift is positive from the definition of F and Vˆ ′s (Ct−) ≥
1, for all Ct ≥ c. Hence, X is a local supermartingale by the Doob-Meyer decomposition.
Moreover, the stopped sequence
Jt := Xt∧τ ≥ −
∫ τ
0+
e−rufu−dNu
is a supermartingale since the admissible dividend strategy ft is intregrable and constructs
a lower bound for Jt. Finally,
Vˆs(c) = Vˆs(C0−) = Vˆs(C0)−∆Vˆs(C0) = J0 −∆Vˆs(C0) ≥ Ec[Jτ ]−∆Vˆs(C0)
= Ec
[
e−rτ Vˆs(Cτ ) +
∫ τ
0+
e−rt(dLt − (ft− + 1{ft−>0}F )dNt)
]
−∆Vˆs(C0)
= Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dLt − (ft− + 1{ft−>0}F )dNt)
]
−∆Vˆs(C0)−∆L0
≥ Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dLt − (ft− + 1{ft−>0}F )dNt)
]
,
where the third equality is due to Vˆs(C0−) = X0 = X0∧τ = J0, the first inequality follows
from the optional sampling theorem for supermartingales, the fifth equality results from
Vˆs(Cτ ) = 0, and the second inequality comes from the fact that Vˆ
′
s (c) ≥ 1 for all c ≥ c.
Finally, taking the supremum of both sides over all admissible dividend and issuance
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strategies yields
Vˆs(c) ≥ sup
{L,f}∈A
Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dLt − (ft− + 1{ft−>0}F )dNt)
]
= Vs(c).
(⇐:) In the second part of the proof, we will show that all above inequalities turn to
equalities when we use (L∗, f∗). First, let’s prove the admissibility of conjectured policies:
Ec
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtf∗t dNt
]
≤ Ec
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtc∗dNt
]
=
λc∗
r
<∞,
where the inequality results from the definition of f∗ and the equality comes by using the
mean of the Poisson process (which is λ in our case). In addition, using the cash reserves
dynamics we obtain
Ec
[∫ T
0
e−rtdL∗t
]
= c+ Ec
[∫ T
0
e−rtµdt+
∫ T
0
e−rtf∗t−dNt
]
.
Then, letting T →∞, using the Fatou’s lemma and the upper bound for f∗t yield
lim
T→∞
Ec
[∫ T
0
e−rtdL∗t
]
≤ Ec
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtdL∗t
]
≤ c+ Ec
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtµdt+
∫ ∞
0
e−rtf∗t−dNt
]
≤ c+ 1
r
(µ+ λc∗),
which implies that (L∗, f∗) ∈ A. Now, consider the process
Xt = e
−r(t∧τ)Vˆs(Ct∧τ ) +
∫ t∧τ
0+
e−ru(dL∗u − (f∗u− + 1{f∗u−>0}F )dNu).
Then, if we apply Ito’s formula for semimartingales toXt with the optimal policies (L
∗, f∗),
the first term in the dynamics of dPt (defined in the first part of the proof) vanishes since
the optimal issuance policy maximizes F . The second and third terms also disappear since
the optimal dividend strategy L∗ is only activated when Ct = c∗, hence Vˆ ′s (Ct) = 1 for
L∗. Therefore, dXt = dQt is a local martingale. Furthermore, for any stopping time τ we
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have
|Xτ | < |Vˆs(c∗)|+
∫ ∞
0
e−rt(dL∗t + f
∗
t−dNt),
since Vˆs is increasing, the optimal policies are admissible and they keep the bank’s capital
in the region (c, c∗] for all t ≥ 0. Hence, Xt is uniformly integrable since it is bounded
from below and above. Finally,
Vˆs(c) = X0− = X0 −∆X0 = X0 + ∆L∗0 = Ec[Xτ ] + ∆L∗0
= Ec
[
e−rτ Vˆs(Cτ ) +
∫ τ
0+
e−rt(dL∗t − (f∗t− + 1{f∗t−>0}F )dNt)
]
+ ∆L∗0
= Ec
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dL∗t − (f∗t− + 1{f∗t−>0}F )dNt)
]
= Vs(c),
where the fourth and fifth equalities follow from the martingale property and the definition
of X, respectively. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4.5
We first solve for the function G2(c0) which satisfies the following ODE:
rG2(c0) = µG
′
2(c0) +
σ2
2
G′′2(c0)
s.t. G2(c1) = G1(c1),
G′2(c1) = G
′
1(c1),
G′2(c) = 0.
General solution form for the above ODE is
G2(c0) = a1e
η1c0 + a2e
η2c0 .
Define G2(c) := k. This definition and the last boundary condition are used to determine
a1 and a2 as follows:
G2(c) = k ⇒ a1eη1c + a2eη2c = k,
G′2(c) = 0 ⇒ a1η1eη1c + a2η2eη2c = 0.
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By solving the above equations, a1 and a2 are found as follows:
a1 =
η2k
η2 − η1 e
−η1c,
a2 =
−η1k
η2 − η1 e
−η2c.
Finally, G2(c) is given as
G2(c0) =
η2ke
η1(c0−c) − η1keη2(c0−c)
η2 − η1 ,
where k has to be determined. Secondly, we look at the solution of G1(c0), which satisfies
the following second order non-homogenous ODE:
(r + λ)G1(c) = µG
′
1(c) +
σ2
2
G′′1(c) + λG2(c)
s.t. G1(c) = 1,
G1(c1) = G2(c1),
G′1(c1) = G
′
2(c1),
which has the following solution form:
G1(c0) = d1c0 + d2︸ ︷︷ ︸+ b1eθ1c0 + b2eθ2c0︸ ︷︷ ︸,
G1p(c0) G1h(c0)
where G1p(c0) is the particular solution of the whole ODE and G1h(c0) is the solution of
the homogenous part with θ1,2 =
−µ±
√
µ2+2σ2(r+λ)
σ2
.32 Plugging G1p into the ODE and
setting the coefficients of c0 and the constants yield
d1 = 0,
d2 =
λk
r + λ
.
Now, we use the initial condition, the continuity and smooth pasting properties at c1 to
32θ1 > 0 > θ2 and |θ2| > |θ1|.
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find b1, b2, k:
b1e
θ1c + b2e
θ2c +
λk
r + λ
= 1,
b1e
θ1(c+y∗2) + b2e
θ2(c+y∗2) = kp,
b1θ1e
θ1(c+y∗2) + b2θ2e
θ2(c+y∗2) = kq,
where
p := η2e
η1(c−c+y∗2)−η1eη2(c−c+y
∗
2)
η2−η1 − λ(r+λ) and q :=
η2η1e
η1(c−c+y∗2)−η1η2eη2(c−c+y
∗
2)
η2−η1 .
Solving above system of equations yields the followings:
k =
1
λ
(r+λ) +
(
q−θ2p
θ1−θ2
)
e−θ1y∗2 +
(
q−θ1p
θ2−θ1
)
e−θ2y∗2
,
b1 =
(
k(q − θ2p)
θ1 − θ2
)
e−θ1(c+y
∗
2),
b2 =
(
k(q − θ1p)
θ2 − θ1
)
e−θ2(c+y
∗
2).

Proof of Proposition 2.4.6
We start by solving for the function V2(c0), which satisfies the following ODE:
rV2(c0) = µV
′
2(c0) +
σ2
2
V ′′2 (c0)
s.t. V2(c1) = V2(c)− (c− c1)− F,
V ′2(c) = 1.
The general solution form for the above ODE is
V2(c0) = ζ1e
η1c0 + ζ2e
η2c0 .
Define V2(c) := n. This definition and the last boundary condition are used to determine
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ζ1 and ζ2 as follows:
V2(c) = n ⇒ ζ1eη1c + ζ2eη2c = n,
V ′2(c) = 1 ⇒ ζ1η1eη1c + ζ2η2eη2c = 1.
By solving the above equations, ζ1 and ζ2 are obtained as follows:
ζ1 =
1− η2n
η1 − η2 e
−η1c,
ζ2 =
1− η1n
η2 − η1 e
−η2c.
Then, by plugging ζi, i = 1, 2, into the initial condition, n is found easily as given in the
proposition. Secondly, we consider the solution of V1(c0), which satisfies a second order
non-homogenous ODE having the following solution form:
V1(c0) = e1c0 + e2︸ ︷︷ ︸+ f1eθ1c0 + f2eθ2c0︸ ︷︷ ︸,
V1p(c0) V1h(c0)
where V1p(c0) is the particular solution of the whole ODE and V1h(c0) is the solution of
the homogenous part. Plugging V1p into the ODE and equalizing the coefficients of c0 and
the constants yield
e1 =
λ
r + λ
,
e2 =
µλ
(r + λ)2
+
λ
r + λ
(n− c− F ).
Remaining steps of the proof are exactly the same as we do above. In particular, we solve
for the initial condition, the continuity and smooth pasting equations at c1 and obtain
f1, f2, n as given in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4.7
The proof is straightforward by applying the same steps in the proof of proposition 2.4.3
since in the general case with outside financing option the function G(c0; c, c) is still defined
in the range [0, 1].
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Appendix 2.B
Figure 2.2: Optimal Thresholds without Voluntary Recapitalizations.
Figure 2.2 shows how the initial capital (c0) and the optimal dividend thresholds for
the shareholders (c∗) and the regulator (c) vary with the restructuring cost ξ. Baseline
parameters are µ = 0.1, σ = 0.1, and r = 6%.
Figure 2.3: Value Function of the Bank without Voluntary Recapitalizations.
Figure 2.3 shows the value function of the bank for the cases, in which the dividend thresh-
old is chosen by the shareholders (Vs(c)) or by the regulator (V (c)). Baseline parameters
are µ = 0.1, σ = 0.1, r = 6%, and ξ = 2 > ξ∗ = 1.31.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal Thresholds with Voluntary Recapitalizations.
Figure 2.4 shows how the initial capital (c0) and the optimal dividend thresholds for
the shareholders (c∗) and the regulator (c) vary with the restructuring cost ξ. Baseline
parameters are µ = 0.1, σ = 0.1, r = 6%, F = 0.025, and λ = 6.
Figure 2.5: Value Function of the Bank with Voluntary Recapitalizations.
Figure 2.5 shows the value functions of the bank for the cases in which the dividend thresh-
old is chosen by the shareholders (Vs(c)) or by the regulator (V (c)). Baseline parameters
are µ = 0.1, σ = 0.1, r = 6%, F = 0.025, λ = 6, and ξ = 2 > ξ∗∗ = 1.41.
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Figure 2.6: Optimal Thresholds without Voluntary Recapitalizations in the Low Restruc-
turing Cost Regime.
Figure 2.6 shows how the initial capital (c0) and the optimal dividend thresholds for the
shareholders (c∗) and the regulator (c) vary with the profitability of the bank (µ), volatility
of the cash flows (σ), and cost of holding cash (r) in the case, where raising outside equity
is infinitely costly and the restructuring cost is low (i.e. ξ < ξ∗).
Figure 2.7: Optimal Thresholds without Voluntary Recapitalizations in the High Restruc-
turing Cost Regime.
Figure 2.7 shows how the initial capital (c0) and the optimal dividend thresholds for the
shareholders (c∗) and the regulator (c) vary with the profitability of the bank (µ), volatility
of the cash flows (σ), and cost of holding cash (r) in the case, where raising outside equity
is infinitely costly and the restructuring cost is high (i.e. ξ > ξ∗).
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Figure 2.8: Optimal Thresholds with Voluntary Recapitalizations in the Low Restructur-
ing Cost Regime.
Figure 2.8 shows how the initial capital (c0), optimal equity issuance threshold (c1), and
optimal dividend thresholds for the shareholders (c∗) and the regulator (c) vary with the
profitability of the bank (µ), volatility of the cash flows (σ), cost of holding cash (r), cost
of raising outside equity (F ), and arrival rate of the outside investors (λ) in the case,
where the restructuring cost is low (i.e. ξ < ξ∗∗). In each plots, the restructuring cost is
always taken as half of the critical restructuring cost.
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Figure 2.9: Optimal Thresholds with Voluntary Recapitalizations in the High Restructur-
ing Cost Regime.
Figure 2.9 shows how the initial capital (c0), optimal equity issuance threshold (c1), and
optimal dividend thresholds for the shareholders (c∗) and the regulator (c) vary with the
profitability of the bank (µ), volatility of the cash flows (σ), cost of holding cash (r), cost
of raising outside equity (F ), and arrival rate of the outside investors (λ) in the case,
where the restructuring cost is high (i.e. ξ > ξ∗∗). In each plots, the restructuring cost is
always taken as two times of the critical restructuring cost.
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Figure 2.10: Critical Restructuring Cost without Voluntary Recapitalizations.
Figure 2.10 shows the sensitivity of the critical restructuring cost with respect to the
expected profitability of the bank (µ), volatility of the cash flows (σ), and cost of holding
cash (r) in the case without voluntary recapitalizations.
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Figure 2.11: Critical Restructuring Cost with Voluntary Recapitalizations.
Figure 2.11 shows the sensitivity of the critical restructuring cost with respect to the
expected profitability of the bank (µ), volatility of the cash flows (σ), cost of holding cash
(r), cost of raising outside equity (F ), and arrival rate of the outside investors (λ) in the
case with voluntary recapitalizations.
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Optimal Dividend Policy with Random Interest Rates
Erdinc¸ Akyıldırım, I˙. Ethem Gu¨ney, Jean-Charles Rochet,
and H. Mete Soner
This paper was accepted for publication in the Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol-
ume 51, March 2014, Pages 93-101, Copyright by Elsevier B.V.
3.1 Introduction
Since Jeanblanc-Picque´ & Shiryaev [8] and Radner & Shepp [10], a sizable literature has
investigated the optimal dividend policy problem for a company that is not allowed to
issue new securities or obtain a new loan from a bank. The default time is then defined
as the first time when the cash reserves of the company fall below zero. In that case, the
optimal dividend policy is simple and natural: distribute dividends whenever the level
of cash reserves exceeds a certain threshold that depends on the characteristics (drift,
volatility) of the cash flow process and the interest rate demanded by shareholders.
An interesting extension of this problem is to investigate how the optimal dividend policy is
modified when the profitability of the firm changes over time, due in particular to business
cycle fluctuations. As clearly shown by Gertler & Hubbard [5] and more recently by
Hackbart, Miao and Morellec [6], macroeconomic conditions have indeed a strong impact
on dividend policies through the changes in the profitability of individual firms that they
induce. For example, Cadenillas & Sotomayor [2] solve for the optimal dividend policy
67
Optimal Dividend Policy with Random Interest Rates
when the drift and the volatility of the cash flow process are governed by a Markov chain
representing macroeconomic fluctuations. Bolton, Chen & Wang [1] study more generally
the impact of changing macroeconomic conditions on both the financial and investment
policies of the firms. However, Gertler & Hubbard [5] also show that macroeconomic
conditions directly influence payments to shareholders, even independently of each firm’s
specific earnings performance. Two natural channels for this influence are the fluctuations
in interest rates demanded by investors, and the conditions of the credit market.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how these macroeconomic fluctuations influence
the dividend policies of firms, even in the absence of fluctuations in their earning processes.
In other words, we study the polar case to the one considered in the literature: the drift
and volatility of the cash flow process are constant, but the interest rate demanded by
investors follows a Markov chain. In a recent paper, Jiang and Pistorius [9] consider a
similar case where both the profitability of the firm and the discount factor follow a Markov
chain. Our paper differs in two respects from Jiang and Pistorius [9]. First we adopt direct
approach: we solve the couple of ODEs that characterize the solution by using standard
numerical techniques. By contrast, Jiang and Pistorius [9] characterize the solution as the
fixed point of a functional operator and find this solution by an iterative algorithm. The
second, and more important, difference between our paper and Jiang and Pistorius [9] is
that we allow the firm to issue new securities. This possibility is not only realistic, but
it also leads to two non-trivial consequences: the ranking of optimal dividend thresholds
across the two states is not always the same; issuance may be optimal even when cash
reserves are still positive. This shows that introducing possibilities of new issuances is not
just a trivial extension, but gives rise to new, economically relevant, results.
Section 3.2 presents the model and the mathematical characterization of the optimal div-
idend policy (Theorem 3.2.1). Section 3.3 establishes several important properties of the
value function. In subsection 3.3.1, we show that the value function remains concave in
the level of cash holdings, even when interest rates are stochastic (Theorem 3.3.3). The
concavity of the value function allows us to prove that it is a smooth solution of the cor-
responding dynamic programming equation (Proposition 3.3.4). In particular, it satisfies
the smooth fit condition which is crucial in the numerical resolution of these types of prob-
lems. These mathematical results are necessary to establish an important economic result
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in subsection 3.3.3: the firm will distribute dividends more often when interest rates are
high than when they are low (Proposition 3.3.5). This result comes from the fact that
the opportunity cost of cash reserves is higher when the interest rates demanded by in-
vestors are high. However, it does not fit well with the empirical evidence, given that
firms actually tend to distribute fewer dividends during recessions (when interest rates are
high) than during booms (when interest rates are low) even when the changes in firms’
individual profitability are corrected for (Gertler & Hubbard [5]). This suggests that other
macroeconomic factors, such as the size of frictions on financial markets, must play a role.
This is why section 3.4 introduces the possibility for the firm to make new equity issuances.
When the cost of these new issues (a proxy for the size of financial frictions) is substan-
tially higher during recessions than during booms, the ranking of dividend thresholds is
reversed, and firms now distribute more dividends during booms than during recessions.
We also provide numerical evidence for the above conclusions. In particular, in subsection
3.3.4, the sensitivity analysis with respect to mean and volatility of the cash flow rate and
jump rates between two different interest rate regimes are presented. The mathematical
results proved in Section 3.3 are also essential in constructing and verifying the numerical
algorithm. Section 3.4 gives several numerical illustrations of the case where new equity
issuance is possible.
3.2 Model and Characterization of the Solution
Uncertainty is described by (Ω,F,P), a filtered probability space satisfying the usual as-
sumptions1. Let Bt be a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion and {it}t≥0 be a
simple stationary Markov process taking values in {0, 1} with jump rates λ(0), λ(1) > 0.
The process {it}t≥0 is assumed to be independent from the Brownian motion. The state
i = 0 is the “good” economic state with a lower interest rate r` > 0 and i = 1 corresponds
to the “bad” state with interest rate rh > r` > 0. We also set λ` := λ(0) and λh := λ(1).
The cash holdings {Xt}t≥0 of the company follow a diffusion process. Positive dividend
payments of any size can be made at any time. However, the cash level is supposed to
remain nonnegative at all times. This constraint clearly places a restriction on the possible
1See [7] for details.
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dividend size. Mathematically,
dXt = µdt+ σdBt − dLt, (3.2.1)
where µ, σ > 0 are given constants and the cumulative dividend payments Lt is an adaptive,
nondecreasing, ca`dla`g process with L0− = 0. Given a dividend process L and an initial
condition x ∈ R, let Xx,L be the unique solution of (3.2.1), i.e.,
Xx,Lt = x+ µt+ σBt − Lt, t ≥ 0.
Let θ = θx,L be the first exit time of Xx,L from the positive real line. This variable θ
defines the time of bankruptcy. In what follows we will suppress the dependence on x, L
unless this dependence is important. We say that L is admissible at the initial level x, if
Xx,Lt ≥ 0, for all time t ∈ [0, θx,L] with probability one. We denote the set of all admissible
strategies by A(x). We note that the admissibility condition is relevant only at the exit
time. Indeed, we only require that the cash level process does not jump into negative real
line. In economic terms, this means that shareholders can never distribute themselves a
dividend that exceeds the cash holdings of the firm. Hence, Xx,Lθ = 0. Since the dividend
policy beyond the exit time is irrelevant, we simply set Lt = Lθ for all t ≥ θ. In particular,
Lθ − Lθ− = Xθ− .
The optimal dividend problem is to maximize
J(x, i, L) := E
[∫ θ
0
Λt dLt
∣∣∣ i0 = i,X0− = x] , Λt := exp(−∫ t
0
r(iu)du
)
.
The value function is then defined by
v(x, i) := sup
L∈A(x)
J(x, i, L), v`(x) := v(x, 0), vh(x) := v(x, 1). (3.2.2)
The case of a deterministic (and constant) interest rate (i.e., r` = rh) is exactly the
problem studied by Jeanblanc-Picque´ & Shiryaev [8] and Radner & Shepp [10]. For future
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reference, we record that the value function with constant interest rate r is given by
V (x, r) := sup
L∈A(x)
E
[∫ θ
0
e−rtdLt|X0− = x
]
. (3.2.3)
Then, it is clear that
0 ≤ V (x, rh) ≤ vh(x) ≤ v`(x) ≤ V (x, rl), ∀ x ∈ R+. (3.2.4)
3.2.1 Characterization of the Solution
Our main mathematical result is the following characterization of the value function. The
existence part of this theorem will be proved in several steps in the subsequent sections.
The uniqueness follows from the classical verification argument (see for instance [4]). This
characterization of the value function and the properties of the thresholds are essential in
our numerical experiments. Indeed, the numerical algorithm is based on these properties.
Moreover, the uniqueness ensures that the computed functions are in fact equal to the
value function.
Theorem 3.2.1. The value function v = (v(·, 0), v(·, 1)) = (v`, vh) is the unique concave
function satisfying the following conditions:
• v`, vh ∈ C2([0,∞) and vl(0) = vh(0) = 0;
• v′(x, i) ≥ 1 for all x;
• For every x > 0 and i ∈ {0, 1}, r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) ≥ 0, where
Lv(x, i) := µv′(x, i) + σ
2
2
v′′(x, i) + λ(i)[v(x, i+ 1)− v(x, i)]; (3.2.5)
with the convention that i+ 1 denotes the other state than i.
• There are two positive thresholds 0 < xh := x(1) and x` := x(0) <∞ such that
v′(x, i) = 1, for x ≥ x(i), and r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) = 0, for x ≤ x(i).
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The above characterization of the value function also provides the structure of the optimal
dividend policy. The optimal dividend policy is simple: only distribute dividends when
cash holdings exceed threshold x(i), which depends on the state i of the economy. This is
done exactly as in the deterministic interest rate case. Namely, if the initial cash holdings
x exceed x(i), then an initial dividend of x− x(i) is distributed. In later times, dividends
are paid only when the cash holdings reach x(i) again. When the state of the economy
changes from good to bad (equivalently when i jumps from zero to one), then cash holdings
may be larger than x(1) and a dividend payment of the difference is optimal. Then, one
proceeds as before.
The above theorem also proves that the value function is a classical solution of the dynamic
programming equation,
min
{
r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) , v′(x, i)− 1 } = 0, x > 0, i = 1, 2, (3.2.6)
together with boundary condition v(0, i) = 0.
3.2.2 Elementary Properties
In this subsection, we prove several simple properties.
Lemma 3.2.2. The value function v is Lipschitz continuous at the origin and
v(0, i) = 0, v(x+ y, i) ≥ v(x, i) + y, ∀ x, y ≥ 0, i = 0, 1.
Proof. Since σ is not null, the only admissible process at x = 0 is L = 0. This proves that
v(0, i) = 0. We also emphasize that at time zero, Ly has a jump of size at least y. Also,
for any given (x, y) and L ∈ A(x), we set Lyt := Lt + y for t ≥ 0 (with, as it is required
Ly
0− = 0).
Then, if one starts with cash holdings x+y at t = 0 and uses the dividend policy Ly, cash
holdings are characterized by {Xˆt}t≥0 defined by
Xˆt := X
x+y,Ly
t = x+ y + µt+ σWt − Lyt
= x+ µt+ σWt − Lt = Xx,Lt =: Xt,
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for all t ≥ 0. In particular, the exit time θˆ of Xˆ from (0,∞) is the same as that of X.
Hence,
v(x+ y, i) ≥ J(x+ y, i, Ly) = E
[∫ θ
0
ΛtdL
y
t
]
= y + E
[∫ θ
0
ΛtdLt
]
.
Since L ∈ A(x) is arbitrary,
v(x+ y, i) ≥ y + v(x, i), ∀ (x, y) ∈ R+, i = 0, 1.
Recall the deterministic value function defined in (3.2.3) and the inequality (3.2.4). Hence
for any x ≥ 0 and i,
V (0, r`) = v(0, i) = 0 ≤ v(x, i) ≤ V (x, r`).
The function V is known explicitly (see [8]) and it is Lipschitz continuous. Hence, v is
Lipschitz continuous at the origin, i.e., there is a constant K such that
0 = v(0, i) ≤ v(x, i) ≤ Kx
for all x ≥ 0.
In this context, the standard dynamic programming principle states that for any initial
point (x, i) and any stopping time τ ≤ θ,
v(x, i) = sup
L∈A(x)
E
[∫ τ
0
ΛtdLt + Λτ v
(
Xx,Lτ , iτ
)]
. (3.2.7)
Our next result, is a step towards proving the concavity of the value function. Indeed, the
concavity is equivalent to the condition (3.2.8) below with c0 = 0.
Lemma 3.2.3. There exists a constant c0 > 0 such that for all 0 ≤ x < y and i ∈ {0, 1},
v(x, i) + v(y, i)− 2v((x+ y)/2, i) ≤ c0. (3.2.8)
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Proof. Recall the value function defined in (3.2.3) and the inequality (3.2.4). Then,
v(x, i) + v(y, i)− 2v((x+ y)/2, i) ≤ V (y, r`) + V (x, r`)− 2V ((x+ y)/2, rh).
The function V is known explicitly and such that there exists a constant c(r) > 0 so that
x ≤ V (x, r) ≤ c(r) + x, ∀ x, r > 0.
We now combine the two inequalities to obtain,
v(x, i) + v(y, i)− 2v((x+ y)/2, i) ≤ [c(r`) + x] + [c(r`) + y]− 2((x+ y)/2) ≤ 2c(r`).
Indeed, the viscosity property is proved exactly as in Theorem 5.1, page 311 in [4]. More-
over, the uniqueness of this solution can be proved by the techniques developed in [4]. But
this result is not needed in this paper.
Lemma 3.2.4. The value function is a continuous viscosity solution of the dynamic pro-
gramming equation (3.2.6).
3.3 Value Function
In this section, we establish several important properties of the value function.
3.3.1 Concavity
In this section, we prove that the value function is concave. We start by showing this is
true in an interval near the origin.
Lemma 3.3.1. There exists x0 > 0 such that for both i = 0, 1,
−v′′(·, i) ≥ 0, on (0, x0),
in the viscosity sense.
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Proof. We first choose x0 > 0 so that
|r(i)v(x, i)− λ(i)[v(x, i+ 1)− v(x, i)]| ≤ µ, ∀ x ∈ [0, x0], i ∈ {0, 1}.
This is possible as v is continuous at the origin with value zero.
We need to show that for ϕ(., i) ∈ C2(R) for each i, which depends on the state of the
economy i, if
(v − ϕ)(x∗, i) = localmin(v − ϕ)(·, i)
at some x∗ ∈ (0, x0), then ϕ′′(x∗) ≤ 0.
Indeed, let ϕ be as above. Then, by the viscosity supersolution property of v we have
r(i)v(x∗, i)− µϕ′(x∗)− σ
2
2
ϕ′′(x∗)− λ(i)[v(x∗, i+ 1)− v(x∗, i)] ≥ 0,
and ϕ′(x∗) ≥ 1. Hence,
−ϕ′′(x∗) ≥ 1
σ2
(−r(i)v(x∗, i) + µ+ λ(i)[v(x∗, i+ 1)− v(x∗, i)]) .
By the choice of x0, the right hand side of the above inequality is non-negative. Therefore,
−ϕ′′ ≥ 0.
The following is an immediate corollary of the above Lemma.
Corollary 3.3.2. There exists x∗ > 0 such that v(·, i) is concave on [0, x∗] and
v′(x, i) ≥ v′(x∗, i) > 1, ∀ i ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ [0, x∗].
Proof: The concavity of v near the origin follows from the previous results and the theory
of viscosity solutions. Also
v(h, i) = v(h, i)− v(0, i) ≥ V (h, rh) > (1 + δ)h,
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for some δ > 0. Hence, v′(0, i) ≥ 1 + δ. Set
x∗ = sup{x : v(·, i) is concave on [0, x] and v′(x, i) ≥ 1 + δ/2}.
Then, it is clear that x∗ > 0.
The following theorem is proved in the Appendix 3.A.
Theorem 3.3.3. v(·, i) is concave for i ∈ {0, 1}.
3.3.2 Smooth Fit
In this section, we use the concavity of the value function to show that it is twice con-
tinuously differentiable. This statement is equivalent to the smooth fit property at the
thresholds. The smoothness of the value function immediately implies that it is a classical
solution of the dynamic programming equation (3.2.6).
Proposition 3.3.4 (Smooth Fit). The value function is twice continuously differentiable
in the x variable.
Proof. Set
x(i) = inf{x : 1 ∈ ∂v(x, i)}, i = 0, 1 (3.3.1)
where ∂v(x, i) denotes the subdifferential of v(·, i) at x (we refer reader to [11] for the
definition and the properties of subdifferentials of convex functions). By Lemma 3.2.2
x(i) > 0. Also, since v′ ≥ 1 in the viscosity sense, concavity of v implies,
v′(x, i) = 1, ∀ x ≥ x(i), and v′(x, i) > 1, ∀ x ∈ [0, x(i)).
Then, since v satisfies the dynamic programming equation (3.2.6),
r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) = 0 ∀x ∈ (0, x(i)),
the elliptic regularity implies that
v(·, i) ∈ C∞((0, x(i))).
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Step 1. First, we show that ∂v(x(i), i) = {1}.
Suppose to the contrary that
∂v(x(i), i) = [1, p]
for some p > 1. Then, for any ε > 0, it is straightforward to construct a smooth test
function ϕε so that
sup(v(·, i)− ϕε(·)) = v(x(i), i)− ϕε(x(i)) = 0,
ϕ′′ε(x(i)) = −1/ε and ϕ′ε(x(i)) ∈ (1, p). The viscosity property of v(·, i) implies that
r(i)v(x(i), i)− µϕ′ε(x(i))−
σ2
2
ϕ′′ε(x(i))− λ(i)[v(x(i), i+ 1)− v(x(i), i)] ≤ 0.
For ε > 0 sufficiently small, this is a contradiction. Hence, ∂v(x(i), i) is a singleton {1}
and v ∈ C1([0,∞)).
Step 2. We now show that v ∈ C2.
The only point at which v may not be twice differentiable is x(i) and
v′′(x, i) = 0, ∀x > x(i).
Set
γ = lim inf
x↑x(i)
v′′(x, i).
Then there exists xn < x(i) converging to x(i), so that v
′′(xn, i) → γ. By the first step,
v′(xn, i)→ 1. Moreover, the elliptic equation holds at all xn’s. Hence,
r(i)v(x(i), i)− µ− σ
2
2
γ − λ(i)[v(x(i), i+ 1)− v(x(i), i)]
= lim
n→∞ r(i)v(xn, i)− Lv(xn, i) = 0. (3.3.2)
The dynamic programming equation (3.2.6) implies that at any x > x(i),
0 ≤ r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) = r(i)v(x, i)− µ− λ(i)[v(x, i+ 1)− v(x, i)].
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Hence as x ↓ x(i)
r(i)v(x(i), i)− µ− λ(i)[v(x(i), i+ 1)− v(x(i), i)] ≥ 0.
The above inequality, together with (3.3.2) imply that γ ≥ 0. However, by concavity,
v′′ ≤ 0. Hence, γ = 0 and
0 ≤ lim inf
x↑x(i)
v′′(x, i) ≤ lim sup
x↑x(i)
v′′(x, i) ≤ 0.
Therefore, v is twice differentiable at x(i).
3.3.3 Dividend Thresholds
In the previous sections, we have shown that v is a concave, twice continuously differen-
tiable, classical solution of (3.2.6). By concavity and Lemma 3.2.2, there are x(i) > 0,
i = 0, 1 such that
v′(x, i) = 1 for x ≥ x(i), and v′(x, i) > 1, r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) = 0, on [0, x(i)).
Indeed,
x(i) := inf{x : v′(x, i) = 1 }, and x` := x(0), xh := x(1).
The following is proved in Appendix 3.A.
Proposition 3.3.5. Let x`, xh > 0 be as above. Then, x` ≥ xh.
3.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we give numerical illustrations of the value function and the sensitivities of
the dividend thresholds with respect to mean and volatility of the cash flow process and
the jump rate between low and high interest rate regimes. The value function is shown in
the figure below, for the parameter values
µ = 0.18, σ = 0.15, λ = 0.1, rl = 0.02, rh = 0.1, xh = 0.4386, xl = 0.5528. (3.3.3)
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Figure 3.1: Value function with parameters in (3.3.3)
µ = 0.18, λ = 0.1, rl = 0.02, rh = 0.1. (3.3.4)
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivities of xh and xl wrt σ with parameters in (3.3.4)
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σ = 0.15, λ = 0.1, rl = 0.02, rh = 0.1. (3.3.5)
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivities of xh and xl wrt µ with parameters in (3.3.5)
µ = 0.18, σ = 0.15, rl = 0.02, rh = 0.1. (3.3.6)
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivities of xh and xl wrt µ with parameters in (3.3.6)
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3.4 Issuance
In this section, we enlarge the set of financial policies available to the firm, by allowing it
to issue new shares, in addition to distribute dividends. Using the previous notation, the
cash level process is now given by
Xt = x+ µt+ σBt − Lt + It, (3.4.1)
where It is the total amount of cash raised up to time t (cumulated issuance process, net
of issuance costs). We assume2 that I is piecewise constant and has the form
It =
∞∑
k=1
ξkχ{t≥τk}, (3.4.2)
where 0 ≤ τ1 < . . . < τk < τk+1 are stopping times at which equity issues are made and
ξk ≥ 0 are the issuance sizes. Then, the optimization problem that the firm faces is to
maximize3
J(x, i, L, I) := E
[∫ θ
0
ΛtdLt −
∞∑
k=1
Λτk (ξk + γ(iτk))
∣∣∣ i0 = i,X0− = x
]
, (3.4.3)
where γ(i) > 0 is the fixed cost of issuance when the economy is in state i. The inter-
pretation of functional J is straightforward. Since there is a fixed cost γ(i) of issuance
(which depends on the state i of the economy), new issues will be lumpy and occur at
discrete times τ1, τ2,... . Since there is no marginal cost of issuance, the total amount of
cash raised at date τk is just ξk + γ(iτk). Functional J represents expected present value
of future dividend payments, net of equity issuances, as in [3].
The value function
v(x, i) := sup
L,I∈A(x)
J(x, i, L, I)
2Given the presence of a fixed issuance cost, such a policy is indeed optimal without loss of generality.
3See [3] for a discussion of the objective function.
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is the unique viscosity solution of
min
{
r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) ; v′(x, i)− 1 ; (3.4.4)
v(x, i)− sup
ξ≥0
(v(x+ ξ, i)− ξ − γ(i))
}
= 0.
We distinguish the cases when the cost structure depends on the point process and when
not.
3.4.1 Constant Issuance Cost
The following lemma shows that when γ(i) ≡ γ, it is never optimal to issue new equity
before the cash reserves are zero. This is consistent with the results of [3] in the case
where interest rates are constant.
Lemma 3.4.1. Suppose γ is independent of i. Then, it is never optimal to issue new
equity when the cash level is non zero. Hence, v is the unique solution of
min
{
r(i)v(x, i)− Lv(x, i) ; v′(x, i)− 1 } = 0,
with boundary condition
v(0, i) = max{0 ; sup
ξ≥0
(v(ξ, i)− ξ − γ)}.
Moreover for any x > 0,
v(x, i) > sup
ξ≥0
(v(x+ ξ, i)− ξ − γ) .
Proof.
Fix x ≥ 0 and let (L, I) ∈ A(x) be any admissible dividend-issuance policy. Then, I is as
in (3.4.2). Suppose that Xτ1 > 0. Define I˜ simply by removing the first issuance, i.e.,
I˜t =
∞∑
k=2
ξkχ{t≥τk} = It − ξ1χ{t≥τ1}.
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The new strategy (L, I˜) may not be admissible, but the corresponding cash flow process
X˜ exists and is given by
X˜t = x+ µt+ σBt − Lt + I˜t.
Set
τ := inf{t ≥ τ1 : X˜t ≤ 0},
or infinity, if the above set is empty. Since we have assumed that Xτ1 > 0, τ > τ1.
We now define another issuance strategy Iˆ by
Iˆt = I˜t + ξ1χ{t≥τ}.
Then, it is clear that Iˆt = It for all t ≥ τ . Let Xˆ be the corresponding cash level process,
i.e.,
X˜t = x+ µt+ σBt − Lt + Iˆt.
Then,
Xˆt =
 X˜t, for t ∈ [0, τ),Xt, for t ≥ τ.
The above characterization of Xˆ shows that Xˆt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Hence, (L, Iˆ) is indeed
admissible. Moreover,
J(x, i, L, Iˆ) = J(x, i, L, I) + E [(Λτ1 − Λτ ) ξ1] > J(x, i, L, I),
where the final inequality follows from the fact that τ > τ1.
The above argument shows that it is enough to consider issuance strategies for which
Xτ1 = 0. By induction we can show that this result extends to all issuance times and we
need only to consider strategies with Xτk = 0 for every k. This is exactly the statement
of the Lemma.
3.4.2 Issuance with Random Costs
If the cost structure γ depends on i, then the above result no longer holds. This is
illustrated in the following numerical example where γ(1) is much larger than γ(0). We
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use the following parameter values:
µ = 0.18, σ = 0.5, λ = 0.1, r(0) = 0.02, r(1) = 0.1.
For this set of parameter values the value function is twice continuously differentiable
except one point, xI , and has the following form. There are thresholds 0 < xI < x` < xh.
Set
Region 1 := (0, xI), Region 2 := (xI , x`), Region 3 := (x`, xh).
In region 1, the firm issues new equity when the interest rate is low (but not when it is
high). The two other regions are associated with dividend thresholds xl and xh like before.
Thus, the value function satisfies
v(x, 0) = v(x`, 0)− (x` − x)− γ(0), x ∈ Region 1,
r(0)v(x, 0) = Lv(x, 0), x ∈ Region 2,
v′(x, 0) = 1, x ≥ x`,
r(1)v(x, 1) = Lv(x, 1), x ≤ xh,
v′(x, 1) = 1, x ≥ xh.
Therefore the optimal strategy is given as follows. The fixed cost γ(1) is so high that
it is never optimal to issue new equity if the state i is equal to one (equivalently, if the
interest rate is high). The dividend threshold for r = rh is xh and when r = rl it is x`.
Interestingly, x` < xh while without issuance the opposite inequality always holds, c.f,
Proposition 3.3.5. For i = 0, if the cash level is sufficiently small, i.e., if in Region 1,
then the firm issues new equity. In Region 2, the firm does not take any action and pays
dividends when x > x`. The value function is shown in the figure below, for the parameter
values
γ(0) = 0.48, r(0) = 0.02, r(1) = 0.1, λ = 0.1, σ = 0.5, µ = 0.18. (3.4.5)
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Figure 3.5: Value function with parameters in (3.4.5)
3.4.3 Different Cost but Same Interest Rate
In the example above, the possibility to issue new equity in the good state allows to reverse
the ranking of the thresholds. So, even if the opportunity cost of cash is lower (rl < rh)
the firm will issue dividends more often in the good state. In order to understand the
impact of issuing costs, we now study this particular case to understand the effect of the
cost alone. Indeed, let
r(i) = r > 0, i = 0, 1, γ(0) ≤ γ(1). (3.4.6)
It is clear that when both γ(0) and γ(1) are very large, then there will not be any issuance
and the problem is the same as the one studied in [3]. In fact, we have an easy quantifi-
cation of this statement. Let V (x, r) be the Jeanblanc-Picque´ & Shiryaev value function
defined in (3.2.3). Let x∗(r) be the dividend payment threshold for this problem and set
γ∗(r) := V (x∗(r), r)− x∗(r).
Lemma 3.4.2. Assume (3.4.6). Then, new equity issues are never optimal and v(x, i) =
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V (x, r), if and only if
γ(i) ≥ γ∗(r), i = 0, 1.
Proof. Since V is concave, we directly verify that for every x, ξ ≥ 0 and i = 0, 1,
V (x+ ξ, r)− V (x, r) ≤ V (ξ, r)− V (0, r) = V (ξ, r)
< ξ + γ∗ ≤ ξ + γ(i).
Using this it is straightforward to show that the value function V (x, r) solves the dynamic
programming equation (3.4.4). Hence by uniqueness v = V . In particular there are never
new equity issues.
To prove the converse, assume that there are never new equity issues. Then, v = V where
V solves the dynamic programming equation (3.4.4). In particular,
V (x, r) ≥ V (x+ ξ, r)− ξ − γ(i),
for all x, ξ ≥ 0 and i = 0, 1. We take ξ = x∗(r) and x = 0 to conclude.
Based on the above result, we computed the value functions for the following parameter
values
r(0) = r(1) = 0.05, λ = 0.3, σ = 0.25, µ = 0.18, (3.4.7)
with two different issuance costs:
γ(0) = 0.1489 < γ∗(r) = 2.60748 << γ(1),
γ(0) = 0.7756 < γ∗(r) = 2.60748 << γ(1).
In both cases, we decreased γ(0) from γ∗. In all examples, there is issuance as proved in
Lemma 3.4.2. There are three critical thresholds:
0 ≤ z0 := issuance threshold,
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i.e., it is optimal to make an issuance whenever the cash reserves are less than or equal to
z0 and when we are in state i = 0. Numerically we observed that of relatively high values
of γ(0) (i.e, values less than but close to γ∗), z0 = 0. However, z0 > 0 for sufficiently small
values of γ(0). Hence, there is a balance between the probability of going to a bad state
in which issuance is too costly and the probability of recovery.
The other common features of the numerical results is that the dividend payment threshold
x(i) is smaller in the “good” state of the economy, i.e., we always find:
x(0) < x(1).
In other words, dividend payment starts at lower cash reserves when the economy is in a
good state.
Below are the tables of these results and two representative graphs. In the first graph
z0 > 0 and the black curve is the issuance part. In the second z0 = 0. In both graphs red
parts correspond to the dividend payment region.
Figure 3.6: Value function with parameters in (3.4.7) and γ(0) = 0.1489
87
Optimal Dividend Policy with Random Interest Rates
Figure 3.7: Value function with parameters in (3.4.7) and γ(0) = 0.7756
Table 3.1: Optimal values for the set of parameters σ = 0.25, µ = 0.18, r = 0.05, λ = 0.3.
γ(0) z0 xl xh
0.0002 0.4990 0.6726 0.9226
0.0033 0.3958 0.7229 0.9229
0.1236 0.1153 0.8327 0.9327
0.1490 0.0954 0.8390 0.9340
0.2691 0.0286 0.8582 0.9382
0.7756 0 0.9003 0.9503
1.0087 0 0.9159 0.9559
1.6265 0 0.9504 0.9704
2.0527 0 0.9702 0.9802
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the specific impact of macroeconomic variables on the dividend
policies of firms by considering the extreme case of a firm whose profitability is constant,
but evolves in a stochastic macroeconomic environment, where interest rates and/or is-
suance costs are governed by an exogenous Markov chain.
Interestingly, we show that these two variables have opposed effects on the dividend policies
of firms. Specifically, firms tend to distribute more dividends when interest rates are high
and less dividends when issuing costs are high. We also find that stochastic issuing costs
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allow to get rid of the unfortunate prediction of previous models to which firms wait until
the last moment (i.e. until they run out of cash) to issue new equity. Like Bolton, Chen
& Wang [1], we obtain a market timing effect: when issuing costs are very high during
recessions (so that shareholders refuse to recapitalize firms when they run out of cash)
it becomes optimal to issue new equity in the good state even if the firm still has cash
reserves, due to the fear that a recession might occur, leading to the forced closure of a
profitable company.
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Appendix 3.A
In this Appendix, we prove the concavity of the value function. Firstly, in view of Lemma
3.3.1 and Corollary 3.3.2, there are constants c1, c2 > 0 such that
v(x, i) ≥ x+ c1 ∀ x ≥ x∗/2, i ∈ {0, 1} (3.5.1)
v(x, i) ≤ V (x, r`) ≤ x+ c2 ∀ x ≥ 0, i ∈ {0, 1}. (3.5.2)
The following technical result is needed in the proof of concavity. Let x∗ be as in the
previous result. Also recall that θx,L is the exit time of Xx,L from the interval (0,∞).
Lemma. There are Tˆ ≥ 1 and Λˆ < 1 such that
E[ΛTˆ∧θx,L ] ≤ Λˆ,
for all x ≥ x∗/2, L ∈ A(x) satisfying
J(x, i;L) ≥ x+ c1
2
,
where c1 is as in (3.5.1).
Proof. Fix x and L as in the statement and set X = Xx,L. For T > 0 to be determined,
set θ = θx,L and τ := θ ∧ T . By dynamic programming,
J(x, i, L) ≤ E
[∫ τ
0
ΛtdLt + Λτv(Xτ , iτ )
]
.
Set X˜t = x+ µt+ σWt, so that Xt = X˜t − Lt. Since Λt ≤ 1, (3.5.2) implies
J(x, i, L) ≤ E
[∫ τ
0
dLt + χ{θ≥T}(X˜T − LT + c2)e−r`T
]
= E
[
Lτ
(
1− χ{θ≥T}e−r`T
)
+ χ{θ≥T}(X˜T + c2)e−r`T
]
.
On {θ < T}, Lθ = X˜θ and on {θ ≥ T}, we have τ = T and LT = X˜T −XT . Then, since
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J(x, i;L) ≥ x+ c1/2,
x+
1
2
c1 ≤ J(x, i;L)
≤ E
[
X˜θ χ{θ<T} +
(
X˜T −XT + e−r`T (XT + c2)
)
χ{θ≥T}
]
= E
[
X˜τ +
(−XT + e−r`T (XT + c2))χ{θ≥T}]
= E
[
X˜τ +
(
e−r`T c2 −XT (1− e−r`T )
)
χ{θ≥T}
]
≤ E
[
X˜τ + e
−r`T c2 χ{θ≥T}
]
≤ (x+ µE[τ ]) + e−r`T c2.
We now set T = Tˆ where Tˆ is so that e−r`Tˆ c2 = c14 . Then,
x+
c1
2
≤ x+ µE(τ) + c1
4
.
Hence,
E[θx,L ∧ Tˆ ] = E[τ ] ≥ c1
4µ
.
Set f(t) = e−r`t so that Λt ≤ f(t). Since f is convex and f(0) = 1,
E[Λτ ] ≤ E[f(τ)] ≤ E
[
τ
Tˆ
f(Tˆ ) + (1− τ
Tˆ
)f(0)
]
=
f(Tˆ )
Tˆ
E[τ ] +
(
1− 1
Tˆ
E[τ ]
)
= 1− 1
Tˆ
(1− f(Tˆ ))E[τ ]
≤ 1− 1
Tˆ
(1− f(Tˆ )) c1
4µ
=: Λˆ.
We are now ready to prove the concavity of the value function.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.3. For x, y ≥ 0, i ∈ {0, 1}, set
I(x, y, i) := v(x, i) + v(y, i)− 2v
(
x+ y
2
, i
)
.
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In view of Corollary 3.3.1, I(x, y, i) ≤ 0, for all x, y ∈ [0, x∗]. Set
αˆ := sup
{
I(x, y, i) :
x∗
2
≤ x ≤ y, i = 0, 1
}
.
By Lemma 3.2.3, αˆ <∞. Hence, for every ε > 0 there are xε, yε, iε ∈ {0, 1} such that
αˆ ≤ I(xε, yε, iε) + ε, and x
∗
2
≤ xε ≤ yε.
In view of Lemma 3.3.1, to prove the concavity of v, it suffices to show that αˆ ≤ 0.
Let Lx ∈ A(xε), Ly ∈ A(yε) be arbitrary dividend strategies satisfying
J(xε, i;L
x) ≥ xε + c1
2
, J(yε, i;L
y) ≥ yε + c1
2
. (3.5.3)
In view of (3.5.1), such processes exist, and
v(xε, i) = sup{J(xε, i;Lx) | Lx ∈ A(xε) and Lx satisfies (3.5.3) }.
The same also holds at yε. Set
L¯ :=
Lx + Ly
2
, x¯ :=
xε + yε
2
.
Finally, let Tˆ be as in the Lemma above. Set θx := θx,L
x
. Without loss of generality
assume that
Xεt := xε + µt+ σWt − Lxt ≤ Y εt := yε + µt+ σWt − Lyt , ∀ t ≤ θx.
Otherwise, one may simply redefine Lx and Ly so that Xεt = Y
ε
t after the first time they
are equal.
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Set τ := θx ∧ Tˆ . By the dynamic programming principle (3.2.7),
J(xε, i;L
x) + J(yε, i;L
y) ≤ 2E
[∫ τ
0
ΛtdL¯t
]
+ E [Λτ (v(Xετ , iτ ) + v(Y ετ , iτ ))]
= 2E
[∫ τ
0
ΛtdL¯t + Λτv(X
x¯,L¯
τ , iτ )
]
+E
(
Λτ
[
v(Xετ , iτ ) + v(Y
ε
τ , iτ )− 2v(X x¯,L¯τ , iτ )
])
≤ 2v(x¯, i) + E[Λτ ]αˆ.
By the Lemma above, E[Λτ ] ≤ Λˆ < 1. Also,
v(xε, iε) + v(yε, iε) = sup{J(xε, iε;Lx) + J(yε, iε;Ly) | (Lx, Ly) satisfying (3.5.3)}.
Hence,
v(xε, iε) + v(yε, iε) ≤ 2v(x¯, iε) + Λˆαˆ.
By the choice of (xε, yε),
αˆ ≤ v(xε, iε) + v(yε, iε)− 2v(x¯, iε) + ε ≤ Λˆαˆ+ ε.
Hence αˆ ≤ ε/(1− Λˆ), for all ε > 0. Therefore, αˆ ≤ 0 and consequently v is concave.
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Appendix 3.B
Proof of Proposition 3.3.5. Towards a contradiction, suppose that x` < xh. Set
u(x) := v′`(x), w(x) := v
′
h(x), λ` := λ(0), λh := λ(1).
Differentiating the original system once and using the above definitions yield the following
coupled ordinary differential equations for u and w, on the interval (0, x`),
rhw(x) = µw
′(x) + (1/2)σ2w′′(x)− λh[w(x)− u(x)], (3.5.4)
r`u(x) = µu
′(x) + (1/2)σ2u′′(x) + λ`[w(x)− u(x)]. (3.5.5)
Since v`(0) = vh(0) = 0 and v`(x) ≥ vh(x) for all x ∈ [0,∞), we conclude that u(0) ≥ w(0).
Our goal is to show that u(x) ≥ w(x) for all x ∈ [0, x`]. Indeed, by our hypothesis x` < xh,
w(x`) > w(xh) = 1. So if we can prove that u ≥ w on [0, x`], then
1 = u(x`) ≥ w(x`) > 1
will provide the desired contradiction. Hence it suffices to prove that u ≥ w on [0, x`].
Set Φ(x) = (u− w)(x) and choose y ∈ [0, x`] so that
(u− w)(y) = min
x∈[0,x`]
(u− w)(x) =: α. (3.5.6)
Our goal is to show that α ≥ 0. We analyze three cases separately.
Case 1: y = 0. In this case, α = u(0)− w(0) = 0.
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Case 2: y ∈ (0, A). Since y is a local minimum of Φ,
Φ′(y) = u′(y)− w′(y) = 0, Φ′′(y) = u′′(y)− w′′(y) ≥ 0.
We use these first in (3.5.4) and then in (3.5.5) at the point y. The result is the following,
r`u(y) = µu
′(y) +
1
2
σ2u′′(y)− λ`α ≥ µw′(y) + 1
2
σ2w′′(y)− λ`α
= rhw(y)− [λh + λ`]α ≥ r`w(y)− [λh + λ`]α.
In the a last step we used the fact that w ≥ 0. Since α = u(y)− w(y), the above implies
that α ≥ 0.
Case 3: y = A. By the smooth fit, we know that v′′(x`) = u′(x`) = 0. We directly
conclude that
Φ′(x`) = u′(x`)− w′(x`) = v′′` (x`)− v′′h(x`) = −v′′h(x`) ≥ 0.
Since y = x` is the minimum of Φ on the interval [0, x`], Φ
′(x`) ≤ 0. Hence, Φ′′(x`) =
−v′h(x`) = 0.
Recall that we have assumed that xh > x`. Set f(x) := v
′′
h(x) and differentiate the dynamic
programming equation (3.2.6) for vh twice. The result is,
rhf(x) = µf
′(x) +
1
2
σ2f ′′(x)− λhf(x), x ∈ (x`, xh),
together with boundary conditions f(x`) = f(xh) = 0. However, the zero function is the
unique solution of this equation. Hence, f(x) = v′′h(x) = 0 for x ∈ [x`, xh]. So, v′h is
constant on [x`, xh] as well. Since v
′
h(x`) > 1, we conclude that xh =∞. But this implies
that vh(x) > v`(x) for all sufficiently large x.
Hence, x` ≥ xh.
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Chapter 4
Corporate Cash Holdings in Developing and Developed
Markets: Evidence from 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
I˙brahim Ethem Gu¨ney
4.1 Introduction
Corporate cash holdings have experienced a significant increase in the last few decades all
over the world. Although the recent financial crisis has slowed down this trend, several
media articles have highlighted, also after the financial crisis, the record cash reserves of
firms from different economies. For instance, a recent Bloomberg article indicates that in
the first quarter of 2013 the US firms hold a record $1.73 trillion in cash.1 Another article
in The Telegraph states that UK firms hold record cash reserves, around £750 billion, in
the same quarter.2 Furthermore, cash reserves of 265 European companies in the Stoxx
Europe 600 Index were reported as $475 billion at the end of 2012.3 In the last two decades,
following Opler et al. [40], the empirical literature has established various determinants
of cash holdings and motives for holding cash.4 However, the current literature works
mostly with US data or small samples from European countries. Although the variations
in agency costs and the firm specific characteristics across countries may affect corporate
1Chris Burritt, “Cash Piles Up as U.S. CEOs Play Safe With Slow-Growth Economy”, Bloomberg, May 23,
2013.
2Jeremy Warner, “Roll up for Britain’s £750bn corporate cash mountain”, The Telegraph, March 28, 2013
3Alex Webb, “European Companies Stockpile $475 Billion as Outlook Dims”, Bloomberg, February 25, 2013.
4See Bates et al. [7], Ferreira and Vilela [20], Ozkan and Ozkan [42], Drobetz and Gru¨ninger [17] for details.
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liquidity decisions, there is no study to the best of our knowledge that compares the
factors that affect corporate liquidity decisions for different country groups. To fill in this
gap, we compare the firm and country specific factors that affect cash policies of firms
between 23 developing and 26 developed countries over the period 1995-2011. We further
study whether the 2007-2009 financial crisis has a significant impact on cash reserves and
their determinants. Finally, we perform an industry analysis to examine which industries
potentially drive the empirically observed corporate cash holdings in developing versus
developed countries.
We start our analysis by demonstrating the evolution of average cash holdings for devel-
oping compared to developed countries over the sample period. We observe an increasing
trend for firms in both country groups with the only exception of the recent financial crisis.
We verify the positive trend in average cash holdings by regressing cash ratios on a constant
and a time variable that is measured in years. The results show that the yearly increase
in average cash holdings is 0.39% for the sample of developed countries. However, the
magnitude of the yearly increase is slightly lower, 0.29%, for developing countries. Hence,
the positive trend in the sample of developed countries is relatively stronger. Moreover, we
examine whether firms have target cash levels in our country groups. We document that
the target cash levels exist in both samples and the adjustment speed of the cash holdings
to the target levels is relatively higher for firms in developed countries. In particular, an
average developing (developed) firm needs approximately 3.56 (1.65) years to reach its
target cash reserves.
As a next step, we investigate the potential drivers for the differences in target cash policies
of firms in both country groups. Several corporate finance theories have been proposed in
the literature that provide a rationale for corporate cash holding decisions. According to
the trade-off theory, in the absence of agency conflicts, firms determine the optimal cash
policies by balancing the marginal costs and benefits of these liquid assets. The trade-off
theory puts emphasis on the transaction cost and precautionary motives for holding cash.
On the other hand, the pecking-order theory explains the role of cash as a buffer between
retained earnings and investment needs by emphasizing the informational asymmetries
between managers and investors. These two theories suggest the impact of the following
firm specific variables on cash reserves: capital expenditures, cash flow, dividends, market-
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to-book ratio, leverage, net working capital, size, and tangibility. In our empirical analysis
we use these variables as proxies for cash holding motives that are related to each of the
two theories. On the other hand, the agency theory emphasizes the conflicts between the
managers and the shareholders concerning the use of internal funds. In order to verify
the impact of agency conflicts on cash holdings, we also include country specific variables
representing the legal protection of shareholders and creditors, ownership concentration
of firms, and the legal traditions and origins of the countries.
First, we employ GMM, Fama-Macbeth, and cross-sectional OLS regressions for the whole
sample period. In this way, we can compare our results with the existing literature on the
determinants of cash holdings. Our main observations are: First, both trade-off and peck-
ing order theory related variables explain partially the relationship between cash holdings
and their determinants. In particular, in both samples, cash holdings increase with cash
flows and decrease with leverage. In addition, cash ratios are negatively related with capi-
tal expenditures in the sample of developed countries. These coefficient signs suggest that
pecking-order theory related motives drive the results. On the other hand, cash holdings
are negatively related with dividend payouts, net working capital, and tangibility, which
highlight the existence of trade-off theory related motives, in particular the transaction
cost motive. In contrast to Opler et al. [40], Ferreira and Vilela [20], Bates et al. [7] where
precautionary motives for holding cash are strong, the transaction cost motive and the
pecking order theory related motives dominate in our country groups. Second, in contrast
to the papers that use US data or a small sample of developed countries, we capture agency
motives for holding cash in both country groups. These motives are relatively stronger in
the sample of developing countries and weaken when we control for firm specific variables
in our baseline regressions. Further, the impact of agency motives is strong in countries
with a common law tradition. Within the subsample of firms with civil law tradition,
controlling for firm specific variables, a weak impact of the agency theory related motives
on cash holdings is observed for the French and Scandinavian legal origin countries but
not for the German civil law countries.
Next, we focus on the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on cash management policies.
Despite a vast literature on the determinants of corporate cash holdings, little is known
about the effects of liquidity crises on corporate cash holding levels. Arslan, Florackis and
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Ozkan [5] consider the effects of financing constraints on Turkish firms during the Turkish
financial crisis of 2001-2002. They find that financially constrained firms exhibit greater
investment cash-flow sensitivity during the crisis than less constrained firms, suggesting
that liquidity is an important problem during market downturns. Elkinawy and Stater
[18] examine the determinants of cash holdings and firm value in Argentina, Mexico, and
Brazil during the Latin American crises in the mid and late 1990’s and they observe that
while illiquidity may become more severe during a crisis, agency costs are also important
factors for corporate cash holdings. Furthermore, Alvarez et al. [2] find that liquidity
crises have had an overall negative and economically significant effect on Chilean firms’
cash holdings and this effect varies across firm size. Finally, Song and Lee [45] investigate
the long-term effect of the Asian financial crisis on corporate cash holdings in eight East
Asian countries. They find that the increase in the cash holdings of the Asian firms can be
explained by the decrease in investment activities and by an increased sensitivity to cash
flow risk. The first observation from our crisis analysis is that the average cash holdings
increase from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period in the sample of developing countries.
However, in the sample of developed countries, average cash holdings increase from the
pre-crisis to the crisis period and decrease below crisis values in the post-crisis period.
We employ several regression models to understand the drivers of these effects. We find
that the increase in average cash holdings of the firms in the developing sample can partly
be explained by a positive regime shift in the demand for cash and the changes in the
relationship between firm characteristics and cash holdings during the recent crisis. On
the other hand, in the sample of developed countries, we observe that the decrease in
average cash ratios after the crisis is at least partly the result of a negative regime shift in
the demand for cash. We further detect changes in the relation between cash holdings and
their determinants which may also contribute to the slight decrease in cash holdings of the
developed firms after the crisis. Another observation is that both trade-off and pecking
order theory related motives play a crucial role in explaining the determinants of cash
holdings in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. In the developing countries, the impact
of agency motives becomes stronger from the pre-crisis to the crisis periods. The agency
motives, however, are weakly observed in the developed countries sample in both periods.
The effect of agency motives is relatively stronger for common law countries. We do not
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observe an impact of agency motives for the civil law subsample of the developed countries.
This result is dominated by the German and Scandinavian legal origin countries.
Finally, we focus on corporate cash holdings at the industry level in order to obtain
more insights about the empirically observed corporate cash holding policies in the sam-
ple of developing versus developed countries. We use industry classification benchmark
(ICB) to classify firms which provides nine industries: Oil and gas (O&G), basic materials
(BM), industrials (IND), consumer goods (CG), health care (HC), consumer services (CS),
telecommunications (TEL), utilities (UTI), and technology (TEC). We start by examining
the average industry cash ratios over the sample period. In both developing and devel-
oped country groups, high-tech and utilities firms hold the highest and lowest cash ratios,
respectively. Manufacturing firms, which constitute the major part of the basic materials,
industrials and consumer goods industries, exhibit relatively lower cash ratios than the
developing and developed sample averages. Secondly, we look at the average industry cash
ratios over the pre-crisis (00-06), crisis (07-08), and post-crisis (09-11) periods. For the
sample of developing countries we observe that the slight increase in average cash ratios
during the crisis is mainly driven by firms in the consumer services and basic materials
industries. In addition, consumer goods and industrial firms dominate the increase in av-
erage cash ratios in the post-crisis period. On the other hand, manufacturing firms play a
crucial role for the increase of average cash ratios in developed countries during the crisis.
However, the decrease in average cash ratios from the crisis to the post-crisis period is
driven by the basic materials and partly by high-tech firms, which face a decline in average
cash ratios during the post-crisis period. Further, we run several regressions to examine
the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on cash holdings and their determinants across
industries. Our key observations are: The positive regime shift in the demand for cash in
the developing countries during the crisis seems to be driven by high-tech firms and sup-
ported partially by manufacturing and consumer services firms. However, in the sample of
developed countries, observed negative regime shift in the demand for cash is dominated
by the basic materials, consumer services, and high-tech firms. Regressions for the pre-
crisis and crisis subsamples show that the slopes of the regressions change for technology
and manufacturing firms but not for oil and gas, health care, consumer services, utilities,
and telecommunications industries in developing countries sample. On the other hand,
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the effects of the recent crisis on the slope coefficients are much stronger for most of the
industries in the sample of developed countries. In particular, we observe significant slope
changes for the high-tech, utilities, and manufacturing industries. Finally, regressions that
allow for slope and intercept changes display the absolute impact of firm specific variables
on industry cash ratios during and after the crisis. The results show that in the sample
of developing countries, the relations between firm specific variables and cash holdings
change slightly for the basic materials, industrials, and telecommunication firms during
the crisis. Moreover, the relations between cash holdings and their determinants change al-
most completely for the utilities and technology industries after the crisis. We also observe
small changes in the relation between cash holdings and their determinants for the basic
materials, industrials, and consumer services industries in the post-crisis period. In the
sample of developed countries, the coefficient signs change mostly for the health care and
consumer goods industries during the crisis. Moreover, the relations between cash hold-
ings and their determinants change slightly for the consumer goods, telecommunications,
and technology industries after the crisis.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing, using a large data set,
important insights about the determinants of corporate cash holdings in developing versus
developed countries and by addressing the effects of the 2007−2009 financial crisis on the
cash management policies of developing and developed countries. The existing literature
mostly uses US data or small samples from European countries. However, by employing
an exhaustive international dataset, in addition to the differences in firm specific variables,
we also capture the variation in agency costs across countries. In addition, we perform
an industry analysis which provides important insights about the potential drivers for the
observed liquidity policies in our country groups. Moreover, in contrast to the previous
literature that uses only OLS regressions, we implement GMM regressions, which are more
robust for target cash level analysis. Last but not least, we investigate the cash holding
motives related to the well known corporate finance theories.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces corporate
finance theories that explain cash holdings and the empirical evidence relating to these
theories. Section 4.3 describes the data and provides the descriptive statistics. We describe
our empirical methodology and present the regression results for the whole sample period
104
Theory and Empirical Evidence
in Section 4.4. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 include the crisis and industry analyses, respectively.
Section 4.7 finally concludes.5
4.2 Theory and Empirical Evidence
In this section, we first elaborate on the main theories developed to elucidate corporate
cash holdings and the empirical evidence related to these theories in the finance and
economics literature. Subsequently, we address the role of country-specific features, such
as shareholder and creditor protection, ownership concentration, and the legal structure
that might influence corporate cash holdings across countries.
4.2.1 Trade-off Theory
One of the earliest cornerstones of the modern corporate finance theory, the Modigliani-
Miller theorem [34], states that firm value is not affected by the capital structure of a firm
in a frictionless market.6 In such an environment, a firm could instantaneously finance its
investment needs without any costs and cash holdings would be irrelevant. However, in
reality there are frictions such as taxes, asymmetric information, transaction and agency
costs, and capital supply uncertainty. These frictions generate a wide spread between
the costs of external and internal financing. Due to these frictions, cash holdings can be
useful for firms for the following three main reasons. First, they help firms to avoid paying
the cost of raising outside funds and selling existing securities and assets (Opler et al.
[40]). Second, they allow corporations to pursue their investments that would otherwise
have been foregone due to outside financing costs (Myers [36] and Myers and Majluf [38]).
Finally, they diminish the likelihood of financial distress (Ferreira and Vilela [20]). On the
other hand, there are also opportunity costs of cash due to the discrepancy between the
returns on the cash reserves and the interest that is required to be paid to fund additional
cash (Dittmar et al. [14]) and possible tax disadvantages for the shareholders (Opler et
al. [40] and Drobetz and Gru¨ninger [17]). In the absence of agency conflicts, the trade-off
theory proposes that the managers maximize the shareholders’ wealth and determine the
optimal cash holding levels by balancing the marginal costs and benefits of these liquid
assets. This theory emphasizes two motives for holding cash, namely the transaction cost
5Tables are gathered in Appendix.
6Taxes, asymmetric information, transaction and agency costs are absent in a frictionless market.
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and precautionary motives.
The Transaction Cost Motive
The grandfather of modern macroeconomics, John Maynard Keynes describes this motive
in his decisive work [27] as “the need of cash for the current transaction of personal and
business exchange”. According to the transaction cost motive, holding cash is beneficial
when raising outside funds and the liquidation of the existing assets are subject to transac-
tion costs (Baumol [8], Miller and Orr [33], and Opler et al. [40]). The existing literature
utilizes numerous determinants of cash as proxies for these costs.
Size. Larger firms utilize economies of scale resulting from the fixed costs of outside
financing and face lower external financing costs than the smaller firms (Mulligan [35],
Kim et al. [28], and Drobetz and Gru¨ninger [17]). Hence, they are expected to hold less
cash.
Investment Opportunities. Investment opportunities are often represented by the
market-to-book ratio in the corporate finance literature. Firms with better investment
opportunities are expected to hold more cash since they have higher opportunity cost
of losing profitable investments in case of cash shortfall (Dittmar et al. [14]) and cash
reserves speed up the investment process, which is crucial in competitive markets having
urgent investment opportunities (Baskin [6]).
Cash Flow Volatility. Firms with higher cash flow volatility are expected to hold more
cash since the uncertainty and the likelihood of future cash deficit increase with cash-flow
fluctuations, which may result in a potential bankruptcy of the firm (Opler et al. [40],
Dittmar et al. [14], and Bates et al. [7]).
Net Working Capital. Net working capital represents the cash substitutes, which can
quickly be converted to cash with lower costs (Ferreira and Vilela [20] and Bates et al [7]).
Therefore, firms with greater net working capital are expected to hold less cash.
Cash Flow. Cash flows stand for the liquidity of the firm. Hence, firms with higher cash
flows are expected to hold lower cash reserves since they do not need cash to meet future
investment needs (Kim et al. [28]).
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Dividend. Firms with higher dividend payouts can easily generate internal funds by
reducing dividend payments or entirely giving them up (Opler et al. [40] and Bates et
al. [7]). Hence, a negative relationship between dividend payouts and cash reserves is
expected.
Asset Tangibility. Firms with more tangible assets are expected to hold less cash reserves
since tangible assets can easily be converted to cash in case of a cash shortfall (Drobetz
and Gru¨ninger [17]).
Capital Expenditures. Dittmar et al. [14] argue that when the capital expenditures
represent investment demand, firms with higher capital expenditures are expected to hold
higher cash reserves.
The Precautionary Motive
The precautionary motive for holding cash dates back to Keynes [27]. He describes this
motive as “the desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of a certain proportion
of total resources”. Within the framework of the precautionary motive, asymmetric infor-
mation between shareholders and the investors is the major determinant that makes firms
seek costly outside financing and issue undervalued securities. In such an environment,
firms should count on internal funds and employ cash reserves as a cushion against adverse
cash flow shocks and the lack of external capital. The recent literature proposes several
determinants as proxies for the precautionary demand for cash.
Size. Information asymmetries are crucial for smaller firms since they have a lower ability
to monitor investors. Almeida et al. [1] denote small firms as financially constrained due
to their limited access to external capital. They show that these firms hold more cash than
the financially unconstrained firms. Moreover, Titman and Wessels [47] put emphasis on
a better diversification of larger firms that supposedly reduces the likelihood of financial
distress and a precautionary need for cash. Therefore, smaller firms are expected to hold
more cash.
Leverage. Agency conflicts between the shareholders and the debtholders make raising
external capital difficult and particularly costly for highly levered firms. In addition, such
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firms might have difficulties to renew their debt obligations. As mentioned by Jensen
and Meckling [25], highly levered firms should promise higher yields and debt covenants.
Moreover, Opler and Titman [41] show that during market downturns, highly levered firms
face higher financial distress costs. Hence, they are expected to hold more cash.
Investment Opportunities. Firms with higher investment opportunities tend to invest
more in good quality projects, which in turn results in higher investment expenditures
in case of financial downturns. Therefore, such firms are expected to hold more cash for
precautionary reasons. Asymmetric information between shareholders and investors is bi-
ased towards the shareholders side and it might induce undervaluation of firms’ securities.
Dittmar et al. [14] propose the use of internal financing to avoid that firms have to pass
up profitable investment opportunities. Moreover, Ferreira and Vilela [20] show that firms
with higher market-to-book ratios should hold higher cash reserves to counteract higher
bankruptcy costs.
R&D Expenditures. As argued by Titman [46], firms that sell unique or specialized
products require higher research and development expenditures. Moreover, such firms are
exposed to higher cost of financial distress due to the presence of asymmetric information
within firms (Opler and Titman [41]). Therefore, as shown by several studies in the
literature, (see e.g., Opler et al. [40], Dittmar et al. [14], and Bates et al. [7]) firms with
higher R&D expenses are further expected to hold more cash to avoid bankruptcy.
Dividend. Bates et al. [7] claim that dividend paying firms are likely to be less risky
because they have a greater access to financial markets. Therefore, they are expected to
hold lower precautionary cash reserves.
Capital Expenditures. Capital expenditures represent the financial distress and bankruptcy
costs. Therefore, a positive relationship between these expenses and cash reserves is ex-
pected (Bates et al. [7]).
Cash Flow Volatility. Firms with higher cash flow volatility might have difficulties
in the repayment of their debt that decreases their credit rating, and limits their access
to external capital markets. Therefore, these firms tend to hold higher cash reserves for
precautionary reasons. Han and Qiu [21] verify this positive relationship for the financially
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constrained firms from both empirical and theoretical perspectives.
4.2.2 The Pecking-Order Theory
The major alternative to the trade-off theory in the corporate finance literature is known
as pecking-order theory7, going back to Myers and Majluf [38]. The theory puts emphasis
on the informational asymmetries between managers and investors which lead to costly
external financing and security mispricing.8 According to the pecking-order theory, there
is no optimal level of cash holdings but cash has rather the role of a buffer between
retained earnings and investment needs. Asymmetric information costs imply a financing
hierarchy for firms for the funding of new investments. Firms initially employ internal
funds. When the internal funds are no longer available, debt is used, followed by equity as
a last resort. The impact of several determinants of cash reserves can be explained using
the pecking-order theory.
Size. In the absence of optimal cash holding levels for firms, the pecking-order theory
expects greater cash holdings for large firms since they often have a successful history.
Opler et al. [40] highlight the importance of controlling for investment expenditures as
well.
Leverage. Due to the financing hierarchy, firms’ leverage increases upon the issuance of
debt when the internal funds are lower than the investment needs. On the other hand, firms
repay debt when they build up sufficient cash reserves. Therefore, a negative relationship
between cash reserves and leverage is expected.
Investment Opportunities. Firms with higher investment opportunities need greater
amounts of internal or external funds to finance profitable projects. As the adverse selec-
tion problems between managers and the outside investors boost external financing costs,
demand for cash reserves increases in order not to forego profitable investments. Hence, a
positive relationship between cash reserves and market-to-book ratio is expected.
Dividend. Myers [37] argues that dividends are “sticky” and not used to finance capital
expenditures. Moreover, changes in cash requirements are not absorbed by the short-run
dividend changes. On the other hand, Brav et al. [12] propose that the dividend payers
7It is also known as the financial hierarchy theory in the literature.
8Due to the adverse selection problem.
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have an incentive to avoid a cash squeeze because they are particularly reluctant to cut
dividends. Therefore, a positive relationship between cash reserves and dividend payouts
is expected.
Cash Flow. According to the pecking-order theory, since the external financing is costly,
firms always prefer to hoard cash reserves whenever it is possible. Hence, the cash surplus
resulting from higher operational cash flows is used to build up cash reserves and a positive
relationship is expected between these variables.
Cash Flow Volatility. Firms with higher cash flow volatility are expected to hold less
cash reserves since they will face difficulties to raise internal or external funds.
Capital Expenditures. According to the pecking order theory, capital expenditures are
initially compensated by internal funds that deplete cash reserves. Therefore, as argued
by Dittmar et al. [14], a negative relation between cash holdings and capital expenditures
is expected in contrast to the trade-off theory.
4.2.3 The Agency Theory
The agency theory deals with conflicts between managers and shareholders concerning the
use of internal funds. According to Jensen and Meckling [25], agency costs arise since
managers do not always act in the best interests of shareholders. They might rather
reduce payouts to shareholders, engage in negative NPV projects to increase the firm
size, or pile up excess cash to diminish the firm’s risk exposure. Jensen [24] explains the
agency conflict in his prominent “free cash-flow theory” that the entrenched managers of
firms with poor investment opportunities are in favor of building up greater cash reserves
in order to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of the shareholders. The
existing literature proposes both firm and country specific determinants of cash holdings
regarding agency costs.
Size. The level of managerial discretion is higher in larger firms since they have a lower
risk of takeover and an extensive distribution of the shareholders. Managers use this
discretionary power and tend to hold greater cash reserves to increase their control on
firms’ investment decisions. Therefore, a positive relationship between cash reserves and
firm size is expected.
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Leverage. Firms with lower leverage ratios seem to be safer for the investors and the
regulators (Ferreira et al. [20]). Hence, they are not exposed to regular monitoring, which
in turn increases the managers’ autonomy in cash holding decisions. Consequently, low
levered firms are expected to hold higher cash reserves.
Investment Opportunities. Within the agency theory framework, managers of firms
with poor investment opportunities tend to set cash aside for upcoming growth opportuni-
ties rather than paying it out to shareholders. Therefore, a negative relationship between
cash reserves of the firm and the market-to-book ratio, a main proxy for investment op-
portunities, is expected.
Country Specific Variables.
In the late 1990s, Rafael La Porta and his coauthors introduce in a series of papers ([29],
[30]) shareholder and creditor protection measures by examining the commercial laws of
several countries. They show that legal protection of investors has great discrepancies
across countries. Subsequently, they investigate the rationale behind this result (La Porta
et al. [31]) and document that the legal traditions and origins are important factors
pertaining to investor protection. They also empirically illustrate that that legal investor
protection is a strong indicator of financial development. The following literature tries
to verify the effects of legal investor protection on agency problems and corporate cash
holdings across countries by employing these measures. Dittmar et al. [14] show that firms
operating in countries with strong legal investor protection have fewer agency problems
and hold less cash. Ferreira and Vilela [20] find supporting evidence by documenting
that firms in countries with superior shareholder protection and concentrated ownership
hold less cash. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith [13] and Kalcheva and Lins [26] emphasize the
importance of good investor protection by showing that firm value is adversely affected
by greater agency problems between managers and outside investors. We employ the
following indicators for shareholders and creditors protection and legal environments to
investigate the impact of agency costs to the corporate cash holdings.
Anti-Self Dealing Index. La Porta et al. ([29], [30]) develop an anti-director rights
index as a proxy for shareholder rights. However, this index has been criticized by several
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papers (see e.g., Pagano and Volpin, [43] and Spamann [44]) in the literature.9 Djankov et
al. [16] revise and improve this index by incorporating both ex-ante and ex-post controls
for self-dealing. The new index is called “anti-self dealing index” which focuses on the
efficiency of corporate laws in controlling self-dealing activities by managers. This index
ranges from 0 to 1 and higher values represent better protection of minority shareholders
against self-dealing transactions by the controlling shareholder. Therefore, higher index
values correspond to lower agency problems, which in turn implies lower cash reserves for
firms.
Creditor Rights Index. The creditor rights index as initially introduced by La Porta
et al. ([29], [30]), is a measure of creditor power. Djankov et al. [15] revise this index and
calculate it for a larger sample. The index assesses the legal rights of creditors against
failure of debtors in different fields. It ranges from 0 to 4 and whereas each positive answer
to the following questions reflects another creditor protection right:
1. Does the country impose restrictions on debtors such as creditors’ assent or minimum
dividends to file for reorganization?
2. Are secured lenders able to control their collateral once the reorganization petition
is approved (no automatic stay or asset freeze by the court)?
3. Do secured creditors have priority to obtain the proceeds from liquidating the assets
of a bankrupt firm?
4. Does a supervisor but not manager run the business during reorganization?
Higher index values represent stronger creditor rights and lower agency problems. There-
fore, a negative relation between creditor rights index and corporate cash holdings is
expected.
Ownership concentration. The ownership concentration measure is introduced by La
Porta et al. [30] and revised by La Porta et al. [32]. It is measured as “the average per-
centage of common shares that are held by the top three shareholders in the ten largest
9This index is criticized as it relies on ad hoc variables to capture the corporate law attitude regarding the
shareholder protection and as it includes several conceptual ambiguities and outright mistakes during construction
period.
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non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country”. Ferreira and Vilela [20]
and Jani et al. [23] define this indicator as a substitute for legal protection in particular
for countries with poor shareholder protection. They document that a higher ownership
concentration provides effective monitoring power to the large shareholders, which alle-
viates managerial agency costs. Hence, a negative relation between cash holdings and
ownership concentration is expected. On the other hand, large shareholders might per-
suade managers to hoard excess cash reserves for private benefits or tax reasons (La Porta
et al. [31]). Therefore, the relation between ownership concentration and cash holdings is
vague.
Legal Origin. Several papers demonstrate the impact of a countries legal origin on
shareholder and creditor protection (see e.g., La Porta et al. ([29], [30]), Dittmar et al
[14], and Beck et al. ([9], [10])). The main classes of legal origin are:
1. The English legal origin, which includes the common law of England and its colonies
including Australia, Canada, and United States;
2. The French legal origin, which includes the civil law of France, its colonies, Spain
and Portugal (conquered by Napoleon);
3. The German legal origin, which includes the civil laws of the Germanic countries in
central Europe, and the East-Asian countries where the German law was transferred;
4. The Nordic legal origin, which includes the civil laws of the four Scandinavian coun-
tries (See Djankov et al. [15]).
There exist two legal traditions: the common and civil law. England and its former colonies
follow the common law tradition and the countries with German, French or Nordic legal
origins follow the civil law. It is well documented in the previous literature that the
common law countries have a stronger legal protection for shareholders and creditors than
the civil law countries. Therefore, firms in common law countries are expected to have
lower agency problems and lower cash holdings.
Table 4.1 summarizes the predictions of three theories and the empirical evidence on the
relationship between firm and country specific variables and corporate cash holdings.
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[Insert Table 4.1 Here]
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data sample used in our study is extracted from Datastream and Worldscope and
includes two sub-samples for developing and developed countries. Our initial dataset
comprises all publicly traded firms from 23 developing10 and 26 developed countries11 over
the period 1995-2011. First, we exclude financial institutions12 due to the idiosyncracy of
their cash holding policies, which are affected by certain supervisory and regulatory laws.
Second, we drop missing firm-year observations for any variable incorporated in our model.
Finally, we keep those firms that have at least five years of consecutive observations for
total assets. These criteria provide us with two unbalanced panels, i.e., one of 8, 151 firms
in developing countries, which represent 87, 979 firm-year observations and another sample
with 17, 402 firms in developed countries, which represent 211, 274 firm-year observations.
4.3.1 Cash Holdings
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the cash ratio. The extant literature
proposes three common ways to calculate this variable. The first and the most popular
technique is to divide cash and cash equivalents by the book value of total assets (see,
e.g., Kim et al. [28], Ozkan and Ozkan [42], and Bates et al. [7]). The second way is
postulated by Opler et al. [40] and used by the subsequent literature (see, e.g., Dittmar
et al. [14] and Ferreira and Vilela [20]). This technique calculates the ratio of cash to net
assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. The last measure
is the logarithm of the second ratio which is not commonly used in the literature (see, e.g.,
Drobetz and Gru¨ninger [17]). We employ the first ratio in our empirical analysis.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the evolution of average cash ratios for developing and developed
samples over the observation period 1995-2011. The key observation here is that the
average cash ratio has an increasing trend across each sample with a few subsequent
10Countries in the developing sample are; Argentina, Brazil, Chile China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.
11Countries in the developed sample are; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.
12Banks, insurance companies and investment trusts are excluded.
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Figure 4.1: Average Cash Ratios for the Period [1995, 2011]
This figure exhibits the long-term trend of average cash ratios of 23 developing and 26 developed countries for
the period [1995, 2011]. Financial firms are excluded and those firms that have at least five years of consecutive
observations for total assets are included, yielding a panel of 87,979 observations for 8,151 firms in developing
countries and 211,274 observations for 17,402 firms in developed countries. Cash ratio is the ratio of cash and cash
equivalents to the book value of total assets.
downs such as in the recent financial crisis. The average cash ratio for developed countries
increases from 15% in 1995 to 20.4% in 2011 and has a peak in 2006 with 22.7%. On the
other hand, the average cash ratio for developing countries increases from 9.2% in 1995
to 13.5% in 2011 and records a value of 14% in 2010. Hence, the percentage growth of
the average cash ratio for developing countries (47%) is higher than that for developed
countries (35%) over the observation period 1995-2011.
We verify the positive trend in average cash ratios by running a regression, in which the
cash ratio is regressed on a constant and a time variable measured in years. We observe a
positive and significant slope coefficient for both samples. In particular, the yearly increase
in average cash ratio is 0.29% (0.39%) for the sample of developing (developed) countries,
which implies that the positive trend in the average cash ratio is stronger for developed
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countries.
[Insert Table 4.2 Here]
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the cash ratio across developing and de-
veloped countries. The main observation is that the developed sample has significantly
higher mean and median cash ratios (19.9% and 12.2%, respectively) than the developing
sample (13% and 8.6%, respectively). In developing sample, Asian countries such as Tai-
wan (18.6%) and China (17.5%) exhibit the highest average cash ratios. On the contrary,
South-American countries such as Colombia (6.5%), Peru (6.8%), Chile (7%), and Ar-
gentina (7.2%) have the lowest relative cash holdings. In the developed sample, Australia
(27.7%), Canada (24.1%), Israel (23.8%), and USA (22.7%) have the highest average cash
ratios. On the other hand, countries with the lowest relative average cash holdings are
Portugal (6.4%), Greece (8.6%), and Spain (9.8%).
4.3.2 Country-Specific Variables
Supported by the theory and the empirical evidence, cash holding levels might differ
across countries due to the discrepancies in corporate governance and legal protection of
shareholders and creditors. In order to analyze this in more detail, we employ the anti-self
dealing index (ASD), creditor rights index (CRI), ownership concentration (OC) measure
and the legal structure data from Djankov et al. ([15], [16]) and La Porta et al. ([32]). The
anti-self dealing and the creditor rights indices are indicators for shareholder and creditor
protections, respectively. The higher values of these indices imply stronger protections of
shareholder and creditor rights. Ownership concentration is used as a substitute for legal
protection of investors. Higher values of this variable give rise to lower agency problems.
Finally, the legal structure data include the information about the legal origins of the
countries (English, French, German, or Scandinavian) and the law of traditions (common-
law or civil-law). These variables are available for 17 developing and 24 developed countries
from our initial sample.
[Insert Table 4.3 Here]
Table 4.3 illustrates the descriptive statistics for these variables. The current sample
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includes 15 countries following common-law and 26 countries following civil-law tradi-
tions. The extant literature proposes that the common-law countries have higher legal
protections than civil law countries which implies lower agency problems and lower cash
ratios for these countries. Average cash ratios for the sample of developing countries are
consistent with this view since common law countries show relatively lower average cash
ratios (9.8%) than civil-law countries (14.3%). However, common law countries exhibit
significantly higher cash ratios (22.6%) than civil-law countries (16.7%) in the sample of
developed countries. Overall, in contrast to the existing literature, common law countries
in our sample show significantly higher average cash ratios (19.8%) than civil-law countries
(16.1%). To understand the rationale behind this result, we consider the civil-law sam-
ple in more detail. Among civil-law countries, the French civil-law system prevails in 16
countries, which is followed by 6 German civil-law countries. Finally, we have 4 countries
from Scandinavian legal origin in our sample. Although the countries with German and
Scandinavian legal origins have considerably higher average cash ratios, namely (17.7%)
and (17.9%), large number of French civil-law countries dominate the sample with very
low average cash ratios (11.6%).
As documented in the previous literature, in our sample, common-law countries exhibit
significantly higher shareholder and creditor protections than the civil-law countries. An-
other observation is that, on average, developed countries show slightly higher shareholder
protection and slightly lower creditor protection than the developing countries. In the de-
veloped sample, the shareholder protection is highest in Singapore and the creditor rights
are strongest in Hong Kong, New Zealand and UK. Netherlands prevails the lowest share-
holder rights and France has the lowest creditor rights. On the other hand, Malaysia
and Nigeria show the highest shareholder and creditor rights among developing countries,
respectively. The legal protection for minority shareholders and the creditors is lowest in
Mexico.
Ownership concentration is higher in developing and common-law samples. Mexico and
Greece are the countries with the highest ownership concentration values among develop-
ing and developed samples, respectively. However, Taiwan and Japan exhibit the lowest
ownership concentration in these samples.
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4.3.3 Firm-Specific Variables
The trade-off, pecking-order and agency theories postulate several financial variables that
might influence corporate cash holdings. We incorporate the following explanatory vari-
ables into our empirical analysis to evaluate the predictive power of these theories.
Following the consensus in the existing literature, firm size is defined as the natural loga-
rithm of total assets. The value of the total assets used in the computation of the SIZE
variable is expressed in 1995 US dollars for all firms in the sample. The consumer price
index (CPI) data from the World Bank database is used to adjust the total asset data
for the inflation. Leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets (see,
e.g., Opler et al. [40] and Ozkan and Ozkan [42]). We standardize the leverage ratio for
all firms to the interval [0, 1]. In order to measure the effects of dividend payouts on cash
holdings, we define a dividend dummy (DIV) which is equal to 1 if a firm pays a dividend
in a given year. The rest of the explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels to remove the effect of outliers. Following Dittmar et al. [14] and Ozkan and Ozkan
[42], we define the net working capital (NWC) as the ratio of current assets minus current
liabilities minus cash to total assets. The market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is incorporated
as a proxy for investment opportunities. We define MTBR as the ratio of the book value
of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets.
CAPEX is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. As in Ferreira and
Vilela [20], we define the cash flow (CF) as the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes
plus depreciation to total assets. Cash flow volatility (CFV) is the five year historical
standard deviation of cash flows. Asset tangibility (TANG) is measured by the ratio of
fixed assets to total assets. Finally, we define research and development (R&D) as the
ratio of research and development expenditures to net sales (see, e.g., Bates et al. [7]).
Table 4.4 summarizes the variable definitions.
Table 4.5 displays the summary statistics for the firm specific variables used as explanatory
variables in our empirical research. Our first observation is that the median values for the
firm specific variables are quite similar in both samples except those for the net working
capital. However, mean values for most of the variables are significantly different in
developing and developed countries. This differences could be due to the small number of
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firms in developed countries, which have risky and lower cash flows, significantly higher
investment opportunities and research and development expenditures, and no counterparts
in developing countries. As a result, firms in developing countries have higher and less
volatile average cash flows than do the firms in developed countries. In addition, firms in
the sample of developed countries have significantly higher investment opportunities and
research and development expenditures than those in developing countries. Last but not
least, firms in developing countries hold more liquid assets than the firms in developed
countries.
[Insert Table 4.5 Here]
Finally, Table 4.6 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between paired variables. We
also employ a significance test for the correlation values. The test results show that almost
all coefficients are significant at a 1% level. Panel A displays that the correlations between
the independent variables are generally low except small outliers in the developing sample.
Thus, one can expect that potential multi-collinearity problems are at most of minor
significances. On the other hand, we observe very high paired correlations between cash
flow, cash flow volatility, market-to-book ratio, and net working capital for the developed
sample. Therefore, we need to distinguish among different explanatory variables when we
implement our empirical analysis for the developed sample.
[Insert Table 4.6 Here]
4.4 Empirical Methodology
In line with the literature, we employ panel data estimation techniques in our empirical
analysis. There are several advantages of using panel data. First, panel data have more
degrees of freedom and sample variability than the time series or cross-sectional data.
Second, panel data comprise both firm13 and time14 specific effects which may be random
or fixed. Moreover, the dynamic structure of the panel data allows us to investigate the
adjustment process of the firms’ cash holdings to the target levels in detail.
13Heterogeneity of the firms concerning the nature of business, risk profile, import-export levels, etc.
14Financial downturns, macroeconomic shocks, etc.
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Standard fixed and random effect models are mainly criticized by the previous literature
since they do not take into account possible endogeneity problems. To alleviate endo-
geneity issues, we implement our regressions via generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimations. One of our main objectives is to examine whether firms in developing or
developed countries have target cash levels. We utilize a partial target adjustment model,
which considers impediments and provides us with the adjustment speed to the target
cash levels. The basic idea in this model is to incorporate the first lag of the dependent
variable, the cash ratio, as an explanatory variable. The model reads as follows:
CASHi,t = δCASHi,t−1 + Γ′Xi,t + εi + εt + ui,t (4.4.1)
where i = 1, .., N , t = 1, .., 17, N is the number of firms in our sample. εi denotes the
firm-specific effects, which are constant through time, εt denotes the time-specific effects
which vary through time but constant across firms for a given time period. ΓMx1 is the
coefficient vector of firm specific explanatory variables.15 ui,t represent disturbance terms,
which are independent and identically distributed over the whole sample. The inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable in the above regression allows for the adjustment of
the dependent variable to the target cash ratio. In particular, (1 − δ) represents the
adjustment rate. The main drawback in this model is the correlation between the first lag
of the dependent variable (CASHi,t−1) and the time-invariant εi. To handle this problem,
we employ instrumental variables (IV ) regressions.
It is common practice in the literature to use the Arellano-Bond [3] approach to estimate
regression models similar to ours; the Arellano-Bond approach performs well for panels
including a large number of firm and a small number of year observations. Arellano and
Bond [3] postulate a model that uses first-differences of the independent and explanatory
variables to transform equation 4.4.1 into a difference GMM equation at which the individ-
ual firm effects (εi) vanish. This approach derives the instruments from the orthogonality
conditions between lagged variables and disturbance terms.16 However, this method relies
on the absence of second-order correlations between disturbance terms in the difference
15We include following firm-specific variables to our empirical analysis: firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio,
cash flow, capital expenditures, dividend dummy, net working capital, and tangibility. We will incorporate the crisis
dummy and the interaction terms of this dummy with firm specific variables in the crisis section as well.
16See Arellano and Bond [3] for details.
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equation. This assumption can be checked by implementing second-order serial correla-
tion test developed by Arellano and Bond [3]. Moreover, the Hansen test [22] has to be
employed to verify the validity of overidentifying restrictions and the instruments. There
are two types of Arellano-Bond estimators, namely one and two step estimators. Both of
these estimators produce biased standard errors. However, the previous literature proves
the asymptotic efficiency of the two-step estimator by emphasizing the downward-biased
standard error estimations provided by this estimator. The downward-biased standard
error problem can also be solved by utilizing finite sample correction for the covariance
matrix developed by Windmeijer [48].
Arellano and Bover [4] and Blundell and Bond [11] state that the lagged variables are
mostly weak instruments concerning bias and precision for the difference GMM equation.
They postulate the system GMM approach, which is an extension of the former method
by incorporating additional moment conditions. The system GMM estimator evaluates
the equations both in first-differences and levels. Therefore, we use the two-step version
of this estimator in our empirical analysis. We employ the second-order serial correlation
test developed by Arellano and Bond [3] and the Hansen test [22] for the validity of the
overidentifying restrictions and instruments. Finally, the Windmeijer correction is applied
in order to obtain robust estimators.
On the other hand, we investigate the agency motives for holding cash by incorporating
proxies for shareholder and creditor rights and ownership concentration. Since the data for
these variables are only available at the country level, we employ Fama-Macbeth [19] (FM)
and cross-sectional (CS) Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. The Fama-Macbeth
procedure has two steps: first we estimate cross-sectional regressions for each year; then
we average the estimated coefficients over the sample period to obtain final coefficient
values. We use Newey-West [39] standard errors to control for autocorrelation.
4.4.1 Regression Results
In this section, we estimate several regressions to evaluate the predictive power of cor-
porate finance theories on the relationship between cash holdings and firm and country
characteristics. We also focus on the question whether firms have target cash levels.
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[Insert Table 4.7 Here]
Our initial regression results are displayed in Table 4.7. Following a similar methodology
as in Opler et al. [40] we use the following first order autoregressive model of the first
differences in cash holdings to investigate whether firms have target cash levels:
∆Cit = α+ β∆Cit−1 + it
where ∆ is a first difference operator, time steps are annual, and it represent disturbance
terms which are iid distributed over the whole sample. As illustrated in Table 4.7, we
find negative and significant coefficients of lagged cash values for both developing and
developed samples. Therefore, cash holdings are mean reverting which confirms the target
cash levels of the firms in both country groups.
Second, we employ system GMM regressions for the samples of developing and developed
countries over the time period 1995 − 2011. R&D and CFV data are not commonly
available for most of the firms in our sample. Hence these variables are not included in
our baseline regressions. The second order correlation and Hansen tests show that we fail
to reject the null hypotheses; there is no second-order correlations between the disturbance
terms and the instruments are valid. Therefore, our econometric methodology is validated
by the data. Almost all explanatory variables are significant in both samples. The only
exceptions are the CAPEX in the developing sample and the MTBR in the developed
sample.
[Insert Table 4.8 Here]
Our first crucial observation from Table 4.8 is that the coefficients of the lagged cash
variable are significantly positive for both the samples of developing (0.719) and developed
(0.395) countries. Significant coefficients highlight the dynamic nature of cash holdings.
The adjustment speed of developing firms (0.281) is considerably lower than the rate for
developed firms (0.605). In other words, an average developing (developed) firm needs
approximately 3.56 (1.65) years to reach it’s target cash reserves. The coefficient signs are
almost the same in both samples except for the SIZE variable. Cash holdings decrease with
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firm size in the developed sample as supported by the trade-off theory which proposes that
the larger firms utilize economies of scale for costly external financing and they are better
diversified. Hence, the precautionary need of cash is lower for these firms. However, the
SIZE coefficient is positive with a low magnitude for the developing sample as predicted
by the agency theory relying on the higher managerial discretion for larger firms. Another
explanation for this difference between developing and developed countries may be that
the larger firms in developing countries play the role of banks in developed countries. More
specifically, they hold higher cash reserves to finance small firms in developing markets.
Among the remaining explanatory variables, we observe the impact of pecking-order theory
related motives from the coefficients of CAPEX, CF and LEV variables. More specifically,
in the developed sample, cash holdings decrease with capital expenditures which may be
due to the fact that cash reserves are initially used to compensate for capital expenditures.
In addition, due to the pecking-order of financing, cash holdings and leverage are negatively
related in both samples. Moreover, a positive sign on CF is observed since the external
financing is costly in a pecking-order world and firms hoard the cash surplus from their
operations whenever it is possible. On the other hand, trade-off theory related motives
are observed from the coefficients of DIV, NWC and TANG. Dividend paying firms are
relatively less financially constrained and hence hold less cash reserves. As expected by
the transaction cost motive, net working capital and tangible assets are negatively related
to cash since they are cash substitutes. Finally, in the developing sample the negative sign
on MTBR, a proxy for investment opportunities, is in line with the free-cash flow theory
since managers of firms with poor growth opportunities tend to hoard cash reserves in
order not to miss upcoming growth opportunities.
Next, we investigate the agency motives for holding cash by incorporating proxies for
shareholder and creditor rights and ownership concentration. The results are summarized
in Table 4.9.
[Insert Table 4.9 Here]
Models (I, II) and (V, V I) of Table 4.9 present the results from Fama-Macbeth regressions
for developing and developed samples, respectively. In models II and V I we incorporate
only legal protection variables and the ownership concentration measure to evaluate the
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direct effects of the agency variables on cash holdings. The explanatory power of these
models is not strong given the low R2 values; this might be due to the fact that the
country specific variables are the same for all firms in that country. All coefficients are
significant with same signs in both samples, which confirms the impact of agency theory
related motives on corporate cash holdings. In line with the agency theory, ASD has
negative signs, which implies that countries with higher shareholder protection hold less
cash. However, CRI has positive signs, which is counterintuitive to the view that stronger
creditor rights imply lower agency problems and so lower cash holdings. One possible
explanation for this result is that the banks are more willing to lend in markets with
stronger creditor rights which will increase corporate cash holdings. Finally, cash holdings
and ownership concentration are negatively related, which is explained by the argument
that a higher ownership concentration decreases the power of the managers by efficient
monitoring and prevents them from hoarding higher cash levels. In models I and V , we
control for firm specific variables. The inclusion of additional control variables increases the
R2 values and so the explanatory power of the models. In addition, it allows us to evaluate
the predictions of the agency theory on LEV, MTBR, and SIZE variables. We observe
that the magnitudes of all agency variables decrease when we incorporate firm specific
variables. Moreover, the ASD variable becomes insignificant in both samples and CRI
becomes insignificant in the developed sample. On the other hand, leverage is negatively
related with cash holdings in both samples, as expected by the agency conflicts view that
firms with lower leverage seem to be safer by investors and are not subject to regular
monitoring which results in higher managerial discretion and higher cash holdings. The
positive SIZE coefficient in the developing sample confirms also the agency motive, which
emphasizes the higher managerial discretion in larger firms. In addition, cross-sectional
OLS regressions are implemented by using the means of variables for each firm over the
sample period. Models IV and V III show that the coefficients of the agency variables are
almost the same when we use Fama-Macbeth regressions. When we control for the firm
specific variables, the impact of shareholder protection on cash holdings disappears since
the ASD becomes insignificant in both samples.
On the other hand, it is well documented in the extant literature that a countries legal
origin and tradition also have an impact on the shareholder and creditor protection, which
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may affect corporate cash policies. In particular, common law countries exhibit stronger
legal protection for shareholders and creditors than do the civil law countries. Hence, the
impact of the agency theory related motives on cash holdings is expected to be higher in
common law countries. We check this prediction by running regressions with firm specific
and agency variables for common and civil law subsamples. Since the Fama-Macbeth
and cross-sectional OLS regression results are almost the same for both samples, we only
provide the results for the cross-sectional OLS regressions in the following analysis.
[ Insert Table 4.10 Here ]
Panel A of Table 4.10 summarizes the results for the subsamples of common and civil
law countries. When we include only agency variables to our regressions, all variables
are significant in both the developing and developed country groups. In the sample of
developing countries, the impact of the agency motives on cash holdings is significant in
both, common and civil law countries. The ASD variable is negative and significant in
both subsamples, but the magnitude of the coefficient is much higher for the common law
subsample. In addition, CRI is positive in the civil law subsample. Therefore, the impact of
the agency theory related motives is stronger for the common law subsample. In the sample
of developed countries, ASD and CRI variables are positive in the civil law subsample,
hence the impact of agency motives is very weak despite the negative coefficient of the OC
variable. However, the impact of the agency motives is confirmed by the negative signs of
ASD and OC in the common law subsample. We also control for firm specific variables in
models I, III, V, and VII. The inclusion of additional control variables increases the R2
values and so the explanatory power of the models. We observe that the magnitudes of
almost all agency variables decrease when we incorporate firm specific variables. Moreover,
in the sample of developing countries, the ASD and OC variables become insignificant in
common law subsample. On the other hand, in the sample of developed countries, CRI
becomes insignificant in the common law subsample, and OC becomes insignificant in the
civil law subsample. Hence, the impact of agency motives of holding cash decreases in
both country groups. Finally, we examine the rationale behind the lower impact of agency
motives in the civil law subsample by employing the same regressions for German, French
and Scandinavian legal origin countries. The sample of developing countries does not
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include any country from Scandinavian legal origin. Further, it includes only one country,
Taiwan, from German legal origin which prevents us from running regressions. Hence, we
restrict our attention to the civil law countries in the developed sample. In models II, IV,
and VI of Panel B, we run regressions with only agency variables. We observe the impact
of the agency motives for the German and French legal origin countries since the ASD and
OC variables are significantly negative. The magnitudes of the coefficients are relatively
higher for the German legal origin subsample, hence the agency motives are stronger for
these countries. On the other hand, we do not observe any impact of the agency motives
for Scandinavian countries. Models I, III, and V present the results when we control for
firm specific variables. The impact of agency motives of holding cash completely vanishes
for German legal origin countries since all the agency variables become insignificant. In
addition, agency motives also weaken in French civil law subsample since the ASD and
CRI variables become insignificant. On the other hand, inclusion of firm specific variables
makes the coefficients of all agency variables significant in Scandinavian countries and
the negative sign of the OC variable confirms the weak impact of agency theory related
motives on holding cash for this subsample.
In summary, firms in developing and developed countries have target cash levels. In
addition, all the trade-off, pecking order and agency theory related motives are observed
in both samples. However, the impact of the agency motives weakens when we control for
firm specific variables. In the full sample, the agency motives for holding cash are relatively
stronger in the developing countries. Common law subsample exhibits higher impact of
agency motives on cash holdings than the civil law subsample. Furthermore, controlling
for firm specific variables, we observe a weak impact of the agency theory related motives
on cash holdings for the French and Scandinavian legal origin countries but not for the
German civil law subsample.
4.5 Crisis Analysis
In this section, we focus on the effects of the recent financial crisis on corporate cash
holdings. In particular, we investigate the direct effect of the crisis through a change in
demand for corporate liquidity and the indirect effects through changes in the relation
between the cash ratio and firm and country characteristics.
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4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
We start by looking at the descriptive statistics for the pre-crisis (2000 − 2006), crisis
(2007 − 2008), and post-crisis (2009 − 2011) periods to examine the change in corporate
cash holdings in developing and developed countries. Table 4.11 demonstrates the mean
and median cash ratios and the standard deviation values for all countries in our sample.
[Insert Table 4.11 Here]
Our first observation is that mean and median cash ratios increase from the pre-crisis
to the post-crisis period for the sample of developing countries. We check the statistical
significance of this increase by employing a t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test for mean and
median values, respectively. p-values from these tests17 verify the increases of the mean
and median cash ratios from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. This increase is mainly
driven by the East Asian countries such as Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. This result is consistent with the findings of Song and Lee [45] who investigate
the long-term effects of Asian financial crisis during the period 1997-1998 and show that the
East Asian firms become more conservative in cash holding policies and hold higher cash
reserves after the crisis for precautionary reasons. Similarly, Latin American countries
hold higher cash reserves during the recent crisis, which can be due to the fact that
they also experienced a Latin American crisis during late 90’s, which might increase the
precautionary motive for these countries. On the other hand, average cash ratios increase
in the developed sample from the pre-crisis to the crisis period and they decrease below
crisis values in the post-crisis period. However, median cash ratios have a slight increase
from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. The statistical significance of these changes
are also verified by Wilcoxon rank sum and t-tests.18 Consistent with our results for
the developing sample, East Asian countries Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea
increase their average cash reserves during the crisis. However, average cash ratios for the
Scandinavian countries except Denmark decrease during the crisis.
17p-value from a t-test = 0.0007 and p-value from a Wilcoxon rank sum test = 0.001.
18p-value from a t-test = 0.0003 (for the pre-crisis vs. crisis periods comparison), p-value from a t-test =
0.0000 (for the crisis vs. post-crisis periods comparison), p-value from a Wilcoxon rank sum test = 0.0018
(for the pre-crisis vs. crisis periods comparison), and p-value from a Wilcoxon rank sum test = 0.0000 (for
the crisis vs. post-crisis periods comparison).
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Secondly, we explore whether firm characteristics change during or after the crisis, which
might affect corporate liquidity decisions as well. Table 4.12 reports summary statistics
for the mean, median, and the standard deviation values for the cash determinants across
pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.
[Insert Table 4.12 Here]
A comparison of the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods in the developing sample in Panel
A shows that capital expenditures, cash flows, leverage, market-to-book-ratio, and tan-
gibility of firms decrease on average after the crisis. On the other hand, net working
capital, dividend payouts, and firm size increase in the post-crisis period. Changes in firm
characteristics after the crisis may provide us with initial ideas about the driving factors
of the increase in corporate cash holdings in the sample of developing countries. First of
all, decrease in the internal cash flows after the crisis implies a lack of cash substitutes.
In addition, increase in net working capital and decrease in tangibility are expected to
have converse effects on cash holdings since they are cash substitutes and these effects
may offset each other. On the other hand, according to the pecking-order theory, both
lower capital expenditures and leverage values, and higher dividend payouts with larger
firm size imply an increase in corporate cash holdings. Therefore, we observe the traces
of pecking-order theory related motives in the developing sample. Panel B reports the
changes in the cash determinants during the crisis for the developed countries. In contrast
to the developing sample, cash substitutes behave differently in the sample of developed
countries. Tangibility of the firms remains almost stable after the crisis and the net work-
ing capital decreases. Moreover, developed firms have lower and highly volatile cash flows
after the crisis. These changes may have negative effects on cash ratios in the post-crisis
period. On the other hand, capital expenditures decrease, firms become bigger and lowly
levered and they pay more dividends after the crisis. Trade-off and pecking order theories
have completely opposite predictions about the effects of these changes on corporate cash
holdings. Since the cash holding levels slightly decrease after the crisis, trade-off theory
related motives seem to dominate pecking-order theory related motives in the sample of
developed countries.
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4.5.2 Regressions for Firm Specific Variables
Having general information from the descriptive statistics of the variables, we now employ
several regressions to examine the effects of the recent crisis on cash holdings and their
determinants across developing and developed countries.
First of all, we check whether there is a regime shift in demand for cash during the crisis.
For this purpose, we define a crisis dummy (D07−11), which is equal to one in the period
2007−2011 and zero otherwise. We incorporate this variable into our initial system GMM
regression with other firm specific variables. Table 4.13 provides the results for both
samples. The dummy variable is positive and significant for the developing sample, which
implies that during the crisis, there is a positive regime shift in the demand for cash.
On the other hand, the dummy variable is positive but insignificant for the developed
sample. Hence, we do not observe an intercept change for the developed countries during
the crisis.19
[Insert Table 4.13 Here]
Next, we investigate the slope changes over the sample period. More specifically, we wish
to examine whether the relationship between cash holdings and firm specific variables
changes over time. Hence, we construct pre-crisis and crisis subsamples and run system
GMM regressions for different time periods. The results are summarized in Table 4.14.
[Insert Table 4.14 Here]
The first observation for the sample of developing countries is that the coefficient signs do
not change from the pre-crisis to the crisis periods except for the DIV and SIZE variables.
Before the crisis, dividend paying firms hold higher cash reserves, as supported by the
pecking-order theory. However, during the recent crisis, firms in developing countries had
to cut dividend payouts to generate internal funds since the external financing was more
costly. This behavior results in a negative relation between cash holdings and dividend
19However, when we allow for both slope and intercept changes we observe a negative regime shift in
demand for cash after the crisis as given in Table 4.15.
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payments. The coefficient of SIZE becomes insignificantly positive due to the recent cri-
sis, which may imply that the economies of scale vanish for firms in developing countries.
Further, the intercept becomes insignificant after the crisis. On the other hand, the effects
of the recent crisis on the slope coefficients are much stronger in the sample of developed
countries. The CF coefficient becomes negative during the crisis. One possible explana-
tion for this change is that firms in developed countries start to use internally generated
cash flows as a substitute for cash due to costly external financing and a lack of cash in
crises times. In addition, the SIZE coefficient switches from negative to positive, which
implies that larger firms hold higher cash reserves during the crisis. Another striking re-
sult is that the MTBR and DIV coefficients are not significant in the pre-crisis period but
become significant after the crisis. The negative signs of the MTBR and DIV variables
provide evidence for agency and precautionary motives, respectively. Moreover, the inter-
cept coefficient becomes insignificant during the crisis similarly to the developing sample.
Finally, we can utilize the signs of the coefficients from Table 4.14 to compare the trade-off
and pecking-order theory related motives for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The results
are similar for developing and developed samples: both trade-off and pecking-order theory
related motives exist in the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
On the other hand, changes in the demand for cash holdings during the crisis could be
due to the differences in the relationship between cash holdings and firm specific vari-
ables during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. We investigate this possibility by estimating
regressions allowing for both slope and intercept changes. In particular, we incorporate
interaction terms of the crisis dummy with firm specific variables. Table 4.15 illustrates
regression results. Second order correlation test results show that we reject the null hy-
pothesis that there is no second order serial correlation between disturbance terms. To
see the magnitude of these correlations, we execute second-order correlation test in Stata.
Untabulated results show that the second order correlation between disturbance terms are
negligible.
[Insert Table 4.15 here]
Our first observation is that most of the coefficients are significant and have the same
sign as the coefficient values from the full sample period regressions reported in Table
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4.8. The only exceptions are DIV and SIZE for the developing sample and LEV for the
developed sample. DIV becomes positive when we incorporate the interaction terms, which
is inline with the pecking-order theory. However, the sign of the DIV variable switches
back to a negative value and the magnitude of this variable increases after the crisis,
which potentially relates to the precautionary motive. In addition, the SIZE coefficient
becomes negative with the inclusion of the interaction terms in the developing sample
regressions. As stated by Bates et al. [7], a negative relation between firm size and cash
holdings can be explained by the transaction cost motive due to economies of scale. In
addition, the negative coefficient of the interaction term for SIZE shows that this relation
becomes stronger after the crisis. On the other hand, the coefficient of LEV variable
becomes positive with the incorporation of interaction terms in the sample of developed
countries. However, the relation between leverage and cash holdings is again negative
after the crisis which can be explained by the financing hierarchy. Table 4.15 also provides
us with the absolute impact of the firm specific variables on cash ratios, which can be
obtained by taking the sum of the coefficient values for estimates and the interaction term
coefficients. The results for the developing sample show that the relation between capital
expenditures and cash holdings become significantly positive during the crisis, which can
be explained with precautionary motives for holding cash. However, this relation weakens
after the crisis and changes sign from positive to negative as supported by the pecking-
order theory. Further, the interaction term for the intercept is significantly positive after
the crisis. This means that the increase in the cash holdings of developing countries may
be partly due to a positive regime shift in the demand for cash during the recent crisis.
On the other hand, in the developed sample, the absolute impact of cash flows and size
on cash holdings becomes weaker after the crisis. Moreover, the SIZE coefficient switches
sign from negative to positive which can be a signal of an increased level of higher agency
conflicts during crises periods. The negative relation between net working capital and
cash holdings strengthens with the crisis. Further, the interaction term for the intercept
becomes negative with the crisis, implying a decrease in the demand for cash which could
partly explain the slight decrease in cash holdings of the developed firms after the crisis.
Finally, we compare the trade-off and pecking-order theory related motives for holding
cash. To this end, we use the signs of the absolute impact of the variables on cash ratio.
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The results show that both the pecking order and trade-off theory related motives have
significant impact on corporate cash holdings in our samples.
4.5.3 Regressions for Country Specific Variables
In this section, we investigate how the relationship between cash holdings and country
specific variables changes during the recent financial crisis. More specifically, we elaborate
on the relation between agency variables, legal traditions, legal origins and cash holdings
separately during crisis periods.
First of all, we examine the effects of the crisis on the relationship between agency variables
and cash ratios. In line with section 4, we employ Fama-Macbeth and cross-sectional OLS
regressions for both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Table 4.16 summarizes the regression
results for the samples of developing and developed countries.
[Insert Table 4.16 here]
Coefficients of almost all variables have the same sign with closer magnitudes in Fama-
Macbeth and cross-sectional OLS regressions, which validates the robustness of results.
When we only incorporate agency variables, the R2 values are relatively low. Hence the
explanatory power of these regressions is weak. However, when we control for firm specific
variables, the R2 values increase dramatically, thus the incorporation of these variables
adds a lot to the explanatory power of the regressions. Models I and II in Panel A
show that the ASD variable has a negative coefficient for the developing sample both in
pre-crisis and crisis periods. This result is consistent with the agency view to the extent
that higher shareholder protection implies lower agency problems, which in turn results in
lower cash ratios. Moreover, the negative impact of higher shareholder protection on cash
holdings strengthens during the crisis since the absolute value of the coefficient becomes
higher. On the other hand, cross-sectional OLS regressions in models V and V I find an
insignificant relation between these variables before the crisis. However, the coefficient
of ASD becomes significant with a higher value due to the crisis similar to the results
of Fama-Macbeth models. When we incorporate firm specific variables into our models,
the impact of the anti-self dealing index on cash holdings vanishes, i.e., the coefficients
become insignificant in both regressions. Our second observation is in contrast to what
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the agency conflict perspective would predict: higher creditor rights imply higher cash
holdings for developing countries and this relation weakens slightly with the crisis. On the
other hand, we observe a negative relation between ownership concentration and the cash
ratio and the strength of this relation increases during the crisis. However, incorporating
firm specific variables decreases the magnitude of the coefficients, which makes the impact
of agency theory related motives weaker. Finally, models (III − IV ) and (V II − V III)
provides us with the opportunity to check the predictions of agency theory about firm
specific variables. Consistent with agency theory related motives, SIZE and cash holdings
are positively related in the sample of developing countries after the crisis. In addition,
leverage is negatively related with the cash ratio but the strength of the relation decreases
with the crisis. Overall, we observe an impact of agency related motives on corporate
cash holdings of developing countries. However, this impact becomes weaker when we
incorporate firm specific variables, while it becomes stronger due to the crisis. Panel B
illustrates the same regression results for the sample of developed countries. When we run
the regressions with only agency variables, the coefficient signs are exactly the same as
those that we obtain for the sample of developing countries. However, the strength of the
negative relation between anti-self dealing index and cash ratios decreases with the crisis
in contrast to the results for the developing sample. This weakened relation is observed
for the OC variable from cross-sectional OLS regressions. Similar with the results for the
developing sample, including firm specific variables eliminates the impacts of shareholder
protection on cash ratios. However, the OC coefficient is lower but still significant. Further,
this negative relation strengthens with the crisis. The signs of the coefficients for the firm
specific variables except for LEV do not support the predictions of the agency theory
about the relation between cash ratios and firm characteristics. Therefore, the impact of
the agency theory related motives is very weak for the sample of developed countries.
Next, we explore whether the recent financial crisis alters the relation between cash hold-
ings and agency variables for countries from different legal traditions and origins. Table
4.17 reports the regression results for different subsamples. We only report the cross-
sectional OLS regression results since the coefficient signs and values are very close in
both models.
[Insert Table 4.17 here]
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Models I-II and V-VI of Panels A and B present the regression results with only agency
variables for the sample of developing and developed countries, respectively. Our first
observation is that the coefficient signs do not change between the pre-crisis and the crisis
periods but the magnitudes change. In other words, the recent financial crisis does not
change the direction of the relation between agency variables and cash holdings, instead
it only affects the strength of the relations, both in the common and civil law subsamples.
The only exception is the CRI variable, which becomes insignificant with the crisis in the
common law subsample of developing countries. The ASD variable has negative coefficients
in both common and civil law subsamples. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is
relatively higher in common law countries and it decreases after the crisis. In addition, the
CRI coefficient is negative in the common law subsample before the crisis, as predicted by
the agency theory. However, it becomes insignificantly negative after the crisis. In contrast
to what the agency conflict view would predict, the coefficient of CRI is positive in the
civil law subsample. Hence, the agency motives are stronger for the developing countries
following common law tradition. On the other hand, the impact of agency motives almost
vanishes in the developed countries following civil law tradition since both the ASD and
CRI variables have positive coefficients. Agency motives are only observed through the
coefficient of the OC variable and become weaker with the crisis. However, both the CRI
and OC variables have negative signs in the common law subsample for both, the pre-
crisis and the crisis periods. Hence, the agency theory related motives are stronger for the
countries following common law tradition in the sample of developed countries. Further,
the recent crisis decreases the strength of these motives. When we incorporate firm specific
variables, as shown by models III-IV, and VII-VIII of Panels A and B, we observe changes
in the magnitude and significance of variables. In the sample of developing countries, ASD
becomes insignificant and CRI becomes significantly negative after the crisis in the common
law subsample. On the other hand, CRI becomes insignificiant with the inclusion of firm
specific variables in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods for the common law subsample
of developed countries. Moreover, the agency motives for holding cash completely vanish
for the civil law subsample since none of the agency variables is significant. To summarize,
the impact of agency motives on cash holdings is negatively affected by the incorporation
of firm specific variables in both samples. Finally, we employ regressions for German,
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French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries from the developed sample to find the
driving horse for not observing agency motives for holding cash. The results are given
in Panel C. Agency motives for holding cash are observed for countries from French and
German legal origins in the pre-crisis period since the coefficient signs for the ASD and
OC variables are negative. However, ASD becomes insignificant with the inclusion of firm
specific variables for the French civil law subsample. After the crisis, the impact of agency
motives on cash holdings disappears for German civil law countries since the coefficients
of all agency variables become insignificant. On the other hand, the magnitudes of the
coefficients decrease but the CRI variable becomes significantly negative for the French
civil law subsample. Further, controlling for firm specific variables, we do not observe
an impact of agency motives for Scandinavian countries in both the pre-crisis and crisis
periods. Therefore, having no agency motives for holding cash in the civil law subsample
of developed countries seems to be driven by the countries from German or Scandinavian
legal origins.
4.6 Industry Analysis
In this section, our objective is to examine which industries are the potential drivers for the
so far observed corporate cash holding policies in developing versus developed countries.
We further investigate the effects of 2007 - 2009 financial crisis to the industry cash ratios
and their determinants.
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
We use Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) to classify firms in our initial sample.
ICB has been established by Dow Jones and FTSE in 2005 and is currently used by sev-
eral financial markets around the world such as New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ,
etc.20 According to this taxonomy, our sample includes firms in nine industries: Oil and
gas (O&G) industry includes firms in alternative energy, oil and gas producers, and oil
equipment, services and distribution sectors. The basic materials (BM) industry comprises
firms in chemicals, forestry and paper, industrial metals, and mining sectors. Industrials
(IND) involves firms in aerospace and defense, general industrials, electronic and electrical
20See www.icbenchmark.com for detail.
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equipment, industrial engineering, industrial transportation, and support services sectors.
Consumer goods (CG) industry incorporates firms in automobiles and parts, beverages,
food producers, household goods and home construction, leisure goods, personal goods,
and tobacco sectors. Health care (HC) industry comprises firms in health care equipment
and services, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors. Consumer services (CS) indus-
try includes firms in food and drug retailers, general retailers, media, travel and leisure
sectors. Telecommunications (TEL) industry consists of firms in fixed line and mobile
telecommunications sectors. Utilities (UTI) industry involves firms in electricity, gas, wa-
ter and multiutilities sectors. Technology (TEC) industry includes firms in software and
computer services and technology hardware and equipment sectors. Manufacturing firms
constitute the major part of the basic materials, industrials and consumer goods indus-
tries and the high-tech firms belong to the health care and technology industries in ICB
taxonomy. This provides us with the opportunity of comparing the performance for the
manufacturing and high-tech firms in our analysis as well.
We start by demonstrating the long-term trend of the industry cash ratios. Figures 4.2
and 4.3 illustrate the evolution of average industry cash ratios over the period [2000, 2011]
in developing and developed countries, respectively.
The main insight from Figure 4.2 is that technology firms hold significantly higher cash
than do the firms in other industries in developing countries. In particular, the cash ra-
tio for an average technology firm is almost two times of the cash ratio for an average
developing firm. Firms in the health care and consumer services industries follow technol-
ogy firms and exhibit relatively higher cash ratios than the developing sample averages.
On the contrary, firms in electricity, gas, water and multiutilities sectors hold the lowest
cash ratios. Basic materials and consumer goods industries follow utilities and exhibit
relatively lower cash ratios as well. Industrial firms have almost the same trend with an
average developing firm. To sum up, high-tech firms seem to drive the average cash ratios
upward and the manufacturing firms seem to balance the developing averages with lower
cash holdings. Similarly, Figure 4.3 shows that health care and the technology industries
exhibit the highest cash ratios in the sample of developed countries. Firms in the utilities
industry have the lowest average cash ratios in developed countries as well. Consumer
goods and industrial firms follow the utilities industry with lower cash holdings. In con-
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Figure 4.2: Average Industry Cash Ratios in Developing Countries
This figure exhibits the long-term trend of average cash ratios for 9 industries in the sample of 23 developing
countries for the period [2000, 2011]. Average cash ratios for the full sample of developing countries are illustrated
by the black curve. Oil and gas (O&G) industry includes firms in alternative energy, oil and gas producers, and
oil equipment, services and distribution sectors. The basic materials (BM) industry comprises firms in chemicals,
forestry and paper, industrial metals and mining sectors. Industrials (IND) involves firms in aerospace and defense,
general industrials, electronic and electrical equipment, industrial engineering, industrial transportation, and support
services sectors. Consumer goods (CG) industry incorporates firms in automobiles and parts, beverages, food
producers, household goods and home construction, leisure goods, personal goods, and tobacco sectors. Health care
(HC) industry comprises firms in health care equipment and services, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors.
Consumer services (CS) industry includes firms in food and drug retailers, general retailers, media, travel and
leisure sectors. Telecommunications (TEL) industry consists of firms in fixed line and mobile telecommunications
sectors. Utilities (UTI) industry involves firms in electricity, gas, water and multiutilities sectors. Technology (TEC)
industry includes firms in software and computer services and technology hardware and equipment sectors. Cash
ratio is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets.
trast to the sample of developing countries, firms in the basic materials industry exhibit
higher cash ratios than the developed sample averages. However, in total, manufacturing
firms possess significantly lower cash holdings than do high-tech firms.
Secondly, we look at the industry cash ratios over the pre-crisis (00-06), crisis (07-08),
and post-crisis (09-11) periods. Table 4.18 summarizes the descriptive statistics about
the industry cash ratios. Panel A shows that industrials, consumer goods, and the basic
materials industries constitute the major part of the sample of developing countries. In
particular, manufacturing firms dominate the sample with around 65% proportion on
average. However, the proportion of high-tech firms is around 15% in the developing
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Figure 4.3: Average Industry Cash Ratios in Developed Countries
This figure exhibits the long-term trend of average cash ratios for 9 industries in the sample of 26 developed countries
for the period [2000, 2011]. Average cash ratios for the full sample of developed countries are illustrated by the black
curve. Oil and gas (O&G) industry includes firms in alternative energy, oil and gas producers, and oil equipment,
services and distribution sectors. The basic materials (BM) industry comprises firms in chemicals, forestry and paper,
industrial metals and mining sectors. Industrials (IND) involves firms in aerospace and defense, general industrials,
electronic and electrical equipment, industrial engineering, industrial transportation, and support services sectors.
Consumer goods (CG) industry incorporates firms in automobiles and parts, beverages, food producers, household
goods and home construction, leisure goods, personal goods, and tobacco sectors. Health care (HC) industry
comprises firms in health care equipment and services, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors. Consumer
services (CS) industry includes firms in food and drug retailers, general retailers, media, travel and leisure sectors.
Telecommunications (TEL) industry consists of firms in fixed line and mobile telecommunications sectors. Utilities
(UTI) industry involves firms in electricity, gas, water and multiutilities sectors. Technology (TEC) industry includes
firms in software and computer services and technology hardware and equipment sectors. Cash ratio is the ratio of
cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets.
countries sample. Most of the industries preserve their proportions from the pre-crisis to
the crisis periods. The only exceptions are the technology and the oil and gas industries,
which slightly increase their proportion with the crisis and the consumer services industry,
which has relatively lower ratio after the crisis. As we have observed so far, the average cash
holdings increase from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period in the sample of developing
countries. The first observation from Panel A is that the slight increase in average cash
ratios during the crisis is driven by the firms in the consumer services and basic materials
industries. Both industries exhibit a 3.5% increase in average cash ratios with the crisis.
On the other hand, almost all industries except telecommunications and utilities21 increase
21These two industries constitute only 5% proportion of the sample of developing countries.
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average cash holdings in the post-crisis period. However, a 5% increase in average cash
ratios in the post-crisis period seems to be dominated by the industrials and consumer
goods industries. A final observation is that the average cash holdings of the high-tech
firms are negatively affected by the crisis but they increase in the post-crisis period.
Panel B summarizes the industry cash ratios in the developed countries. The first observa-
tion is that the proportions of high-tech firms (22%) and oil and gas companies (6.5%) are
relatively higher but the proportion of manufacturing (55%) and utilities (2%) firms are
relatively lower in the sample of developed countries.22 Firms in the basic materials, oil
and gas industries increase their proportion during the crisis. However, the proportions of
industrial, consumer goods and services firms decrease with the crisis. As documented in
the previous section, in the sample of developed countries, average cash holdings increase
from the pre-crisis to the crisis period and decrease below crisis values in the post-crisis
period. Panel B shows that manufacturing firms play a crucial role for the 4% increase of
average cash ratios during the crisis. However, the decrease in average cash ratios from
the crisis to the post-crisis period is mainly caused by the basic materials industry, which
faces a 10% decrease in average cash ratios during the post-crisis period. Finally, high-tech
firms display a decreasing trend in average cash ratios from the pre-crisis to the post crisis
period which also partially drives the decrease in average cash ratios for the developed
sample after the crisis.
[Insert Table 4.18 here]
Next, we explore how the firm characteristics change with or after the crisis in different
industries. Table 4.19 presents the industry averages for the firm specific variables over
the pre-crisis (00-06), crisis (07-08), and post-crisis (09-11) periods.
[Insert Table 4.19 here]
Panel A summarizes the results for developing countries. The key observations are: First,
capital expenditures and the tangibility of the firms decrease on average after the crisis in
22Note that the proportion values given in parentheses are calculated by taking the average of pre-crisis,
crisis, and post-crisis proportions for these industries.
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all industries. Second, average firm size increases in all industries except telecommunica-
tions and firms have riskier cash flows in the post-crisis period. Further, technology firms
face extremely high but very risky cash flows during the crisis. Although cash flows drop
to normal values in the post crisis period, cash flow volatility remains extremely high. In
addition, these firms have lower net working capital and tangibility after the crisis, which
imply a potential lack of cash substitutes. Finally, manufacturing firms exhibit higher but
risky cash flows, pay less dividends, and become lowly levered in the post-crisis period.
Panel B reports the changes in firm specific variables for the developed countries. The
first observation is that from the crisis to the post-crisis period cash flows, size, and the
tangibility of firms increase in almost all industries. However, firms have relatively lower
investment opportunities, capital expenditures, and net working capital. High-tech firms
face relatively lower research and development expenditures, investment opportunities,
and capital expenditures during the crisis. These firms yet become larger, increase their
cash flows and pay higher dividends after the crisis. On the other hand, manufacturing
firms exhibit higher losses, lower net working capital and tangibility after the crisis. How-
ever, these firms become larger, riskier and lowly levered on average. Firms in the basic
materials industry, which drive the decreasing trend in average cash ratios for the devel-
oped countries, exhibit the following changes in cash determinants from the pre-crisis to
the post-crisis period: Capital expenditures, size, tangibility, and the cash flow volatility
increase after the crisis. Cash substitutes such as cash flows and the net working capital
decrease, firms become lowly levered and have less investment opportunities.
4.6.2 Industry Regressions
In this subsection, we employ several regressions to examine the effects of the 2007-2009
financial crisis on industry cash holdings and their determinants across developing and
developed countries.
We start by measuring the direct effect of the recent crisis through a change in the de-
mand for corporate liquidity. For this purpose, we run regressions for the nine industry
subsamples, in which firm specific variables and the crisis dummy (D07−11) are used as
explanatory variables. Table 4.20 provides the results for the samples of developing and
developed countries.
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[Insert Table 4.20 Here]
Panel A shows that the D07−11 dummy is positive and significant for consumer goods,
industrials, health care, consumer services, and the technology industries. Therefore,
with the effect of recent crisis, these industries face positive regime shifts in the demand
for cash. However, the crisis dummy is significantly negative for utilities firms. Thus,
the demand for cash decreases in the utilities industry with the crisis. In summary, the
observed positive regime shift in the demand for cash in the developing countries during
the crisis seems to be driven by high-tech firms and is supported partly by the results
for the manufacturing and consumer services firms. On the other hand, Panel B shows
that the results are quite different for the sample of developed countries. In particular, we
observe a negative regime shift in the demand for cash for the basic materials, health care,
consumer services, and the technology industries with the crisis since the D07−11 dummy is
significantly negative. However, a positive regime shift in the demand for cash is observed
for industrial and telecommunication firms with the crisis. The negative regime shifts
seem to dominate since we observe a negative regime change in demand for cash with the
crisis in our developed sample analysis. A final comment is that high-tech firms exhibit a
negative regime shift but manufacturing firms face a positive regime shift in demand for
cash with the crisis in the sample of developed countries.
Secondly, we investigate whether the slopes of the regressions change over the sample pe-
riod. More specifically, we wish to explore whether the relationship between corporate
cash holdings and firm specific variables changes during the crisis in our industry subsam-
ples. Hence, we employ system GMM regressions for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. The
results are summarized in Table 4.21.
[Insert Table 4.21 Here]
The first observation for the sample of developing countries is that the coefficient signs
do not change in oil and gas, health care, consumer services, utilities, and the telecom-
munications industries from the pre-crisis to the crisis periods except for changes in the
significance of few variables. More specifically, the coefficient of the LEV variable becomes
significantly negative for the oil and gas industry with the effect of the recent crisis, which
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might be due to the financing hierarchy of the oil and gas firms. Furthermore, the CF
and SIZE coefficients are not significant in the pre-crisis period but become significant
after the crisis for the consumer services industry. The positive signs of the CF and SIZE
variables after the crisis provide evidence for the pecking order theory related motives for
holding cash. In addition, the MTBR coefficient becomes significantly negative for the
health care industry during the crisis, which shows the impact of agency motive for hold-
ing cash. Moreover, the coefficients of the SIZE and MTBR variables become insignificant
for utilities and telecommunication firms with the effect of the recent crisis, which may
indicate that the economies of scale vanish and the precautionary motive for holding cash
weakens for these firms. In contrast to the above industries, we observe slope changes for
technology firms. The CF coefficient switches to a negative sign after the crisis, which can
be explained with the fact that cash flows stand for the cash substitutes. Moreover, the
impact of tangibility on cash holdings vanishes for technology firms after the crisis since
the TANG coefficient becomes insignificant. More striking results exist for manufacturing
firms. In particular, with the crisis, the coefficients of the SIZE and MTBR variables
switch from negative to positive and the CAPEX coefficient changes to negative for firms
in the basic materials industry. Hence, pecking order theory related motives replace pre-
cautionary motives for holding cash for basic materials firms after the crisis. On the other
hand, the DIV coefficient becomes negative for the consumer goods and industrial firms
and the CF coefficient switches to negative for the consumer goods industry which provide
evidence for the transaction cost and the precautionary motives for holding cash for these
industries after the crisis.
On the other hand, effects of the recent crisis on the slope coefficients are much stronger for
most of the industries in the sample of developed countries. Consistent with the results
for developing countries, the coefficient signs do not change for oil and gas, consumer
services, and telecommunications industries with the crisis. However, the CAPEX and
SIZE coefficients become insignificant and the MTBR coefficient becomes significant for
the telecommunication and oil and gas firms after the crisis. In addition, the DIV and
MTBR coefficients become insignificant but the TANG coefficient becomes significant for
the consumer services industry. In contrast to the sample of developing countries, we
observe slope changes for utilities firms in developed countries. The DIV, LEV, and NWC
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coefficients switch to a positive sign after the crisis. Hence, both precautionary and pecking
order theory related motives for holding cash are present for utilities firms. High-tech
industries exhibit relatively more slope changes in the developed countries. In particular,
the CF and NWC coefficients become negative for technology firms with the crisis, which
shows that the impact of the transaction cost motive becomes relatively stronger. However,
the MTBR coefficient switches to negative with the agency motive and the DIV coefficient
becomes positive as supported by the pecking order theory. The main observation from
the health care industry regressions is that the CAPEX coefficient becomes negative and
counterintuitively the NWC coefficient becomes positive after the crisis. Manufacturing
firms face slope changes during the crisis as well. The SIZE coefficient switches to positive
for the basic materials and consumer goods industries, the DIV coefficient becomes positive
for industrial firms, and the CAPEX coefficient becomes negative for the basic materials
industry. These observations reflect the increasing impact of the pecking-order theory
related motives on manufacturing firms after the crisis. However, the transaction cost
motive for holding cash also becomes visible since the CF coefficient switches to negative
for basic materials and industrial firms.
Finally, we investigate whether alterations in the demand for cash with the crisis are due
to the differences in the relationship between cash holdings and the firm specific variables
during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. For this purpose, we employ regressions allowing
for both slope and intercept changes for our industry subsamples. More specifically, we
incorporate interaction terms of the crisis dummy with firm specific variables. We also run
industry regressions without interaction terms for the whole sample period and compare
these results to each other in order to better evaluate the effects of the recent crisis.
Tables 4.23 and 4.22 present the regression results with and without interaction terms,
respectively.23
[Insert Table 4.22 here]
23Second order correlation test results for the consumer goods industry in the sample of developing
countries and basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, and the health care industries for the sample of
developed countries show that we reject the null hypothesis that there is no second order serial correlation
between disturbance terms. To see the magnitude of these correlations, we execute second-order correlation
tests in Stata. Untabulated results show that the second order correlation between disturbance terms are
negligible.
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[Insert Table 4.23 here]
We first compare the ‘Estimate’ columns in Table 4.23 with the coefficient values from
Table 4.22. The first observation from the sample of developing countries is that most
of the coefficients become insignificant when we incorporate the interaction terms espe-
cially for the consumer goods and health care industries. However, almost all significant
coefficients have the same sign as the coefficient values from the whole sample period re-
gressions. The first exception is the CF variable for the basic materials industry, which
becomes positive with the incorporation of interaction terms as supported by the pecking-
order theory. However, the sign of the CF variable switches back to negative and the
magnitude of this variable decreases after the crisis, which can be explained by the trans-
action cost motive. A second exception is the LEV variable for the industrial firms which
also becomes positive in the regressions with interaction terms. The relation between
leverage and cash holdings returns back to negative values for industrial firms after the
crisis which can be explained by the financing hierarchy. The final exception is the SIZE
variable for the telecommunications industry. The SIZE coefficient becomes negative with
the inclusion of interaction terms, which can be explained by the transaction cost motive
due to the economies of scale. We also utilize the absolute impacts of the firm specific
variables on cash ratios from Table 4.23 by calculating the sum of estimate values and
the coefficients of interaction terms. Results from Panel A show that relations between
firm specific variables and cash holdings change almost completely for the utilities and
technology industries in developing countries. Coefficient signs for technology industry
show that the absolute impact of the MTBR and SIZE variables on cash holdings become
weaker after the crisis. The relations change signs from negative to positive with the crisis,
which can be explained by the pecking order theory related motives. Furthermore, the
interaction term for intercept is significantly negative after the crisis. This means that the
slight decrease in the cash holdings of technology firms may partly be due to a negative
regime shift in the demand for cash with the recent crisis. In contrast to the changes
for technology firms, the relations between cash holdings and both the MTBR and SIZE
variables change signs from positive to negative and weaken during the crisis for utilities
firms. In addition, the absolute impact of the LEV variable on cash holdings becomes
positive after the crisis. These results emphasize the impact of precautionary motives for
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holding cash for the utilities industry. Relations between firm specific variables and cash
holdings slightly change for the basic materials, industrials, and the consumer services in-
dustries. In particular, the relation between the DIV variable and cash holdings becomes
negative for the basic materials and consumer services industries. Although the degree
of the relation decreases for the basic material firms, the relation becomes stronger for
the consumer services industry after the crisis. Finally, the absolute impact of CAPEX
variable on cash holdings becomes weaker and negative for industrial firms.
On the other hand, the key observations for the sample of developed countries are: First,
most of the coefficients become insignificant with the incorporation of interaction terms
especially for firms in the oil and gas, industrials, and the consumer services industries.
Second, among the significant variables, we observe that the coefficients change mostly
in the health care and consumer goods industries. The coefficients of CAPEX, DIV, and
NWC become positive and the TANG coefficient becomes negative with the incorporation
of interaction terms for the health care industry. These changes can be explained by both,
the trade-off and pecking-order theories related motives. In addition, signs of the MTBR
and SIZE variables switch to positive and negative values, respectively, for firms in the
consumer goods industry as expected by the transaction cost motive. These variables
revert back to the pre-crisis signs after the crisis. Further, the interaction terms for the
intercept are significantly negative for the consumer goods and health care industries after
the crisis. Therefore, negative regime shifts in the demand for cash are observed for
these industries. Moreover, relations between the firm specific variables and cash holdings
change for the consumer goods, telecommunications, and the technology industries after
the crisis. In particular, the absolute impact of the CF variable on cash holdings becomes
less significant after the crisis for the consumer goods and technology firms. The relations
change signs from positive to negative which can be explained by the transaction cost
motive. In addition, the relation between the DIV variable and cash holdings becomes
weaker and switches sign to positive values for the technology industry as supported by
the pecking-order theory. Finally, the absolute impact of the LEV and NWC variables
on cash holdings strengthens and becomes positive for telecommunication firms after the
crisis.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates firm and country specific determinants of corporate cash holding
decisions for firms in developing compared to firms in developed countries. We further
study whether the 2007-2009 financial crisis has a significant impact on cash reserves and
their determinants and examine which industries are the potential drivers for the observed
corporate cash holding policies. To this end, we use a very large panel dataset that includes
firms from 23 developing and 26 developed countries over a period from 1995-2011. Our
data allows us to examine the relationship of firm and country specific variables with cash
holdings over time.
We start with the observation that average cash holdings exhibit an increasing trend
for firms in both country groups with the only exception of the recent financial crisis.
Moreover, we find that firms in both country groups employ cash level targets. In addition,
the adjustment speed of the cash holdings to the target levels is relatively higher for firms
in developed countries.
Drawing on the insights from corporate finance theory, we use capital expenditures, cash
flow, dividend, market-to-book ratio, leverage, net working capital, size, and tangibility
in our empirical analysis in order to analyze firm specific effects on cash holdings. These
variables allow us to evaluate the predictions of the trade-off and pecking order theory
regarding the relationship between cash holdings and their determining variables. More-
over, this approach also allows us to study the motives for holding cash. On the other
hand, cash holding policies might also be affected by agency motives. Hence, we also
include country specific variables such as proxies for the legal protection of shareholders
and creditors, the ownership concentration of firms, and the legal traditions and origins
of the countries.
We first employ GMM, Fama-Macbeth, and cross-sectional OLS regressions for the whole
sample period. Our main observations are: First, both trade-off and pecking order theory
related variables help to explain the relationship between cash holdings and their determi-
nants. In particular, in both samples, cash holdings increase with cash flows and decrease
with capital expenditures and leverage, which suggest the pecking-order theory related mo-
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tives. Moreover, cash holdings are negatively related with dividend payouts, net working
capital, and tangibility, which highlights the existence of trade-off theory related motives,
in particular the transaction cost motive. Second, agency motives for holding cash oc-
cur in both samples but they are relatively stronger in the sample of firms in developing
countries. This motive weakens when we control for firm specific variables in our baseline
regressions. Further, the impact of the agency motives is strongly observed in countries
with a common law tradition. Within the subsample of firms with civil law tradition,
controlling for firm specific variables, a weak impact of the agency theory related motives
on cash holdings is observed for the French and Scandinavian legal origin countries but
not for the German civil law countries.
Next, we focus on pre-crisis and crisis periods to analyze the effects of the 2007-2009
financial crisis on cash management policies. Our first observation is that average cash
holdings increase from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period for the developing sample.
However, in the sample of developed countries, average cash holdings increase from the
pre-crisis to the crisis period and decrease below crisis values in the post-crisis period. We
find that the increase in average cash holdings of the firms in the developing sample can
partly be explained by a positive regime shift in the demand for cash and the changes in
the relationship between firm characteristics and cash holdings during the recent crisis.
On the other hand, in the sample of developed countries, we observe that the decrease
in average cash ratios after the crisis is at least partly the result of a negative regime
shift in the demand for cash. We further detect changes in the relation between cash
holdings and their determinants which may also contribute to the slight decrease in cash
holdings of the developed firms after the crisis. Another observation is that both trade-
off and pecking order theory related motives play a crucial role for the relation between
cash holdings and the firm specific variables in both pre-crisis and crises periods. In the
developing countries, the impact of agency motives becomes stronger from the pre-crisis
to the crisis periods. The agency motives, however, are weakly observed in the developed
countries sample in both periods. Finally, the impact of the agency theory related motives
is relatively stronger for common law countries. We do not observe an impact of agency
motives for the civil law subsample of the developed countries and this result seems to be
dominated by the German and Scandinavian legal origin countries.
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Finally, we employ an industry analysis to have a better insight for the observed cor-
porate cash holding policies in our country groups. In both developing and developed
country samples, high-tech and utilities firms hold the highest and lowest cash ratios, re-
spectively. On the other hand, manufacturing firms exhibit relatively lower cash ratios
than the developing and developed sample averages. Consumer services and the basic
materials industries seem to be the main drivers for the slight increase in average cash
ratios for developed countries during the crisis. In the post-crisis period, increase in aver-
age cash ratios stems from the consumer goods and industrial firms. On the other hand,
manufacturing firms play a crucial role in the increase of average cash ratios for developed
countries during the crisis and the basic materials industry dominates the significant de-
crease in average cash ratios during the post-crisis period. We further run a number of
regressions to explore the impact of the recent financial crisis on cash holdings and their
determinants across industries. The first observation is that high-tech firms and partly
manufacturing firms drive the positive regime shift in the demand for cash in developing
countries with the crisis. However, in the sample of developed countries, observed nega-
tive regime shift in the demand for cash is dominated by the basic materials, consumer
services, and high-tech firms. Moreover, the relations between firm specific variables and
cash holdings change mostly for the utilities, technology and manufacturing industries in
the sample of developing countries after the crisis. On the other hand, the coefficient signs
change mostly for firms in the health care and consumer goods industries in the sample
of developed countries during the crisis. We also observe changes in the relations between
firm specific variables and cash holdings for consumer goods, telecommunications, and
technology firms after the crisis.
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Appendix
Table 4.1: Summary of Theory and the Related Empirical Evidence Predictions
This table summarizes the predictions of the well-known corporate finance theories and the empirical evidence
related to these theories on the relation between corporate cash holdings and firm and country specific factors.
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio
of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Cash flow volatility (CFV) is the five year
historical standard deviation of cash flows. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend
in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the
ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net
working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. Research
and development (R&D) is the ratio of research and development expenditures to net sales. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets in 1995 US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
The anti-self dealing index (ASD) and the creditor rights index (CRI) are indicators for shareholder and creditor
protections, respectively. Ownership concentration (OC) is the median percentage of common shares owned by the
largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms.
Variable Trade-off Theory Pecking Order Theory Agency Theory
Capital Expenditures Positive Negative -
Cash Flow Negative Positive -
Cash Flow Volatility Positive Negative -
Dividends Negative Positive -
Leverage Positive Negative Negative
Market to Book Ratio Positive Positive Negative
Net Working Capital Negative - -
Research & Development Positive - -
Size Negative Positive Positive
Tangibility Negative - -
Anti-Self Dealing Index - - Negative
Creditor Rights Index - - Negative
Ownership Concentration - - Positive / Negative
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Country Cash Ratios
This table summarizes descriptive statistics about the cash ratio for each country in the sample for the period
[1995, 2011]. Financial firms are excluded and those firms that have at least five years of consecutive observations
for total assets are included. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for 23 developing countries with 87,979
observations for 8,151 unique firms. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for 26 developed countries with
211,274 observations for 17,402 unique firms. Cash ratio is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book
value of total assets. Column (6) shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period.
Panel A: Developing Countries
Mean 25th perc. Median 75th perc. SD N
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Argentina 0.072 0.019 0.048 0.097 0.078 911
Brazil 0.111 0.017 0.066 0.153 0.132 3042
Chile 0.070 0.011 0.032 0.084 0.111 1876
China 0.175 0.081 0.141 0.231 0.136 17312
Colombia 0.065 0.015 0.042 0.092 0.071 342
Czech Republic 0.119 0.026 0.064 0.123 0.188 162
Egypt 0.162 0.043 0.123 0.238 0.147 791
Hungary 0.089 0.025 0.056 0.141 0.080 321
India 0.070 0.014 0.032 0.078 0.105 14389
Indonesia 0.122 0.027 0.079 0.178 0.126 3396
Malaysia 0.131 0.034 0.084 0.181 0.138 8292
Mexico 0.082 0.028 0.060 0.113 0.076 1356
Morocco 0.102 0.017 0.050 0.136 0.136 381
Nigeria 0.101 0.042 0.077 0.130 0.085 195
Pakistan 0.090 0.010 0.038 0.125 0.122 1924
Peru 0.068 0.010 0.029 0.086 0.106 953
Philippines 0.136 0.024 0.081 0.177 0.170 1684
Poland 0.110 0.026 0.065 0.146 0.130 2128
Russia 0.101 0.014 0.050 0.133 0.133 3006
South Africa 0.146 0.039 0.099 0.195 0.158 2823
Taiwan 0.186 0.077 0.144 0.253 0.151 15142
Thailand 0.101 0.019 0.056 0.142 0.118 4998
Turkey 0.098 0.013 0.055 0.144 0.116 2556
All Developings 0.130 0.030 0.086 0.182 0.138 87979
Panel B: Developed Countries
Mean 25th perc. Median 75th perc. SD N
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Australia 0.277 0.051 0.165 0.434 0.283 10867
Austria 0.130 0.035 0.082 0.163 0.155 779
Belgium 0.132 0.035 0.072 0.150 0.169 1302
Canada 0.241 0.028 0.129 0.370 0.271 16161
Denmark 0.164 0.031 0.085 0.212 0.203 1445
Finland 0.143 0.036 0.082 0.173 0.170 1611
France 0.157 0.050 0.107 0.208 0.157 7202
Germany 0.178 0.036 0.102 0.242 0.201 8006
Greece 0.086 0.020 0.046 0.107 0.107 2720
Hong Kong 0.223 0.085 0.167 0.309 0.190 10400
Ireland 0.191 0.057 0.123 0.299 0.174 543
Israel 0.238 0.058 0.146 0.340 0.246 2526
Italy 0.119 0.039 0.078 0.148 0.124 2484
Japan 0.182 0.085 0.143 0.237 0.140 43738
Luxembourg 0.123 0.064 0.109 0.153 0.086 144
Netherlands 0.124 0.024 0.069 0.166 0.146 1541
New Zealand 0.105 0.007 0.031 0.102 0.177 948
Norway 0.192 0.054 0.112 0.233 0.214 1652
Portugal 0.064 0.017 0.037 0.075 0.081 600
Singapore 0.190 0.073 0.144 0.260 0.159 6003
South Korea 0.152 0.049 0.107 0.211 0.141 13836
Spain 0.098 0.025 0.063 0.128 0.108 1400
Sweden 0.196 0.044 0.111 0.269 0.216 3430
Switzerland 0.175 0.065 0.128 0.224 0.169 2391
UK 0.183 0.038 0.106 0.248 0.211 12321
USA 0.227 0.027 0.110 0.339 0.266 57224
All Developed 0.199 0.047 0.122 0.267 0.217 211274
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Country Specific Variables
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the country specific variables for the period [1995, 2011] with Panel
A and Panel B displaying the statistics for 17 developing and 24 developed countries, respectively. Cash ratio is
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. The anti-self dealing index (ASD) and
the creditor rights index (CRI) are indicators for shareholder and creditor protections, respectively. Ownership
concentration (OC) is the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the
ten largest privately owned non-financial firms. The legal structure data includes the information about the
legal origins (LO) of the countries (English, French, German, or Scandinavian) and the law of traditions (LT)
(common-law or civil-law).
Panel A: Developing Countries
Country Cash ASD CRI OC LT LO
India 0.07 0.58 2 0.40 Common Law English
Malaysia 0.13 0.95 3 0.54 Common Law English
Nigeria 0.10 0.43 4 0.40 Common Law English
Pakistan 0.09 0.41 1 0.37 Common Law English
South Africa 0.15 0.81 3 0.52 Common Law English
Thailand 0.10 0.81 2 0.47 Common Law English
Average 0.098 0.718 2.294 0.455
Indonesia 0.12 0.65 2 0.58 Civil Law French
Mexico 0.08 0.17 0 0.64 Civil Law French
Argentina 0.07 0.34 1 0.53 Civil Law French
Peru 0.07 0.45 0 0.56 Civil Law French
Philippines 0.14 0.22 1 0.57 Civil Law French
Brazil 0.11 0.27 1 0.57 Civil Law French
Chile 0.07 0.63 2 0.45 Civil Law French
Colombia 0.07 0.57 0 0.63 Civil Law French
Turkey 0.10 0.43 2 0.59 Civil Law French
Egypt 0.16 0.20 2 0.62 Civil Law French
Taiwan 0.19 0.56 2 0.18 Civil Law German
Average 0.143 0.486 1.659 0.317
Developing Average 0.120 0.603 1.979 0.386
Panel B: Developed Countries
Country Cash ASD CRI OC LT LO
Australia 0.28 0.76 3 0.28 Common Law English
Canada 0.24 0.64 1 0.40 Common Law English
Hong Kong 0.22 0.96 4 0.54 Common Law English
Ireland 0.19 0.79 1 0.39 Common Law English
Israel 0.24 0.73 3 0.51 Common Law English
New Zealand 0.11 0.95 4 0.48 Common Law English
Singapore 0.19 1.00 3 0.49 Common Law English
United Kingdom 0.18 0.95 4 0.19 Common Law English
United States 0.23 0.65 1 0.20 Common Law English
Average 0.226 0.743 1.939 0.289
Belgium 0.13 0.54 2 0.54 Civil Law French
France 0.16 0.38 0 0.34 Civil Law French
Greece 0.09 0.22 1 0.67 Civil Law French
Italy 0.12 0.42 2 0.58 Civil Law French
Netherlands 0.12 0.20 3 0.39 Civil Law French
Portugal 0.06 0.44 1 0.52 Civil Law French
Austria 0.13 0.21 3 0.58 Civil Law German
Germany 0.18 0.28 3 0.48 Civil Law German
Japan 0.18 0.50 2 0.18 Civil Law German
South Korea 0.15 0.47 3 0.23 Civil Law German
Switzerland 0.18 0.27 1 0.41 Civil Law German
Denmark 0.16 0.46 3 0.45 Civil Law Scandinavian
Finland 0.14 0.46 1 0.37 Civil Law Scandinavian
Norway 0.19 0.42 2 0.36 Civil Law Scandinavian
Sweden 0.20 0.33 1 0.28 Civil Law Scandinavian
Average 0.167 0.434 2.005 0.285
Developed Average 0.200 0.606 1.968 0.287
All Common Average 0.198 0.738 2.016 0.325
All Civil Average 0.161 0.447 1.916 0.293
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Table 4.4: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Cash Cash & Short Term Investments / Total Assets (TA)
CAPEX Capital Expenditures / TA
Cash Flow (Pretax Income - Income Taxes + Depreciation) / TA
Cash Flow Volatility Five year historical standard deviation of cash flows
Dividends Dummy variable defined according to common dividends payment
Leverage Total Debt / TA
Market to Book Ratio (TA - Common Shareholders’ Equity + Market Value) / TA
Net Working Capital (Current Assets - Current Liabilities - Cash) / TA
Research & Development Research & Development Expenditures / Net Sales
Size log(Total Asset/CPI)
Tangibility Fixed Assets / TA
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Specific Variables
This table illustrates summary statistics for the firm specific variables used as explanatory variables for the sample
period [1995, 2011]. The sample includes firms that have at least five years of consecutive observations for total
assets and excludes financial firms. The explanatory variables are winsorized following the instructions in Section
4.3. Panel A shows summary statistics for the developing sample with 87,979 observations for 8,151 unique firms.
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the developed sample with 211,274 observations for 17,402 unique firms.
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of
pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Cash flow volatility (CFV) is the five year
historical standard deviation of cash flows. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend
in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the
ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net
working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. Research
and development (R&D) is the ratio of research and development expenditures to net sales. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets in 1995 US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
Column (6) shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period.
Panel A: Developing Countries
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum N
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Expenditures 0.062 0.040 0.067 0.000 0.339 86023
Cash Flow 0.074 0.075 0.103 -0.401 0.353 83044
Cash Flow Volatility 0.059 0.034 0.088 0.004 0.654 52118
Dividend Dummy 0.492 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 88148
Leverage 0.252 0.228 0.207 0.000 1.000 88080
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.536 1.171 1.149 0.343 7.555 76391
Net Working Capital 0.017 0.026 0.220 -0.914 0.530 87398
R&D 0.006 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.142 87384
Size 18.044 18.072 1.888 6.251 26.104 88138
Tangibility 0.373 0.355 0.220 0.005 0.893 88018
Panel B: Developed Countries
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum N
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Expenditures 0.058 0.032 0.078 0.000 0.459 202161
Cash Flow -0.143 0.055 0.901 -7.005 0.392 201210
Cash Flow Volatility 0.225 0.037 0.836 0.003 6.936 143311
Dividend Dummy 0.486 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 211912
Leverage 0.227 0.175 0.233 0.000 1.000 211320
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.842 1.189 7.510 0.396 63.388 175197
Net Working Capital -0.107 0.002 0.788 -6.480 0.505 208367
R&D 0.098 0.000 0.530 0.000 4.655 195433
Size 18.346 18.477 2.630 6.522 27.129 211877
Tangibility 0.292 0.242 0.240 0.000 0.934 210584
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Table 4.6: Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between paired explanatory variables. The sample includes
the firms that have at least five years of consecutive observations for total assets and excludes financial firms. The
explanatory variables are winsorized following the instructions in Section 4.3. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes
plus depreciation to total assets. Cash flow volatility (CFV) is the five year historical standard deviation of cash
flows. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of
current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. Research and development (R&D) is the ratio
of research and development expenditures to net sales. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1995 US
dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
Panel A: Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) CASH 1.00
(2) CAPEX -0.10 1.00
(3) CF 0.15 0.19 1.00
(4) CFV 0.06 -0.07 -0.26 1.00
(5) DIV 0.05 0.09 0.28 -0.20 1.00
(6) LEV -0.35 0.09 -0.32 0.08 -0.17 1.00
(7) MTBR 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.23 -0.09 -0.04 1.00
(8) NWC -0.04 -0.05 0.27 -0.20 0.19 -0.41 -0.20 1.00
(9) R&D 0.27 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.15 0.04 0.08 1.00
(10) SIZE 0.02 0.09 0.12 -0.29 0.19 0.12 -0.03 -0.16 -0.04 1.00
(11) TANG -0.38 0.35 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.26 -0.12 -0.30 -0.12 0.15 1.00
Panel B: Developed Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) CASH 1.00
(2) CAPEX -0.10 1.00
(3) CF -0.16 -0.04 1.00
(4) CFV 0.16 0.03 -0.70 1.00
(5) DIV -0.22 -0.07 0.25 -0.25 1.00
(6) LEV -0.31 0.02 -0.26 0.20 -0.04 1.00
(7) MTBR 0.19 0.03 -0.73 0.65 -0.20 0.22 1.00
(8) NWC -0.09 -0.03 0.73 -0.62 0.18 -0.40 -0.71 1.00
(9) R&D 0.31 -0.03 -0.28 0.20 -0.17 -0.01 0.22 -0.13 1.00
(10) SIZE -0.33 -0.05 0.49 -0.45 0.50 0.03 -0.46 0.40 -0.17 1.00
(11) TANG -0.39 0.47 0.07 -0.10 0.10 0.19 -0.10 0.00 -0.12 0.18 1.00
Table 4.7: Target Cash Level Regression
Developing Developed
α 0.0015 -0.0031
(0.0003) (0.0003)
β -0.2217*** -0.2507***
(0.003) (0.002)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 4.8: System GMM Regressions for the Whole Sample
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions predicting cash holdings. The sample period in
all regressions is [1995, 2011] though the available number of observations for each firm changes across firms. The
dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets.
L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to
total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets.
Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio
of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current
assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1995 US
dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for the first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test for
overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate a coefficient, which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
VARIABLES DEVELOPING SAMPLE DEVELOPED SAMPLE
L.CASH 0.719*** 0.395***
(0.042) (0.024)
CAPEX 0.195 -0.678**
(0.407) (0.315)
CF 0.182*** 0.208***
(0.029) (0.058)
DIV -0.120** -0.016***
(0.049) (0.0027)
LEV -0.113*** -0.075**
(0.022) (0.032)
MTBR -0.032** -0.001
(0.015) (0.001)
NWC -0.129*** -0.167***
(0.027) (0.042)
SIZE 0.004* -0.026***
(0.002) (0.008)
TANG -0.165*** -0.489**
(0.054) (0.206)
CONS 0.146*** 0.822***
(0.044) (0.109)
N 67,158 153,470
# FIRMS 7,714 15,594
AR1 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.160 0.161
HANSEN 0.760 0.151
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Table 4.9: Agency Variables Regressions for the Whole Sample Period
This table presents Fama-Macbeth and cross-sectional OLS regressions predicting cash holdings. The sample period
in all regressions is [1995, 2011] though the available number of observations for each firm changes across firms. The
dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. The
anti-self dealing index (ASD) and the creditor rights index (CRI) are indicators for the shareholder and creditor
protection, respectively. Ownership concentration (OC) is the median percentage of common shares owned by the
largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes
plus depreciation to total assets. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend in a given
year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of the
book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net working
capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets in 1995 US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
Fama-Macbeth model gives the average of time series of coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions. The
cross-sectional OLS regression uses means of variables for each firm. Newey-West standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a coefficient, which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
VARIABLES
DEVELOPING SAMPLE DEVELOPED SAMPLE
FAMA-MACBETH CROSS-SECTION OLS FAMA-MACBETH CROSS-SECTION OLS
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
ASD -0.0097 -0.0448*** 0.0114 -0.0340*** -0.0051 -0.0337*** -0.0018 -0.0381***
(0.0079) (0.0047) (0.0099) (0.0117) (0.0030) (0.0069) (0.0059) (0.0075)
CRI 0.0086*** 0.0252*** 0.0047* 0.0218*** 0.0012 0.0099*** 0.0055*** 0.0136***
(0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0010) (0.0013)
OC -0.0685* -0.1010** -0.1320*** -0.1700*** -0.0622*** -0.2050*** -0.0785*** -0.2540***
(0.0376) (0.0407) (0.0086) (0.0112) (0.0208) (0.0253) (0.0084) (0.0100)
CAPEX -0.0005
-
0.0204
-
0.0535**
-
0.1490***
-(0.0168) (0.0277) (0.0201) (0.0245)
CF 0.154***
-
0.1740***
-
-0.0067
-
-0.0204***
-(0.0164) (0.0253) (0.0087) (0.0043)
DIV 0.0104***
-
-0.0006
-
-0.0369***
-
-0.0571***
-(0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0034)
LEV -0.1860***
-
-0.2550***
-
-0.2910***
-
-0.386***
-(0.0168) (0.0078) (0.0073) (0.0083)
MTBR 0.0102***
-
0.0184***
-
0.0024***
-
0.0016***
-(0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.00047)
NWC -0.1930***
-
-0.2030***
-
-0.0768*
-
-0.0252***
-(0.0068) (0.0105) (0.0381) (0.0049)
SIZE 0.0020***
-
0.0021***
-
-0.0084***
-
-0.0073***
-(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0007)
TANG -0.2080***
-
-0.2060***
-
-0.2710***
-
-0.2490***
-(0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0067) (0.0065)
CONS 0.1960*** 0.1320*** 0.2330*** 0.1660*** 0.5230*** 0.2540*** 0.5220*** 0.2860***
(0.0256) (0.0234) (0.0174) (0.0069) (0.0359) (0.0150) (0.0124) (0.0059)
N 52,994 64,669 5692 5980 160,185 211,130 15643 17382
Years 17 17 - - 17 17 - -
R2 0.321 0.035 0.441 0.059 0.319 0.017 0.407 0.033
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Table 4.10: Legal Origin and Tradition Analyses
This table presents cross-sectional OLS regressions predicting cash holdings. The sample period in all regressions
is [1995, 2011] though the available number of observations for each firm changes across firms. The dependent
variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. The anti-self
dealing index (ASD) and the creditor rights index (CRI) are indicators for the shareholder and creditor protection,
respectively. Ownership concentration (OC) is the median percentage of common shares owned by the largest three
shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms. Panel A displays the results according to law of
tradition for both country groups. Panel B presents the results according to legal origin for the sample of developed
countries. The cross-sectional OLS regression uses means of variables for each firm. Newey-West standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a coefficient, which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
PANEL A
VARIABLES DEVELOPING SAMPLE DEVELOPED SAMPLE
COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
ASD -0.0128 -0.226*** -0.0371** -0.132*** 0.0521* 0.208*** 0.139*** 0.0861***
(0.0473) (0.0493) (0.0166) (0.0192) (0.0289) (0.0348) (0.0228) (0.0271)
CRI -0.0187*** -0.0112** 0.0158*** 0.0262*** -0.000877 -0.0127*** 0.00436** 0.00765***
(0.00490) (0.00509) (0.00359) (0.00365) (0.00297) (0.00359) (0.00172) (0.00224)
OC 0.463*** 1.147*** -0.112*** -0.222*** -0.0832*** -0.181*** 0.0307** -0.288***
(0.154) (0.153) (0.0121) (0.0134) (0.0116) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0176)
CAPEX 0.144***
-
0.104**
-
0.0684**
-
0.300***
-(0.0324) (0.0456) (0.0311) (0.0375)
CF 0.101***
-
0.273***
-
-0.00142
-
-0.0326***
-(0.0349) (0.0344) (0.00610) (0.00610)
DIV 0.00619
-
0.0169***
-
-0.0356***
-
-0.0864***
-(0.00431) (0.00641) (0.00437) (0.00536)
LEV -0.191***
-
-0.259***
-
-0.339***
-
-0.446***
-(0.0103) (0.0147) (0.0109) (0.0127)
MTBR 0.0156***
-
0.0267***
-
0.00303***
-
0.00103*
-(0.00311) (0.00400) (0.000745) (0.000602)
NWC -0.166***
-
-0.197***
-
-0.0288***
-
-0.0240***
-(0.0138) (0.0178) (0.00725) (0.00673)
SIZE -0.000949
-
-0.00290**
-
-0.0101***
-
-0.00482***
-(0.00112) (0.00125) (0.000847) (0.00112)
TANG -0.166***
-
-0.261***
-
-0.227***
-
-0.280***
-(0.0103) (0.0124) (0.00790) (0.0107)
CONS 0.0405 -0.236*** 0.327*** 0.253*** 0.520*** 0.127*** 0.411*** 0.262***
(0.0341) (0.0298) (0.0302) (0.0123) (0.0221) (0.0194) (0.0225) (0.0164)
N 3163 3273 2529 2707 8810 10259 6833 7123
R2 0.403 0.091 0.514 0.128 0.394 0.017 0.426 0.054
PANEL B
VARIABLES DEVELOPED CIVIL LAW SAMPLE
FRENCH GERMAN SCANDINAVIAN
I II III IV V VI
ASD 0.0178 -0.0913*** -0.206 -0.629* 1.245*** 0.390
(0.0247) (0.0332) (0.294) (0.361) (0.421) (0.454)
CRI -0.00166 -0.00616 0.00618 0.0249** 0.0424** 0.0566**
(0.00302) (0.00411) (0.00840) (0.0104) (0.0202) (0.0233)
OC -0.0761*** -0.145*** -0.151 -0.918*** -0.969* -0.935
(0.0224) (0.0324) (0.232) (0.287) (0.548) (0.598)
CAPEX 0.311***
-
0.308***
-
-0.00432
-(0.0750) (0.0431) (0.137)
CF 0.0931**
-
-0.0344***
-
-0.0167
-(0.0461) (0.00632) (0.0295)
DIV -0.0245**
-
-0.114***
-
-0.0137
-(0.0109) (0.00698) (0.0174)
LEV -0.431***
-
-0.447***
-
-0.437***
-(0.0235) (0.0148) (0.0371)
MTBR 0.00744
-
0.000817
-
0.0191***
-(0.00620) (0.000617) (0.00470)
NWC -0.195***
-
-0.0186***
-
-0.116***
-(0.0353) (0.00704) (0.0400)
SIZE -0.00742***
-
-0.00538***
-
-0.00685**
-(0.00207) (0.00139) (0.00297)
TANG -0.252***
-
-0.313***
-
-0.0930***
-(0.0191) (0.0127) (0.0340)
CONS 0.498*** 0.276*** 0.637*** 0.698*** 0.182*** 0.279***
(0.0386) (0.0213) (0.172) (0.212) (0.0598) (0.0498)
N 1224 1261 4957 5205 652 657
R2 0.494 0.031 0.427 0.036 0.440 0.011
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Table 4.11: Cash Ratios for the Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods
This table summarizes descriptive statistics about the cash ratio for each country in the sample for the pre-crisis
(00-06), crisis (07-08), and post-crisis (09-11) periods. Financial firms are excluded and those firms that have at
least five years of consecutive observations for total assets are included. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics
for 23 developing countries and Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for 26 developed countries. Cash ratio is
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets.
Panel A: Developing Countries
Country Pre-Crisis (00-06) Crisis (07-08) Post-Crisis (09-11)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Argentina 0.0657 0.0393 0.0811 0.0874 0.0658 0.0842 0.0893 0.0716 0.0747
Brazil 0.1026 0.0533 0.1310 0.1304 0.0907 0.1415 0.1264 0.0910 0.1350
Chile 0.0584 0.0246 0.0980 0.0821 0.0318 0.1340 0.0892 0.0506 0.1315
China 0.1774 0.1428 0.1344 0.1725 0.1371 0.1414 0.1837 0.1477 0.1424
Colombia 0.0710 0.0509 0.0729 0.0685 0.0474 0.0788 0.0640 0.0362 0.0667
Czech Republic 0.0897 0.0471 0.1038 0.1355 0.0630 0.2577 0.1838 0.0832 0.2770
Egypt 0.1441 0.1084 0.1409 0.1667 0.1472 0.1373 0.1739 0.1314 0.1543
Hungary 0.0848 0.0555 0.0798 0.1015 0.0679 0.0869 0.0800 0.0462 0.0782
India 0.0737 0.0314 0.1119 0.0761 0.0359 0.1079 0.0702 0.0322 0.1045
Indonesia 0.1133 0.0704 0.1218 0.1189 0.0789 0.1261 0.1263 0.0808 0.1378
Malaysia 0.1287 0.0789 0.1421 0.1329 0.0868 0.1329 0.1440 0.1020 0.1363
Mexico 0.0807 0.0549 0.0794 0.0874 0.0659 0.0830 0.0898 0.0766 0.0718
Morocco 0.1169 0.0562 0.1304 0.1056 0.0604 0.1453 0.0845 0.0401 0.1355
Nigeria 0.0920 0.0752 0.0833 0.1131 0.0960 0.0887 0.0986 0.0748 0.0849
Pakistan 0.1079 0.0582 0.1365 0.0912 0.0373 0.1271 0.0684 0.0221 0.1033
Peru 0.0590 0.0225 0.0953 0.0827 0.0293 0.1366 0.0820 0.0413 0.1114
Philippines 0.1173 0.0695 0.1552 0.1603 0.0958 0.1853 0.1820 0.1181 0.2083
Poland 0.1041 0.0623 0.1232 0.1310 0.0727 0.1489 0.1049 0.0608 0.1290
Russia 0.0850 0.0446 0.1165 0.1113 0.0558 0.1396 0.1097 0.0548 0.1411
South Africa 0.1520 0.1053 0.1605 0.1492 0.0988 0.1570 0.1453 0.0984 0.1610
Taiwan 0.1688 0.1268 0.1412 0.1980 0.1535 0.1542 0.2273 0.1866 0.1613
Thailand 0.0986 0.0555 0.1140 0.1025 0.0594 0.1186 0.1147 0.0659 0.1294
Turkey 0.0940 0.0502 0.1169 0.0856 0.0499 0.0953 0.0970 0.0569 0.1086
All Developings 0.1311 0.0885 0.1363 0.1315 0.0886 0.1407 0.1380 0.0922 0.1463
Panel B: Developed Countries
Country Pre-Crisis (00-06) Crisis (07-08) Post-Crisis (09-11)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Australia 0.2849 0.1654 0.2924 0.3070 0.2074 0.2861 0.2733 0.1746 0.2710
Austria 0.1299 0.0784 0.1626 0.1287 0.0667 0.1624 0.1384 0.0877 0.1608
Belgium 0.1310 0.0667 0.1722 0.1481 0.0767 0.2002 0.1383 0.0816 0.1798
Canada 0.2482 0.1314 0.2785 0.2672 0.1638 0.2809 0.2346 0.1277 0.2628
Denmark 0.1579 0.0784 0.2042 0.1808 0.0655 0.2369 0.1447 0.0630 0.2006
Finland 0.1551 0.0794 0.1929 0.1375 0.0822 0.1610 0.1229 0.0848 0.1269
France 0.1574 0.1065 0.1584 0.1642 0.1066 0.1682 0.1625 0.1160 0.1563
Germany 0.1881 0.0997 0.2146 0.1944 0.1121 0.2083 0.1869 0.1298 0.1852
Greece 0.0878 0.0483 0.1073 0.0752 0.0430 0.0989 0.0776 0.0420 0.1025
Hong Kong 0.2201 0.1659 0.1858 0.2521 0.1884 0.2055 0.2486 0.1914 0.1962
Ireland 0.2070 0.1242 0.1969 0.1936 0.1228 0.1597 0.1817 0.1293 0.1558
Israel 0.2409 0.1614 0.2451 0.2471 0.1508 0.2527 0.2402 0.1421 0.2497
Italy 0.1266 0.0791 0.1375 0.1136 0.0796 0.1174 0.1009 0.0676 0.1030
Japan 0.1795 0.1384 0.1438 0.1755 0.1316 0.1478 0.1957 0.1565 0.1488
Luxembourg 0.1088 0.0903 0.0799 0.1338 0.1216 0.0991 0.1248 0.1117 0.0825
Netherlands 0.1295 0.0744 0.1519 0.1253 0.0657 0.1713 0.1016 0.0698 0.1203
New Zealand 0.1176 0.0341 0.1885 0.0999 0.0337 0.1697 0.1186 0.0371 0.1905
Norway 0.2051 0.1151 0.2259 0.1982 0.1104 0.2186 0.1747 0.1054 0.1996
Portugal 0.0620 0.0352 0.0779 0.0791 0.0440 0.1060 0.0749 0.0497 0.0771
Singapore 0.1796 0.1340 0.1544 0.2022 0.1509 0.1640 0.2174 0.1785 0.1683
South Korea 0.1556 0.1077 0.1457 0.1617 0.1180 0.1448 0.1553 0.1120 0.1410
Spain 0.1026 0.0617 0.1173 0.0990 0.0631 0.1177 0.1071 0.0794 0.0963
Sweden 0.2155 0.1350 0.2252 0.1889 0.0990 0.2135 0.1723 0.0989 0.1989
Switzerland 0.1778 0.1261 0.1736 0.1802 0.1126 0.1859 0.1892 0.1482 0.1687
UK 0.1968 0.1093 0.2285 0.1938 0.1140 0.2099 0.1800 0.1082 0.2015
USA 0.2344 0.1119 0.2731 0.2371 0.1220 0.2701 0.2345 0.1356 0.2567
All Developed 0.2035 0.1221 0.2234 0.2113 0.1279 0.2266 0.2061 0.1343 0.2137
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Table 4.12: Descriptive Statistics of Cash Determinants for the Pre-Crisis, Crisis and
Post-Crisis Periods
This table illustrates the summary statistics for the firm specific variables used as explanatory variables for the pre-
crisis (00-06), crisis (07-08), and post-crisis (09-11) periods. Financial firms are excluded and those firms that have
at least five years of consecutive observations for total assets are included. Panel A shows summary statistics for
the sample of developing countries and Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the sample of developed countries.
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio
of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Cash flow volatility (CFV) is the five year
historical standard deviation of cash flows. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend
in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the
ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net
working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. Research
and development (R&D) is the ratio of research and development expenditures to net sales. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets in US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
Panel A: Developing Countries
Pre-Crisis (00-06) Crisis (07-08) Post-Crisis (09-11)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Capital Expenditures 0.062 0.040 0.067 0.069 0.046 0.072 0.054 0.034 0.060
Cash Flow 0.076 0.077 0.104 0.078 0.077 0.102 0.069 0.070 0.098
Cash Flow Volatility 0.060 0.034 0.091 0.058 0.033 0.085 0.059 0.035 0.085
Dividend Dummy 0.472 0.000 0.499 0.485 0.000 0.500 0.487 0.000 0.500
Leverage 0.253 0.229 0.207 0.247 0.225 0.204 0.244 0.216 0.208
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.533 1.169 1.142 1.694 1.294 1.232 1.448 1.095 1.125
Net Working Capital 0.007 0.017 0.223 0.030 0.040 0.221 0.030 0.037 0.219
R&D 0.006 0.000 0.021 0.006 0.000 0.021 0.007 0.000 0.022
Size 17.941 18.000 1.817 17.929 17.930 1.905 18.041 18.024 2.016
Tangibility 0.385 0.368 0.219 0.354 0.333 0.217 0.350 0.328 0.220
Panel B: Developed Countries
Pre-crisis (00-06) Crisis (07-08) Post -Crisis (09-11)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Capital Expenditures 0.056 0.031 0.078 0.063 0.033 0.087 0.049 0.025 0.072
Cash Flow -0.158 0.057 0.938 -0.178 0.053 0.957 -0.170 0.049 0.955
Cash Flow Volatility 0.225 0.035 0.833 0.252 0.039 0.907 0.279 0.049 0.941
Dividend Dummy 0.461 0.000 0.498 0.477 0.000 0.499 0.465 0.000 0.499
Leverage 0.229 0.174 0.237 0.213 0.150 0.235 0.217 0.156 0.238
Market-to-Book Ratio 3.093 1.220 7.929 3.195 1.318 8.134 2.752 1.056 7.909
Net Working Capital -0.116 0.000 0.798 -0.125 -0.001 0.841 -0.151 -0.004 0.906
R&D 0.106 0.000 0.553 0.114 0.000 0.586 0.095 0.000 0.516
Size 18.135 18.285 2.681 18.240 18.320 2.636 18.373 18.489 2.665
Tangibility 0.290 0.242 0.237 0.278 0.215 0.246 0.289 0.227 0.255
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Table 4.13: Regressions Allowing for Intercept Changes
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions which allow for the intercept change. The sample
period in all regressions is [1995, 2011] though the available number of observations for each firm changes across
firms. The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of
total assets. L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital
expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to
total assets. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV)
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of
current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in
1995 US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. D07−11 is the dummy variable
representing the years 2007 to 2011.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for the first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test for
overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
VARIABLES DEVELOPING SAMPLE DEVELOPED SAMPLE
L.CASH 0.9110*** 0.3970***
(0.0953) (0.0277)
CAPEX -1.4940*** -0.6830**
(0.2780) (0.3170)
CF -0.2790** 0.2090***
(0.1380) (0.0597)
DIV 0.0002 -0.0164***
(0.0064) (0.0027)
LEV -0.2930** -0.0754**
(0.1350) (0.0317)
MTBR -0.0167*** -0.0010
(0.0048) (0.0013)
NWC -0.0855 -0.1680***
(0.0547) (0.0425)
SIZE 0.0481*** -0.0262***
(0.0160) (0.0083)
TANG 0.0838* -0.4810**
(0.0464) (0.2140)
D07−11 0.0109*** 0.0005
(0.0042) (0.0039)
CONS -0.6960** 0.8230***
(0.3030) (0.1090)
N 67,158 153,470
# FIRMS 7,714 15,594
AR1 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.962 0.147
HANSEN 0.106 0.111
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Table 4.14: Regressions Allowing for Slope Changes
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions which allow for the slope change of the regressors
from the pre-crisis (00-06) to the crisis (07-11) period. The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of
cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital
Expenditures (CAPEX) is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is computed
as the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a
variable set to 1 if a firm pays dividend for a given year. Leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio of total debt to
total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is computed as the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is defined as the ratio
of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in
US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for the first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test statistic
for overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate coefficient which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
VARIABLES DEVELOPING SAMPLE DEVELOPED SAMPLE
Pre-Crisis(00-06) Crisis (07-11) Pre-Crisis (00-06) Crisis (07-11)
L.CASH 0.6240*** 0.4430*** 0.3510*** 0.3260***
(0.0390) (0.0333) (0.0265) (0.0354)
CAPEX -0.1330*** -0.1830*** -0.0821** -0.1760***
(0.0194) (0.0274) (0.0362) (0.0633)
CF 0.3110*** 0.7140*** 0.1570*** -0.0614***
(0.0674) (0.2030) (0.0428) (0.0144)
DIV 0.0285*** -0.0281*** 0.0237 -0.1000***
(0.0081) (0.0065) (0.0288) (0.0284)
LEV -0.2550*** -0.0803*** -0.3530*** -1.3320***
(0.0617) (0.0299) (0.0513) (0.4680)
MTBR -0.0210*** -0.0237*** 0.0009 -0.0084***
(0.0073) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0024)
NWC -0.6400*** -0.2320*** -0.2690*** -0.2120***
(0.1810) (0.0297) (0.0614) (0.0609)
SIZE -0.0083** 0.0116 -0.0338** 0.0481***
(0.0034) (0.0110) (0.0167) (0.0179)
TANG -0.2450*** -0.2100*** -0.2010*** -0.1260**
(0.0393) (0.0135) (0.0203) (0.0577)
CONS 0.3610*** -0.0228 0.8750*** -0.3810
(0.0901) (0.1900) (0.2920) (0.2710)
N 24561 28897 60329 56535
# FIRMS 5386 7577 13219 14830
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
AR2 0.121 0.516 0.475 0.275
HANSEN 0.179 0.130 0.131 0.129
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Table 4.15: Regressions Allowing for Slope and Intercept Changes
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions which allow for the slope and intercept changes
using the interaction terms. The sample period in all regressions is [1995, 2011] though the available number of
observations for each firm changes across firms. The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and
cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital Expenditures
(CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus
income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend
in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the
ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net
working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. SIZE is the
natural logarithm of total assets in 1995 US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets. D07−11 is the dummy variable representing the years 2007 to 2011.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test statistic for
the overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
VARIABLES DEVELOPING SAMPLE DEVELOPED SAMPLE
Estimate Interaction (07-11) Estimate Interaction (07-11)
L.CASH 0.4140*** -0.2810* 0.4360*** -0.2090**
(0.0956) (0.1580) (0.0444) (0.0921)
CAPEX 0.4550* -0.8580* -0.1000 0.9710
(0.2460) (0.4660) (0.3010) (0.7140)
CF 0.2160* 0.1950 0.2800*** -0.2140**
(0.1240) (0.2190) (0.0631) (0.1080)
DIV 0.0474* -0.1390* 0.1460 -0.3390
(0.0266) (0.0712) (0.1070) (0.2300)
LEV -0.3110** 0.3260 0.8920** -2.490***
(0.1450) (0.2520) (0.3980) (0.8430)
MTBR -0.0125** 0.0100 0.0029* -0.0120***
(0.0059) (0.0079) (0.0016) (0.0046)
NWC -0.3980** 0.0933 -0.1340* -0.3150*
(0.1830) (0.3660) (0.0756) (0.1640)
SIZE -0.0347** -0.0303* -0.0536*** 0.1020**
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0196) (0.0443)
TANG -0.0236 -0.3390 -0.6910** 0.1460
(0.1080) (0.5090) (0.2860) (0.4420)
CONS 0.7310** 0.7640* 1.1000*** -1.3730*
(0.3660) (0.4000) (0.3260) (0.7030)
N 67158 153470
# FIRMS 7714 15594
AR1 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.002 0.000
HANSEN 0.293 0.367
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Table 4.16: Agency Variables Regressions in Crises Periods
This table presents Fama-Macbeth and cross-sectional OLS regressions for the pre-crisis (PC) (00-06) and the
crisis (C) (07-11) periods with Panel A and Panel B showing the results for the sample of developing and developed
countries, respectively. The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the
book value of total assets. The anti-self dealing index (ASD) and the creditor rights index (CRI) are indicators
for the shareholder and creditor protection, respectively. Ownership concentration (OC) is the median percentage
of common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms.
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of
pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1
if a firm pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book
ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of
equity to total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus
cash to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1995 US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Fama-MacBeth model gives the average of the time series of coefficients
from annual cross-sectional regressions. The cross-sectional OLS regression uses means of variables for each firm.
Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is significant
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
PANEL A - DEVELOPING SAMPLE
VARIABLES FAMA-MACBETH CROSS-SECTION OLS
I-PC II-C III-PC IV-C V-PC VI-C VII-PC VIII-C
ASD -0.0353*** -0.0375*** 0.0096*** 0.0021 -0.0184 -0.0368*** 0.0155 0.0054
(0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0119) (0.0120)
CRI 0.0254*** 0.0204*** 0.0069*** 0.0060*** 0.0203*** 0.0200*** 0.0108*** 0.0047
(0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0032)
OC -0.1240*** -0.2080*** -0.0655* -0.1800*** -0.1330*** -0.2080*** -0.0756*** -0.1860***
(0.0235) (0.0145) (0.0274) (0.0184) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0097) (0.0105)
CAPEX
- -
-0.0240* -0.0266
- -
-0.0197 -0.0189
(0.0111) (0.0142) (0.0229) (0.0291)
CF
- -
0.1880*** 0.1260***
- -
0.2020*** 0.1620***
(0.0105) (0.0068) (0.0243) (0.0285)
DIV
- -
0.0100*** 0.0086***
- -
-0.0017 0.0053
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0040)
LEV
- -
-0.1850*** -0.2370***
- -
-0.2190*** -0.2510***
(0.0142) (0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0085)
MTBR
- -
0.0120*** 0.0122***
- -
0.0134*** 0.0153***
(0.0023) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0027)
NWC
- -
-0.1780*** -0.2030***
- -
-0.1950*** -0.1970***
(0.0088) (0.0063) (0.0112) (0.0110)
SIZE
- -
0.0006 0.0029***
- -
0.0032*** 0.0028***
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0009)
TANG
- -
-0.2120*** -0.2250***
- -
-0.2040*** -0.2200***
(0.0113) (0.0019) (0.0089) (0.0088)
CONS 0.1400*** 0.1960*** 0.2140*** 0.2560*** 0.1390*** 0.1960*** 0.1700*** 0.2590***
(0.0153) (0.0056) (0.0206) (0.0114) (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0194) (0.0196)
N 27924 29605 20907 26087 5976 5958 4837 5546
Years 7 5 7 5 - - - -
R2 0.037 0.052 0.331 0.368 0.035 0.063 0.382 0.419
PANEL B - DEVELOPED SAMPLE
VARIABLES FAMA-MACBETH CROSS-SECTION OLS
I-PC II-C III-PC IV-C V-PC VI-C VII-PC VIII-C
ASD -0.0450*** -0.0386*** -0.0055 -0.0029 -0.0473*** -0.0392*** -0.0034 -0.0024
(0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0042) (0.0062) (0.0089) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0067)
CRI 0.0139*** 0.0134*** 0.0019 0.0055*** 0.0156*** 0.0137*** 0.0048*** 0.0056***
(0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011)
OC -0.2390*** -0.2410*** -0.0693** -0.1170*** -0.2870*** -0.2410*** -0.0706*** -0.1110***
(0.0214) (0.0162) (0.0194) (0.0028) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0098) (0.0094)
CAPEX
- -
0.0634*** 0.1030***
- -
0.1450*** 0.2100***
(0.0164) (0.0091) (0.0236) (0.0242)
CF
- -
0.0032 -0.0074**
- -
-0.0022 -0.0191***
(0.0037) (0.0018) (0.0044) (0.0043)
DIV
- -
-0.0445*** -0.0282**
- -
-0.0599*** -0.0350***
(0.0017) (0.0083) (0.0035) (0.0033)
LEV
- -
-0.2860*** -0.2740***
- -
-0.3520*** -0.3140***
(0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0091) (0.0083)
MTBR
- -
0.0021*** 0.0014***
- -
0.0026*** 0.0023***
(0.0003) (8.88e-05) (0.00048) (0.0005)
NWC
- -
-0.0300*** -0.0156***
- -
-0.0317*** -0.0051
(0.0052) (0.0021) (0.0051) (0.0043)
SIZE
- -
-0.0079*** -0.0132***
- -
-0.0084*** -0.0113***
(0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007)
TANG
- -
-0.2730*** -0.2800***
- -
-0.2720*** -0.2620***
(0.0102) (0.0039) (0.0069) (0.0062)
CONS 0.2720*** 0.2770*** 0.5140*** 0.6160*** 0.3070*** 0.2770*** 0.5390*** 0.5780***
(0.0168) (0.0093) (0.0470) (0.0132) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0145) (0.0134)
N 93566 82440 69548 70279 17343 16893 13463 15040
Years 7 5 7 5 - - - -
R2 0.021 0.021 0.309 0.305 0.03 0.026 0.383 0.356
167
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Table 4.17: Legal Origin and Tradition Analyses in Crises Periods
This table presents cross-sectional OLS regressions predicting cash holdings for the pre-crisis (PC) (00-06) and the
crisis (C) (07-11) periods. The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the
book value of total assets. The anti-self dealing index (ASD) and the creditor rights index (CRI) are indicators for
the shareholder and creditor protection, respectively. Ownership concentration (OC) is the median percentage of
common shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms. Panel
A displays the results according to law of tradition for both country groups. Panel B presents the results according
to legal origin for the sample of developed countries. The cross-sectional OLS regression uses means of variables for
each firm. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
PANEL A - DEVELOPING SAMPLE
VARIABLES COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW
I-PC II-C III-PC IV-C V-PC VI-C VII-PC VIII-C
ASD -0.330*** -0.151*** -0.159*** 0.0232 -0.125*** -0.145*** -0.0308* -0.0636***
(0.0596) (0.0557) (0.0567) (0.0542) (0.0212) (0.0227) (0.0186) (0.0200)
CRI -0.0197*** -0.00606 -0.0423*** -0.0102* 0.0238*** 0.0222*** 0.0189*** 0.0165***
(0.00636) (0.00544) (0.00742) (0.00541) (0.00412) (0.00430) (0.00397) (0.00443)
OC 1.482*** 0.931*** 1.097*** 0.303* -0.192*** -0.270*** -0.0678*** -0.176***
(0.189) (0.171) (0.181) (0.175) (0.0140) (0.0156) (0.0137) (0.0154)
CAPEX
- -
0.0432* 0.114***
- -
-0.0161 0.0955*
(0.0251) (0.0327) (0.0474) (0.0550)
CF
- -
0.106*** 0.106***
- -
0.349*** 0.285***
(0.0322) (0.0329) (0.0351) (0.0452)
DIV
- -
0.00348 0.0130***
- -
0.0109* 0.00982
(0.00436) (0.00457) (0.00608) (0.00727)
LEV
- -
-0.168*** -0.184***
- -
-0.209*** -0.259***
(0.0122) (0.0102) (0.0145) (0.0165)
MTBR
- -
0.0142*** 0.0139***
- -
0.0212*** 0.0195***
(0.00294) (0.00328) (0.00361) (0.00438)
NWC
- -
-0.165*** -0.157***
- -
-0.186*** -0.199***
(0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0186) (0.0188)
SIZE
- -
-0.00123 -0.000802
- -
-0.000439 -0.00426***
(0.00133) (0.00120) (0.00128) (0.00157)
TANG
- -
-0.181*** -0.173***
- -
-0.233*** -0.289***
(0.0123) (0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0141)
CONS -0.291*** -0.199*** -0.0730* 0.0660* 0.228*** 0.300*** 0.237*** 0.420***
(0.0363) (0.0339) (0.0402) (0.0362) (0.0131) (0.0147) (0.0310) (0.0368)
N 3271 3256 2718 3,160 2705 2702 2119 2386
R2 0.067 0.078 0.362 0.367 0.092 0.129 0.479 0.474
PANEL B - DEVELOPED SAMPLE
VARIABLES COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW
I-PC II-C III-PC IV-C V-PC VI-C VII-PC VIII-C
ASD 0.269*** 0.182*** 0.0570* 0.0774** 0.0712** 0.0872*** 0.0878*** 0.166***
(0.0416) (0.0372) (0.0339) (0.0326) (0.0310) (0.0287) (0.0249) (0.0256)
CRI -0.0193*** -0.00899** -0.00190 -0.00291 0.0143*** 0.00486** 0.00466** 0.00366*
(0.00427) (0.00385) (0.00347) (0.00336) (0.00263) (0.00240) (0.00200) (0.00197)
OC -0.202*** -0.170*** -0.0720*** -0.0944*** -0.331*** -0.277*** 0.00895 -0.0170
(0.0161) (0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0127) (0.0204) (0.0187) (0.0167) (0.0166)
CAPEX
- -
0.0820*** 0.157***
- -
0.261*** 0.315***
(0.0296) (0.0323) (0.0366) (0.0357)
CF
- -
0.0104 0.00368
- -
-0.0114* -0.0301***
(0.00647) (0.00684) (0.00614) (0.00555)
DIV
- -
-0.0410*** -0.0161***
- -
-0.0857*** -0.0560***
(0.00443) (0.00436) (0.00560) (0.00521)
LEV
- -
-0.310*** -0.298***
- -
-0.404*** -0.336***
(0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0147) (0.0130)
MTBR
- -
0.00313*** 0.00349***
- -
0.00228*** 0.00182***
(0.000722) (0.000903) (0.000638) (0.000659)
NWC
- -
-0.0368*** -0.0151**
- -
-0.0283*** 0.000672
(0.00708) (0.00683) (0.00731) (0.00558)
SIZE
- -
-0.0103*** -0.0135***
- -
-0.00670*** -0.00992***
(0.000938) (0.000875) (0.00127) (0.00112)
TANG
- -
-0.252*** -0.241***
- -
-0.301*** -0.293***
(0.00846) (0.00753) (0.0114) (0.0104)
CONS 0.109*** 0.130*** 0.519*** 0.550*** 0.279*** 0.259*** 0.468*** 0.475***
(0.0230) (0.0207) (0.0259) (0.0246) (0.0187) (0.0173) (0.0255) (0.0246)
N 10240 10069 7644 8577 7103 6824 5819 6463
R2 0.015 0.013 0.374 0.352 0.051 0.046 0.394 0.364
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PANEL C - DEVELOPED CIVIL SAMPLE
VARIABLES FRENCH GERMAN SCANDINAVIAN
I-PC II-C III-PC IV-C V-PC VI-C VII-PC VIII-C IX-PC X-C XI-PC XII-C
ASD -0.136*** -0.0948*** 0.000319 0.0129 -1.377*** -0.541 -0.629* 0.185 0.651 0.526 1.052** 1.398***
(0.0379) (0.0342) (0.0306) (0.0270) (0.417) (0.387) (0.338) (0.336) (0.527) (0.475) (0.495) (0.452)
CRI 0.00458 -0.0148*** 0.00246 -0.00989*** 0.0526*** 0.0183* 0.0174* -0.00451 0.0618** 0.0602** 0.0279 0.0587**
(0.00471) (0.00422) (0.00373) (0.00329) (0.0128) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.00942) (0.0284) (0.0240) (0.0255) (0.0230)
OC -0.158*** -0.150*** -0.0810*** -0.0783*** -1.588*** -0.815*** -0.481* 0.0775 -1.341* -0.964 -0.870 -1.176*
(0.0367) (0.0336) (0.0282) (0.0242) (0.335) (0.308) (0.269) (0.265) (0.696) (0.624) (0.636) (0.608)
CAPEX
- -
0.257*** 0.295***
- -
0.289*** 0.308***
- -
-0.153 0.228
(0.0739) (0.0810) (0.0425) (0.0397) (0.120) (0.146)
CF
- -
0.0846*** 0.151***
- -
-0.0147** -0.0308***
- -
0.0535* -0.0137
(0.0293) (0.0387) (0.00637) (0.00570) (0.0281) (0.0343)
DIV
- -
-0.0383*** -0.00394
- -
-0.113*** -0.0764***
- -
-0.0261 0.00468
(0.0104) (0.0102) (0.00743) (0.00667) (0.0180) (0.0154)
LEV
- -
-0.368*** -0.402***
- -
-0.405*** -0.332***
- -
-0.433*** -0.334***
(0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0169) (0.0150) (0.0422) (0.0354)
MTBR
- -
0.00959* 0.0106
- -
0.002*** 0.00154**
- -
0.00781*** 0.0250***
(0.00542) (0.00687) (0.00066) (0.000673) (0.00260) (0.00675)
NWC
- -
-0.107*** -0.229***
- -
-0.0232*** 0.00580
- -
-0.223*** -0.0799*
(0.0363) (0.0286) (0.00768) (0.00574) (0.0474) (0.0415)
SIZE
- -
-0.00449** -0.0117***
- -
-0.00634*** -0.0112***
- -
-0.0127*** -0.00956***
(0.00229) (0.00200) (0.00159) (0.00137) (0.00360) (0.00330)
TANG
- -
-0.246*** -0.257***
- -
-0.335*** -0.322***
- -
-0.155*** -0.125***
(0.0211) (0.0226) (0.0139) (0.0119) (0.0427) (0.0294)
CONS 0.286*** 0.290*** 0.435*** 0.567*** 1.148*** 0.644*** 0.891*** 0.506** 0.326*** 0.213*** 0.417*** 0.157**
(0.0240) (0.0220) (0.0412) (0.0369) (0.244) (0.227) (0.195) (0.197) (0.0613) (0.0510) (0.0840) (0.0652)
N 1261 1259 1036 1152 5188 4908 4300 4661 654 657 483 650
R2 0.020 0.047 0.466 0.451 0.036 0.029 0.386 0.371 0.009 0.012 0.424 0.391
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Table 4.18: Industry Cash Ratios for the Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods
This table summarizes descriptive statistics about the cash ratio for each industry in the sample for the pre-crisis (00-
06), crisis (07-08), and post-crisis (09-11) periods. Financial firms are excluded and those firms that have at least five
years of consecutive observations for total assets are included. N represents the number of firm-period observations
for 9 industries in a particular period. % of Total represents the number of firm-period observations as a percentage
of total firm-period observations in that period. Panel A and B present the descriptive statistics about the cash ratio
for 9 industries in developing and developed countries, respectively. Oil and gas (O&G) industry includes firms in
alternative energy, oil and gas producers, and oil equipment, services and distribution sectors. The basic materials
(BM) industry comprises firms in chemicals, forestry and paper, industrial metals and mining sectors. Industrials
(IND) involves firms in aerospace and defense, general industrials, electronic and electrical equipment, industrial
engineering, industrial transportation, and support services sectors. Consumer goods (CG) industry incorporates
firms in automobiles and parts, beverages, food producers, household goods and home construction, leisure goods,
personal goods, and tobacco sectors. Health care (HC) industry comprises firms in health care equipment and
services, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors. Consumer services (CS) industry includes firms in food and
drug retailers, general retailers, media, travel and leisure sectors. Telecommunications (TEL) industry consists of
firms in fixed line and mobile telecommunications sectors. Utilities (UTI) industry involves firms in electricity, gas,
water and multiutilities sectors. Technology (TEC) industry includes firms in software and computer services and
technology hardware and equipment sectors. Cash ratio is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value
of total assets.
Panel A: Developing Countries
Country Pre-crisis (00-06) Crisis (07-08) Post -Crisis (09-11)
Mean Median N % Total Mean Median N % Total Mean Median N % Total
OIL&GAS 0.106 0.066 843 2.2 0.112 0.078 407 2.5 0.122 0.081 608 2.5
BASIC MATERIALS 0.103 0.067 6220 16.1 0.106 0.066 2596 16.1 0.109 0.069 3890 16.2
INDUSTRIALS 0.132 0.096 11107 28.8 0.132 0.099 4631 28.8 0.139 0.103 6927 28.8
CONSUMER GOODS 0.107 0.065 8523 22.1 0.098 0.056 3545 22.1 0.110 0.063 5291 22.0
HEALTH CARE 0.149 0.105 2088 5.4 0.146 0.089 867 5.4 0.156 0.111 1294 5.4
CONSUMER SERVICES 0.140 0.100 3576 9.3 0.144 0.095 1377 8.6 0.150 0.104 2064 8.6
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 0.127 0.082 453 1.2 0.143 0.083 181 1.1 0.135 0.078 272 1.1
UTILITIES 0.099 0.061 1767 4.6 0.105 0.067 754 4.7 0.104 0.065 1134 4.7
TECHNOLOGY 0.223 0.179 4020 10.4 0.222 0.180 1717 10.7 0.230 0.185 2558 10.6
ALL DEVELOPINGS 0.131 0.089 38597 100 0.132 0.089 16075 100 0.138 0.092 24038 100
Panel B: Developed Countries
Country Pre-crisis (00-06) Crisis (07-08) Post -Crisis (09-11)
Mean Median N % Total Mean Median N % Total Mean Median N % Total
OIL&GAS 0.220 0.097 5292 5.7 0.218 0.111 2340 7.0 0.188 0.095 3423 7.0
BASIC MATERIALS 0.214 0.107 11486 12.3 0.251 0.143 5074 15.2 0.225 0.132 7533 15.4
INDUSTRIALS 0.155 0.106 25901 27.7 0.159 0.107 8664 25.9 0.167 0.124 12754 26.0
CONSUMER GOODS 0.141 0.094 13828 14.8 0.149 0.095 4587 13.7 0.161 0.113 6774 13.8
HEALTH CARE 0.371 0.274 7726 8.3 0.369 0.269 2771 8.3 0.354 0.255 3979 8.1
CONSUMER SERVICES 0.177 0.111 13313 14.3 0.179 0.112 4485 13.4 0.178 0.116 6526 13.3
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 0.183 0.109 1176 1.3 0.179 0.093 402 1.2 0.155 0.088 592 1.2
UTILITIES 0.104 0.038 1855 2.0 0.126 0.051 624 1.9 0.104 0.054 932 1.9
TECHNOLOGY 0.296 0.242 12768 13.7 0.279 0.224 4463 13.4 0.275 0.227 6499 13.3
ALL DEVELOPED 0.204 0.122 93345 100 0.211 0.128 33410 100 0.206 0.134 49012 100
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Table 4.19: Average Cash Determinant Values in Different Industries
This table illustrates the industry averages for the firm specific variables used as explanatory variables for the pre-
crisis (00-06), crisis (07-08), and post-crisis (09-11) periods. Financial firms are excluded and those firms that have
at least five years of consecutive observations for total assets are included. Panel A shows the industry averages
for the firm specific variables in the developing sample and Panel B presents the industry averages for the firm
specific variables in the developed sample. Oil and gas (O&G) industry includes firms in alternative energy, oil and
gas producers, and oil equipment, services and distribution sectors. The basic materials (BM) industry comprises
firms in chemicals, forestry and paper, industrial metals and mining sectors. Industrials (IND) involves firms in
aerospace and defense, general industrials, electronic and electrical equipment, industrial engineering, industrial
transportation, and support services sectors. Consumer goods (CG) industry incorporates firms in automobiles
and parts, beverages, food producers, household goods and home construction, leisure goods, personal goods, and
tobacco sectors. Health care (HC) industry comprises firms in health care equipment and services, pharmaceuticals
and biotechnology sectors. Consumer services (CS) industry includes firms in food and drug retailers, general
retailers, media, travel and leisure sectors. Telecommunications (TEL) industry consists of firms in fixed line and
mobile telecommunications sectors. Utilities (UTI) industry involves firms in electricity, gas, water and multiutilities
sectors. Technology (TEC) industry includes firms in software and computer services and technology hardware and
equipment sectors. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow
(CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Cash flow volatility (CFV)
is the five year historical standard deviation of cash flows. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm
pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio
(MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to
total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total
assets. Research and development (R&D) is the ratio of research and development expenditures to net sales. SIZE
is the natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets.
Panel A: Developing Countries
OIL&GAS BASIC MATERIALS INDUSTRIALS
PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPEX 0.077 0.090 0.080 0.067 0.077 0.061 0.061 0.068 0.051
Cash Flow 0.095 0.087 0.079 0.084 0.072 0.600 0.066 0.053 0.066
Cash Flow Volatility 0.047 0.061 0.068 0.077 0.110 0.391 0.080 0.080 0.096
Dividend Dummy 0.532 0.509 0.563 0.455 0.455 0.451 0.471 0.506 0.504
Leverage 0.225 0.217 0.217 0.294 0.291 0.287 0.249 0.238 0.238
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.401 1.702 1.182 1.725 2.383 3.072 2.760 2.122 1.523
Net Working Capital 0.001 -0.003 0.031 -0.051 -0.014 -1.044 -0.165 0.019 0.032
R&D 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.013 0.007
Size 18.964 18.699 18.879 18.141 18.097 18.188 17.859 17.937 18.067
Tangibility 0.463 0.400 0.408 0.450 0.408 0.410 0.359 0.326 0.324
CONSUMER GOODS HEALTH CARE CONSUMER SERVICES
PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPEX 0.076 0.069 0.052 0.069 0.069 0.056 0.070 0.082 0.054
Cash Flow 0.068 0.032 0.072 0.075 0.074 0.090 0.070 0.081 0.082
Cash Flow Volatility 0.063 0.078 0.096 0.055 0.069 0.076 0.059 0.052 0.057
Dividend Dummy 0.502 0.500 0.489 0.468 0.453 0.475 0.496 0.454 0.465
Leverage 0.278 0.293 0.283 0.226 0.223 0.203 0.232 0.212 0.214
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.436 1.748 1.703 2.050 2.030 2.093 1.938 2.417 3.577
Net Working Capital 0.000 -0.032 -0.042 0.014 0.050 0.050 -0.076 -0.041 -0.048
R&D 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.116 0.041 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000
Size 17.775 17.696 17.755 17.526 17.557 17.713 17.873 17.847 17.965
Tangibility 0.390 0.375 0.366 0.367 0.342 0.337 0.418 0.377 0.369
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UTILITIES TECHNOLOGY
PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPEX 0.099 0.107 0.088 0.069 0.078 0.067 0.060 0.058 0.046
Cash Flow 0.044 0.144 0.106 0.072 0.078 0.073 0.105 14.145 0.020
Cash Flow Volatility 0.047 0.048 0.130 0.054 0.038 0.040 0.083 8.673 13.593
Dividend Dummy 0.536 0.555 0.588 0.492 0.429 0.481 0.404 0.507 0.497
Leverage 0.254 0.221 0.230 0.268 0.269 0.288 0.176 0.156 0.157
Market-to-Book Ratio 6.794 33.521 3.883 1.511 1.940 1.251 2.004 30.279 13.213
Net Working Capital -0.247 -0.590 -0.302 -0.070 -0.068 -0.073 0.073 -0.009 -0.024
R&D 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.036 0.038
Size 19.943 19.501 19.565 18.903 18.793 19.027 17.621 17.568 17.675
Tangibility 0.518 0.462 0.437 0.549 0.504 0.483 0.225 0.212 0.212
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Panel B: Developed Countries
OIL&GAS BASIC MATERIALS INDUSTRIALS
PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPEX 0.124 0.149 0.112 0.081 0.109 0.085 0.046 0.048 0.036
Cash Flow -0.281 -0.308 -0.335 -0.274 -0.332 -0.316 -0.055 -0.059 -0.054
Cash Flow Volatility 0.335 0.410 0.482 0.295 0.378 0.447 0.149 0.163 0.162
Dividend Dummy 0.260 0.244 0.255 0.373 0.308 0.296 0.575 0.627 0.601
Leverage 0.216 0.211 0.228 0.194 0.146 0.154 0.240 0.225 0.230
Market-to-Book Ratio 5.218 4.792 3.987 3.518 4.161 3.201 2.227 2.302 1.883
Net Working Capital -0.285 -0.265 -0.294 -0.156 -0.148 -0.184 -0.028 -0.028 -0.044
R&D 0.059 0.069 0.052 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.048 0.044 0.035
Size 17.420 17.838 18.072 17.220 17.200 17.409 18.581 18.763 18.863
Tangibility 0.454 0.473 0.497 0.401 0.408 0.443 0.278 0.250 0.257
CONSUMER GOODS HEALTH CARE CONSUMER SERVICES
PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPEX 0.048 0.050 0.039 0.041 0.037 0.028 0.057 0.053 0.042
Cash Flow -0.042 -0.077 -0.073 -0.463 -0.528 -0.504 -0.066 -0.061 -0.059
Cash Flow Volatility 0.116 0.164 0.164 0.434 0.510 0.562 0.171 0.162 0.170
Dividend Dummy 0.619 0.638 0.593 0.233 0.248 0.266 0.515 0.576 0.564
Leverage 0.252 0.242 0.246 0.204 0.211 0.210 0.264 0.260 0.255
Market-to-Book Ratio 2.103 2.461 2.280 5.256 5.206 4.907 2.548 2.525 2.200
Net Working Capital -0.024 -0.045 -0.077 -0.200 -0.241 -0.297 -0.166 -0.172 -0.175
R&D 0.027 0.033 0.032 0.704 0.826 0.673 0.014 0.013 0.009
Size 18.698 18.812 18.899 17.186 17.385 17.474 18.607 18.784 18.924
Tangibility 0.296 0.276 0.276 0.176 0.156 0.158 0.317 0.284 0.291
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UTILITIES TECHNOLOGY
PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C PRE-C CRISIS POST-C
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPEX 0.078 0.067 0.062 0.066 0.072 0.066 0.041 0.038 0.030
Cash Flow -0.287 -0.110 -0.080 -0.030 -0.051 -0.095 -0.268 -0.211 -0.177
Cash Flow Volatility 0.423 0.363 0.282 0.068 0.105 0.154 0.400 0.327 0.323
Dividend Dummy 0.381 0.468 0.495 0.728 0.709 0.711 0.273 0.344 0.358
Leverage 0.324 0.287 0.301 0.330 0.307 0.335 0.174 0.170 0.173
Market-to-Book Ratio 3.672 2.539 2.505 1.607 2.072 1.954 4.318 3.455 3.150
Net Working Capital -0.373 -0.246 -0.282 -0.094 -0.095 -0.132 -0.167 -0.172 -0.202
R&D 0.042 0.025 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.149 0.119 0.106
Size 19.016 19.110 19.252 20.254 20.426 20.626 17.425 17.625 17.724
Tangibility 0.343 0.290 0.292 0.541 0.507 0.522 0.138 0.123 0.125
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Table 4.20: Industry Regressions Allowing for Intercept Changes
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions for all industries which allow for the intercept
change. Panel A and Panel B show the results for developing and developed sample, respectively. The sample period
in all regressions is [1995, 2011] though the available number of observations for each firm changes across firms.
The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets.
L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to
total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets.
Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio
of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current
assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1995
US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. D07−11 is the dummy variable
representing the years 2007 to 2011.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for the first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test for
overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Developing Countries
VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC CS TEL UTI TEC
L.CASH 0.560*** 0.573*** 0.763*** 0.674*** 0.549*** 0.716*** 0.474*** 0.417*** 0.650***
(0.196) (0.037) (0.131) (0.038) (0.041) (0.054) (0.132) (0.052) (0.177)
CAPEX 0.005 -0.373* -0.733* -0.001** -0.158*** -0.018 -0.137 -0.032 -1.01**
(0.123) (0.192) (0.420) (0.0002) (0.039) (0.017) (0.117) (0.036) (0.453)
CF -0.447** -4.54e-05* -0.137 -0.001** 0.045*** 0.007* 0.424* 0.136** 0.003**
(0.223) (2.65e-05) (0.125) (0.0005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.251) (0.053) (0.001)
DIV -0.0893 0.0371* 0.0367*** 0.001 -0.002 0.0001 -0.304*** -0.023* 0.093***
(0.074) (0.022) (0.013) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.086) (0.014) (0.029)
LEV -0.230*** -0.034*** -0.642*** -0.064*** -0.134*** -0.045** -0.186*** -0.141*** -0.349*
(0.069) (0.013) (0.179) (0.008) (0.026) (0.022) (0.062) (0.054) (0.181)
MTBR (0.049) 6.79e-05 -0.028*** -0.009*** -0.012** -0.0002* -0.008 0.013** -0.004**
(0.022) (0.0001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
NWC -0.077** 0.0001 -0.611*** -0.033*** -0.094** -0.004 -0.202 -0.070** -0.626**
(0.0305) (0.000143) (0.185) (0.00510) (0.0403) (0.0375) (0.155) (0.0304) (0.266)
SIZE 0.019** 0.014** 0.024*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.002** 0.03*** 0.031** -0.082**
(0.01) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.015) (0.042)
TANG -0.224*** -0.092*** -0.023 -0.096*** -0.167*** -0.074*** -0.149** -0.176*** 0.022
(0.07) (0.028) (0.079) (0.009) (0.026) (0.018) (0.062) (0.033) (0.188)
D07−11 -0.067 -0.002 0.02** 0.091*** 0.013** 0.062* 0.016 -0.017* 0.022**
(0.049) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.006) (0.033) (0.026) (0.009) (0.01)
CONS 0.014 -0.164 -0.180 -0.040 0.107*** 0.018 -0.289 -0.416* 1.655**
(0.111) (0.121) (0.117) (0.028) (0.04) (0.035) (0.194) (0.249) (0.740)
N 1,492 11,142 19,210 15,100 3,622 6,056 800 3,027 6,684
# FIRMS 188 1,258 2,241 1,663 422 643 89 368 839
AR1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 0.26 0.65 0.13 0.46 0.17 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.19
HANSEN 0.58 0.66 0.13 0.24 0.53 0.79 0.93 0.81 0.70
173
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Panel B: Developed Countries
VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC CS TEL UTI TEC
L.CASH 0.311*** 0.269*** 0.504*** 0.493*** 0.179* 0.436*** 0.268*** 0.175** 0.338***
(0.032) (0.026) (0.051) (0.059) (0.1) (0.029) (0.072) (0.069) (0.031)
CAPEX -0.065*** 0.016 -0.068* 0.407* 1.914*** -0.121*** -0.025 0.346** -0.133***
(0.021) (0.032) (0.037) (0.231) (0.703) (0.028) (0.098) (0.152) (0.045)
CF 0.009* 0.036* 0.093** 0.118** 0.175** 0.138** 0.006 0.154* 0.012***
(0.005) (0.021) (0.039) (0.047) (0.074) (0.054) (0.015) (0.094) (0.004)
DIV -0.015** -0.070*** -0.315*** -0.540*** 0.144** -0.007** -0.051*** 0.215** -0.273***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.106) (0.126) (0.069) (0.003) (0.018) (0.105) (0.095)
LEV -0.084*** -0.714*** -0.390*** -0.177 0.661** -0.110*** -0.453*** 0.119* -0.216***
(0.016) (0.158) (0.084) (0.235) (0.283) (0.013) (0.164) (0.062) (0.02)
MTBR 0.001** 0.003 -0.006* -0.008* -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.015** 0.002***
(0.0007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
NWC -0.012* -0.163*** -0.254** -0.248*** 0.219* -0.129*** -0.054*** -0.032 -0.026***
(0.006) (0.053) (0.102) (0.094) (0.116) (0.041) (0.019) (0.031) (0.005)
SIZE -0.009*** 0.011* 0.028** 0.035* -0.108*** -0.014*** 0.008* -0.025*** 0.012**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.018) (0.041) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
TANG -0.293*** -0.410*** -0.080*** -0.459** -2.564*** -0.137*** -0.112** -0.581*** -0.212***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.215) (0.714) (0.013) (0.051) (0.146) (0.03)
D07−11 0.007 -0.019** 0.017** -0.007 -0.039** -0.013** 0.043* 0.008 -0.014**
(0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.006) (0.024) (0.017) (0.007)
CONS 0.446*** 0.276*** -0.139 -0.058 2.550*** 0.439*** 0.122 0.657*** 0.125*
(0.037) (0.082) (0.143) (0.362) (0.772) (0.065) (0.075) (0.125) (0.074)
N 8,332 19,515 43,391 23,410 12,657 20,852 1,645 3,193 20,464
# FIRMS 1,014 2,259 4,046 2,208 1,338 2,084 176 281 2,187
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.920 0.590 0.760 0.130 0.160 0.340 0.800 0.210 0.150
HANSEN 0.160 0.120 0.260 0.900 0.560 0.160 0.340 0.890 0.160
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Table 4.21: Industry Regressions Allowing for Slope Changes
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions for all industries which allow for the slope change
of the regressors from the pre-crisis (00-06) to the crisis (07-11) period. Panel A and Panel B show the results for the
sample of developing and developed countries, respectively. The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio
of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital
Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax
income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm
pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio
(MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to
total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total
assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed
assets to total assets.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for the first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test statistic
for overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Developing Countries
VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC
PC C PC C PC C PC C PC C
L.CASH 0.520*** 0.492*** 0.015 0.495*** 0.371*** 0.555*** 0.607*** 0.722*** 0.540*** 0.585***
(0.139) (0.077) (0.133) (0.099) (0.136) (0.091) (0.039) (0.082) (0.065) (0.095)
CAPEX -0.138* -0.200** 0.586* -0.085*** 0.124 -0.690** -0.0004*** -0.104*** -0.234*** -0.216***
(0.077) (0.081) (0.308) (0.025) (0.102) (0.346) (5.69e-05) (0.028) (0.048) (0.068)
CF 0.167* 0.122** -0.055 -0.0006 0.047 1.01*** 0.029*** -0.001** 0.112*** 0.052***
(0.101) (0.057) (0.161) (0.0007) (0.037) (0.390) (0.007) (0.0005) (0.032) (0.005)
DIV 0.0008 -0.004 0.059** -0.002 0.047** -0.029** 0.004** -0.006** 0.004 -0.006
(0.012) (0.009) (0.023) (0.003) (0.019) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
LEV -0.035 -0.094*** -0.412* -0.052*** -0.448** 0.023 -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.059** -0.135***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.241) (0.016) (0.186) (0.049) (0.011) (0.019) (0.029) (0.037)
MTBR -0.004 -0.002 -0.024* 0.0008** -0.041** -0.043*** -0.003** -0.006*** 0.0007 -0.009***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.0004) (0.019) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
NWC -0.065** -0.134*** -0.705*** 0.001** -0.401* -0.210*** -0.046*** -0.0229*** -0.0252* -0.118***
(0.0287) (0.026) (0.263) (0.0004) (0.207) (0.057) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.029)
SIZE -0.002 -0.0008 -0.092** 0.007*** -0.089** -0.010** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.042) (0.002) (0.042) (0.005) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
TANG -0.128*** -0.165*** -1.079*** -0.136*** -0.160*** -0.115 -0.123*** -0.087*** -0.140*** -0.163***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.171) (0.022) (0.048) (0.076) (0.010) (0.016) (0.027) (0.039)
CONS 0.148** 0.181*** 2.373*** 0.003 1.899** 0.343*** 0.0401** 0.043** 0.054 0.123***
(0.071) (0.036) (0.786) (0.023) (0.822) (0.096) (0.016) (0.017) (0.050) (0.044)
N 478 679 3,969 4,711 7,042 8,426 5,498 6,228 1,379 1,582
# FIRMS 118 184 841 1,230 1,578 2,202 1,169 1,620 298 418
AR1 0.003 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.407 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.14 0.000
AR2 0.641 0.270 0.718 0.435 0.167 0.951 0.953 0.940 0.288 0.761
HANSEN 0.988 0.553 0.409 0.384 0.169 0.119 0.872 0.254 0.473 0.161
VAR / IND CS TEL UTI TEC
PC C PC C PC C PC C
L.CASH 0.463*** 0.492*** -0.561** 0.467* 0.481*** 0.553*** 0.567*** 0.476***
(0.082) (0.073) (0.232) (0.262) (0.064) (0.190) (0.123) (0.161)
CAPEX -0.082*** -0.166*** -0.234 -0.013 -0.422 -0.047 0.062 -0.269
(0.031) (0.034) (0.165) (0.066) (0.565) (0.076) (0.092) (0.226)
CF 0.008 0.015*** 0.889** 0.063** 0.124*** 0.161*** 0.124*** -0.0009**
(0.021) (0.003) (0.382) (0.031) (0.029) (0.056) (0.036) (0.0003)
DIV 0.009** 0.001 0.005 -0.016 -0.031* -0.009* -0.215** -0.048**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.032) (0.014) (0.018) (0.005) (0.089) (0.023)
LEV -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.024 -0.065* -0.266** -0.040* -0.226*** -1.261**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.252) (0.035) (0.109) (0.024) (0.061) (0.499)
MTBR -0.0004 -0.0001 0.040** 0.0001 0.014*** -0.003 0.006* 0.001*
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.017) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0006)
NWC -0.077*** -0.085*** -0.531* -0.003 -0.170*** -0.058* -0.076*** 0.198*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.293) (0.009) (0.053) (0.035) (0.026) (0.109)
SIZE 0.001 0.003* -0.038** -0.0004 0.082*** 1.51e-06 0.011* 0.024**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.005) (0.031) (0.001) (0.005) (0.010)
TANG -0.132*** -0.120*** -0.443*** -0.124** -0.269*** -0.098*** -0.156*** 0.246
(0.018) (0.020) (0.161) (0.058) (0.078) (0.032) (0.046) (0.205)
CONS 0.125*** 0.096*** 0.987** 0.147 -1.313** 0.101** 0.066 -0.135
(0.036) (0.032) (0.395) (0.139) (0.528) (0.045) (0.082) (0.128)
N 2,362 2,423 293 331 1,118 1,321 2,410 3,186
# FIRMS 485 634 65 87 248 363 581 836
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.089 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
AR2 0.629 0.463 0.405 0.124 0.877 0.827 0.357 0.520
HANSEN 0.350 0.767 0.200 0.450 0.177 0.886 0.451 0.387
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Panel B: Developed Countries
VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC
PC C PC C PC C PC C PC C
L.CASH 0.167** 0.306*** 0.260*** 0.338*** 0.450*** 0.441*** 0.220** 0.594*** 0.176** 0.402***
(0.085) (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.0426) (0.061) (0.105) (0.081) (0.085) (0.063)
CAPEX 0.930* 0.0219 0.747** -0.499** -0.086*** -0.138*** -0.164*** -0.0749 0.554** -0.381***
(0.530) (0.052) (0.337) (0.226) (0.031) (0.042) (0.056) (0.066) (0.224) (0.091)
CF 0.027** 0.032* 0.014* -0.027*** 0.053* -0.049*** 0.054** -0.050 0.107** 0.072**
(0.011) (0.018) (0.007) (0.009) (0.029) (0.017) (0.027) (0.034) (0.049) (0.029)
DIV 0.009 -0.018* -0.044*** -0.493*** -0.008** 0.013*** 0.128** -0.347** 1.320*** 0.185*
(0.020) (0.009) (0.007) (0.177) (0.004) (0.003) (0.063) (0.150) (0.489) (0.098)
LEV -0.076* -0.300*** -0.143*** -0.130*** -0.189*** -0.160*** -0.101*** -0.286*** -0.132** -0.088**
(0.039) (0.107) (0.024) (0.037) (0.041) (0.019) (0.034) (0.062) (0.058) (0.037)
MTBR 0.001 -0.006* -0.002** 0.0005 -0.003 -0.019*** -0.004* -0.017* 0.006* -0.0005
(0.001) (0.004) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
NWC -0.025** -0.173** -0.029*** -0.0007 -0.121* -0.095*** -0.007 -0.104*** -0.059** 0.041*
(0.012) (0.081) (0.009) (0.009) (0.069) (0.024) (0.020) (0.036) (0.027) (0.024)
SIZE -0.009*** 0.003 -0.013*** 0.036* -0.006*** -0.013*** -0.095** 0.027* -0.095** -0.138***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.020) (0.002) (0.002) (0.045) (0.014) (0.043) (0.052)
TANG -0.543*** -0.317*** -0.499*** -0.428*** -0.145*** -0.132*** -0.124*** -0.085** -1.438*** -0.321***
(0.138) (0.031) (0.064) (0.041) (0.012) (0.014) (0.030) (0.041) (0.305) (0.065)
CONS 0.475*** 0.285*** 0.575*** -0.084 0.292*** 0.442*** 1.894** -0.105 1.889*** 2.703***
(0.059) (0.081) (0.054) (0.298) (0.027) (0.045) (0.823) (0.187) (0.726) (0.887)
N 2,873 3,659 6,975 8,258 17,388 14,939 9,354 8,081 4,981 4,742
# FIRMS 751 980 1,761 2,197 3,589 3,867 1,952 2,098 1,119 1,251
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.406 0.706 0.292 0.394 0.167 0.328 0.329 0.468 0.209 0.519
HANSEN 0.278 0.723 0.157 0.569 0.557 0.197 0.319 0.143 0.807 0.324
VAR / IND CS TEL UTI TEC
PC C PC C PC C PC C
L.CASH 0.514*** 0.545*** 0.508*** 0.310** 0.165** 0.147 0.393*** 0.318***
(0.056) (0.122) (0.146) (0.127) (0.083) (0.139) (0.047) (0.065)
CAPEX -1.289** -0.199*** -0.966* -0.484 -0.066 0.999*** -0.844*** -0.102*
(0.619) (0.056) (0.533) (0.483) (0.065) (0.331) (0.270) (0.056)
CF 0.127* 0.016** -0.372 0.266 0.363*** -0.012 0.160*** -0.034**
(0.066) (0.007) (0.245) (0.162) (0.124) (0.017) (0.045) (0.015)
DIV -0.025** 0.0006 -0.066* -0.076* -0.029* 0.449** -0.058*** 0.009**
(0.013) (0.003) (0.039) (0.040) (0.017) (0.197) (0.010) (0.004)
LEV -0.162** -0.128*** -0.925* -0.780** -0.087** 0.202* -0.265*** -0.219***
(0.067) (0.028) (0.481) (0.382) (0.037) (0.104) (0.038) (0.025)
MTBR 0.007** 0.0006 -0.013 0.023* 0.037*** 0.0007 0.008*** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
NWC -0.079** -0.041*** 0.069 -0.182* -0.121** 0.037* -0.081*** -0.049***
(0.034) (0.009) (0.109) (0.107) (0.058) (0.019) (0.023) (0.014)
SIZE -0.014*** -0.004* 0.045* 0.003 -0.015*** -0.042* -0.022*** -0.009***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.026) (0.012) (0.003) (0.023) (0.005) (0.002)
TANG 0.185 -0.084*** 0.069 0.088 -0.233*** -0.875*** 0.851*** -0.232***
(0.227) (0.022) (0.152) (0.161) (0.047) (0.219) (0.300) (0.027)
CONS 0.379*** 0.213*** -0.418 0.247 0.505*** 0.969*** 0.540*** 0.438***
(0.069) (0.072) (0.350) (0.158) (0.086) (0.354) (0.081) (0.054)
N 8,464 7,434 668 610 1,247 1,060 8,373 7,748
# FIRMS 1,804 1,952 142 160 249 274 1,851 2,050
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.010 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.934 0.314 0.781 0.487 0.117 0.188 0.395 0.347
HANSEN 0.208 0.694 0.585 0.455 0.952 0.547 0.675 0.457
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Table 4.22: Industry Regressions for the Whole Sample
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions for 9 industries predicting cash holdings. Oil
and gas (O&G) industry includes firms in alternative energy, oil and gas producers, and oil equipment, services
and distribution sectors. The basic materials (BM) industry comprises firms in chemicals, forestry and paper,
industrial metals and mining sectors. Industrials (IND) involves firms in aerospace and defense, general industrials,
electronic and electrical equipment, industrial engineering, industrial transportation, and support services sectors.
Consumer goods (CG) industry incorporates firms in automobiles and parts, beverages, food producers, household
goods and home construction, leisure goods, personal goods, and tobacco sectors. Health care (HC) industry
comprises firms in health care equipment and services, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sectors. Consumer
services (CS) industry includes firms in food and drug retailers, general retailers, media, travel and leisure sectors.
Telecommunications (TEL) industry consists of firms in fixed line and mobile telecommunications sectors. Utilities
(UTI) industry involves firms in electricity, gas, water and multiutilities sectors. Technology (TEC) industry includes
firms in software and computer services and technology hardware and equipment sectors. The sample period in
all regressions is [1995,2011] though the available number of observations for each firm changes across firms. The
dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets.
L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to
total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets.
Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio
of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity to total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current
assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1995 US
dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for the first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test for
overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses..
***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Developing Countries
VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC CS TEL UTI TEC
L.CASH 0.525*** 0.575*** 0.009 0.695*** 0.784*** 0.390*** 0.392** 0.562*** 0.367*
(0.061) (0.036) (0.237) (0.041) (0.082) (0.076) (0.156) (0.077) (0.208)
CAPEX -0.140** -0.368* 0.782* -0.0006*** -0.216*** 0.013 -0.115 -0.031 -0.535
(0.062) (0.189) (0.457) (9.45e-05) (0.050) (0.018) (0.101) (0.044) (0.385)
CF 0.065* -4.90e-05** 0.101 -0.006* 0.066*** 0.014** 0.216** 0.067*** 0.002**
(0.039) (2.32e-05) (0.091) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.090) (0.026) (0.001)
DIV -0.031 0.038* -0.040* -0.046 -0.069* 0.126*** -0.318*** 0.010* 0.088***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.042) (0.039) (0.048) (0.122) (0.005) (0.029)
LEV -0.103** -0.033*** -0.819*** -0.143*** -0.066*** -0.039 -0.181** -0.126** -0.256*
(0.052) (0.011) (0.218) (0.036) (0.024) (0.039) (0.074) (0.054) (0.155)
MTBR -0.023* 5.82e-05 -0.032*** -0.041** -0.004** -0.016** -0.005 0.005** -0.003**
(0.014) (0.0001) (0.008) (0.017) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
NWC -0.056** 0.0002 0.029 -0.157** -0.033* -0.178*** -0.082 -0.263*** -0.501**
(0.026) (0.0001) (0.220) (0.066) (0.019) (0.054) (0.080) (0.098) (0.201)
SIZE 0.021 0.0131** -0.092** 0.004** 0.003* -0.011* 0.027** 0.005* -0.071*
(0.018) (0.006) (0.043) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.042)
TANG -0.195*** -0.089*** -0.117* -0.158*** -0.094*** -0.539** -0.145** -0.128*** -0.559
(0.059) (0.027) (0.063) (0.028) (0.028) (0.250) (0.059) (0.026) (0.532)
CONS -0.183 -0.145 2.083** 0.150*** 0.072** 0.468*** -0.166 0.014 1.608*
(0.275) (0.103) (0.819) (0.054) (0.029) (0.174) (0.197) (0.041) (0.836)
N 1,492 11,142 19,210 15,100 3,622 6,056 800 3,027 6,684
# FIRMS 188 1,258 2,241 1,663 422 643 89 368 839
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.972
AR2 0.305 0.647 0.381 0.564 0.136 0.129 0.605 0.786 0.300
HANSEN 0.621 0.695 0.101 0.141 0.672 0.753 0.940 0.464 0.110
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Panel B: Developed Countries
VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC CS TEL UTI TEC
L.CASH 0.305*** 0.210*** 0.672*** 0.482*** 0.711*** 0.470*** 0.274*** 0.169** 0.434***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.112) (0.035) (0.169) (0.032) (0.066) (0.069) (0.039)
CAPEX -0.063*** 0.097*** -0.611** 0.442 -5.050*** -0.666*** 0.059 0.324** -0.091*
(0.020) (0.035) (0.262) (0.440) (1.847) (0.191) (0.105) (0.163) (0.054)
CF 0.009* 0.108*** -0.132*** 0.069** -0.063** 0.143*** 0.041* 0.057* 0.0500***
(0.005) (0.029) (0.049) (0.029) (0.026) (0.049) (0.024) (0.034) (0.016)
DIV -0.016** -0.053*** -0.202*** -0.438*** -0.287*** -0.027*** -0.041** 0.210** -0.232**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.069) (0.102) (0.098) (0.008) (0.016) (0.106) (0.107)
LEV -0.085*** -0.160*** -0.646* -0.435*** -1.028** -0.234*** -0.334*** 0.074 -0.327***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.337) (0.078) (0.410) (0.046) (0.120) (0.069) (0.051)
MTBR 0.001** 0.004*** -0.010* -0.006* 0.004* 0.007*** -0.002 0.016** -0.002
(0.0006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002)
NWC -0.013** -0.052*** -0.139*** -0.222*** -0.130*** -0.086*** -0.122** 0.041** -0.147***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.047) (0.085) (0.050) (0.026) (0.056) (0.020) (0.048)
SIZE -0.009*** -0.028*** 0.122*** 0.043*** 0.116** -0.019*** 0.007* -0.018** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.047) (0.009) (0.048) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
TANG -0.293*** -0.450*** 0.428 -0.160** 0.607* 0.398** -0.160*** -0.530*** -0.211***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.268) (0.065) (0.342) (0.183) (0.053) (0.156) (0.032)
CONS 0.452*** 0.890*** -2.054** -0.305*** -1.646** 0.418*** 0.122 0.521*** 0.005
(0.035) (0.075) (0.862) (0.117) (0.829) (0.046) (0.079) (0.131) (0.087)
N 8,332 19,515 43,391 23,410 12,657 20,852 1,645 3,193 20,464
# FIRMS 1,014 2,259 4,046 2,208 1,338 2,084 176 281 2,187
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.958 0.522 0.200 0.100 0.344 0.291 0.963 0.767 0.167
HANSEN 0.178 0.629 0.228 0.487 0.303 0.335 0.322 0.870 0.457
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Table 4.23: Industry Regressions Allowing for Slope and Intercept Changes
This table presents system GMM dynamic panel data regressions for all industries which allow for the slope and
intercept changes using the interaction terms. The sample period in all regressions is [1995,2011] though the available
number of observations for each firm changes across firms. The dependent variable is the cash which is the ratio
of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. L.CASH is the lagged dependent variable. Capital
Expenditures (CAPEX) is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Cash flow (CF) is the ratio of pretax
income minus income taxes plus depreciation to total assets. Dividend dummy (DIV) is a variable set to 1 if a firm
pays a dividend in a given year. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Market-to-book ratio
(MTBR) is the ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to
total assets. Net working capital (NWC) is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities minus cash to total
assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1995 US dollars. Asset tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of
fixed assets to total assets. D07−11 is the dummy variable representing the years 2007 to 2011.
N shows the number of firm-year observations over the sample period. AR1 and AR2 are p-values of test statistics
for the first and second order autocorrelations in residuals, respectively. HANSEN is the p-value of the test for
overidentifying restrictions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses..
***, ** and * indicate a coefficient which is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Developing Countries
VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC
Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11)
L.CASH 0.520*** -0.033 0.442*** 0.047 0.633*** -0.176 0.506*** -0.360* 0.557*** 0.015
(0.163) (0.300) (0.058) (0.089) (0.125) (0.192) (0.105) (0.196) (0.121) (0.168)
CAPEX 0.143 -0.539 0.163 -0.257 1.042*** -1.637** -0.0006 0.381 -0.126 0.324
(0.373) (0.812) (0.171) (0.281) (0.325) (0.646) (0.0006) (0.457) (0.488) (0.639)
CF 0.357* 0.103 0.134** -0.134** 0.243** -0.092 0.049 -0.055 0.530** -0.237
(0.214) (0.394) (0.062) (0.062) (0.110) (0.231) (0.140) (0.141) (0.238) (0.298)
DIV -0.003 -0.016 0.035** -0.069** -0.118* 0.052 0.089** -0.253*** -0.104*** 0.175***
(0.086) (0.129) (0.017) (0.035) (0.064) (0.159) (0.035) (0.080) (0.040) (0.066)
LEV -0.015 0.146 -0.049 -0.182 0.406* -0.879* -0.177 -1.096*** 0.201 -0.551*
(0.259) (0.453) (0.113) (0.212) (0.242) (0.483) (0.172) (0.423) (0.162) (0.321)
MTBR -0.046* 0.037 -0.0003 0.0006 0.007 -0.024* -0.029* 0.025 0.017** -0.040***
(0.025) (0.033) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.007) (0.012)
NWC -0.154 0.125 -0.328*** 0.328*** 0.190 -0.520* -0.310** 0.289* 0.002 -0.311**
(0.371) (0.456) (0.114) (0.114) (0.121) (0.278) (0.136) (0.159) (0.045) (0.158)
SIZE 0.054** -0.102** 0.007 0.009 -0.105*** 0.096*** -0.011 0.029 -0.011 0.015
(0.025) (0.044) (0.009) (0.016) (0.031) (0.034) (0.020) (0.036) (0.018) (0.025)
TANG -0.358* 0.437 -0.317*** 0.029 -0.144 0.003 -0.468 0.776 -0.105 -0.132
(0.217) (0.382) (0.113) (0.247) (0.220) (0.434) (0.349) (0.683) (0.154) (0.332)
CONS -0.834* 1.776** 0.033 -0.089 1.923*** -1.433*** 0.489 -0.428 0.251 -0.110
(0.468) (0.831) (0.169) (0.270) (0.529) (0.528) (0.481) (0.816) (0.304) (0.452)
N 1,492 11,142 19,210 15,100 3,622
# FIRMS 188 1,258 2,241 1,663 422
AR1 0.046 0.094 0.067 0.000 0.012
AR2 0.226 0.694 0.220 0.007 0.637
HANSEN 0.808 0.908 0.113 0.750 0.491
VAR / IND CS TEL UTI TEC
Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11)
L.CASH 0.342*** -2.35e-05 -0.153 0.492** 0.328*** 0.139 0.368 -1.465
(0.128) (0.320) (0.160) (0.214) (0.071) (0.145) (0.300) (1.295)
CAPEX 0.811* -0.812* 0.125 -0.037 0.059 0.237 0.068 -1.447
(0.416) (0.430) (0.153) (0.259) (0.241) (0.611) (0.922) (2.424)
CF 0.059 -0.039 0.258*** -0.088 0.029 0.215 0.879* -0.889*
(0.140) (0.150) (0.090) (0.211) (0.095) (0.332) (0.497) (0.498)
DIV 0.105** -0.238** 0.033 -0.010 -0.008 0.030 -0.146 0.069
(0.045) (0.103) (0.049) (0.096) (0.032) (0.073) (0.125) (0.442)
LEV 0.292 -0.703 -0.154 0.174 -0.289** 0.462* 0.335 -0.021
(0.245) (0.467) (0.137) (0.254) (0.144) (0.267) (0.413) (1.701)
MTBR -0.049** 0.042* -0.006 0.006 0.028** -0.049** -0.036** 0.047**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.025) (0.017) (0.024)
NWC -0.064 -0.243 -0.242** 0.245** -0.236* 0.152 -0.294 2.103
(0.101) (0.255) (0.102) (0.105) (0.133) (0.211) (0.350) (2.634)
SIZE -0.049 0.070 -0.043** 0.008 0.038** -0.056* -0.165*** 0.245***
(0.034) (0.056) (0.022) (0.027) (0.019) (0.031) (0.054) (0.084)
TANG -1.188*** 0.537 -0.213* 0.121 -0.225** 0.113 1.404 -1.576
(0.373) (0.650) (0.113) (0.251) (0.109) (0.186) (1.394) (2.876)
CONS 1.408** -1.278 1.073** -0.311 -0.537 0.901* 2.819*** -3.757**
(0.709) (1.198) (0.418) (0.418) (0.330) (0.519) (0.998) (1.643)
N 6,056 800 3,027 6,684
# FIRMS 643 89 368 839
AR1 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.701
AR2 0.115 0.594 0.729 0.266
HANSEN 0.918 0.402 0.380 0.496
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VAR / IND O&G BM IND CG HC
Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11)
L.CASH 0.049 0.312*** 0.361*** -0.225* 0.526*** -0.520** 0.424*** 0.354*** 0.231*** 0.240*
(0.084) (0.118) (0.089) (0.123) (0.064) (0.220) (0.063) (0.131) (0.084) (0.134)
CAPEX -0.212 0.366 -0.039 -0.342 -0.199 0.403 0.223 -1.266 0.980* -2.842*
(0.222) (0.377) (0.340) (0.424) (0.325) (0.822) (0.426) (1.000) (0.574) (1.489)
CF -0.088 0.147 -0.085 0.148 0.124** 0.320* 0.292*** -0.561*** -0.009 -0.048
(0.097) (0.147) (0.066) (0.107) (0.058) (0.193) (0.076) (0.159) (0.050) (0.088)
DIV 0.012 -0.067 -0.170* 0.163 -0.020 0.057 -0.083 -0.180 0.266* -0.726**
(0.107) (0.212) (0.097) (0.220) (0.090) (0.204) (0.089) (0.217) (0.140) (0.296)
LEV -0.489** 0.680* -0.577** 0.762 0.302 -1.036* -0.241 0.226 0.075 -1.507**
(0.226) (0.409) (0.242) (0.524) (0.234) (0.548) (0.162) (0.382) (0.320) (0.637)
MTBR 0.003 -0.005 -0.009** 0.016* -0.0008 -0.016** 0.009* -0.025** -0.0009 0.008
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006)
NWC 0.023 -0.054 -0.173** 0.297** -0.124* -0.291* -0.140** 0.254* 0.142* -0.247**
(0.068) (0.114) (0.082) (0.144) (0.074) (0.153) (0.071) (0.143) (0.081) (0.124)
SIZE 0.015 -0.043 0.044*** -0.111*** 0.019 -0.112* -0.073*** 0.089** -0.029* 0.049
(0.027) (0.048) (0.015) (0.030) (0.021) (0.059) (0.027) (0.044) (0.017) (0.035)
TANG -0.777*** 0.762* -0.525** -0.078 -0.025 -0.445 -0.048 0.013 -1.724*** 3.238***
(0.258) (0.439) (0.205) (0.311) (0.263) (0.601) (0.210) (0.464) (0.376) (0.891)
CONS 0.391 0.193 -0.256 1.938*** -0.301 2.503** 1.560*** -1.581** 1.032*** -1.071*
(0.456) (0.821) (0.239) (0.478) (0.374) (1.145) (0.503) (0.748) (0.324) (0.617)
N 8,332 19,515 43,391 23,410 12,657
# FIRMS 1,014 2,259 4,046 2,208 1,338
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.996 0.007 0.045 0.086 0.090
HANSEN 0.815 0.166 0.277 0.271 0.146
VAR / IND CS TEL UTI TEC
Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11) Estimate Int (07-11)
L.CASH 0.548*** -0.085 0.355*** -0.111 0.465*** -0.237 0.378*** 0.168**
(0.058) (0.101) (0.088) (0.257) (0.148) (0.193) (0.047) (0.077)
CAPEX -0.144 -0.697 -0.468 1.972 -0.190 1.525 -1.090** -0.732
(0.235) (0.560) (1.202) (3.898) (0.498) (1.130) (0.477) (0.888)
CF -0.054 0.149* 0.032 -0.266 0.108 -0.023 0.0434 -0.145*
(0.041) (0.084) (0.063) (0.251) (0.099) (0.163) (0.035) (0.080)
DIV 0.041 -0.082 0.111 1.192** 0.153* 0.382* -0.131** 0.204*
(0.065) (0.150) (0.165) (0.562) (0.090) (0.212) (0.059) (0.118)
LEV -0.029 0.071 -0.548*** 1.322** 0.245 -0.087 -0.731** -0.034
(0.157) (0.332) (0.209) (0.581) (0.238) (0.560) (0.322) (0.386)
MTBR -0.005* 0.014* -0.011 -0.027 -0.048*** 0.049** -0.0002 -0.0005
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.047) (0.015) (0.021) (0.001) (0.004)
NWC 0.081* -0.181** -0.312*** 0.695** -0.254** 0.219 -0.124* 0.085
(0.047) (0.081) (0.116) (0.282) (0.116) (0.173) (0.065) (0.109)
SIZE -0.0009 -0.012 0.0123 -0.168* -0.021 -0.081** -0.005 0.005
(0.017) (0.037) (0.034) (0.090) (0.018) (0.040) (0.009) (0.017)
TANG -0.128 0.066 0.170 -1.039 -0.640*** -0.112 0.229 0.197
(0.183) (0.460) (0.537) (1.560) (0.190) (0.421) (0.267) (0.452)
CONS 0.146 0.221 -0.056 2.575* 0.711** 1.308* 0.442*** -0.249
(0.264) (0.548) (0.584) (1.480) (0.320) (0.738) (0.159) (0.338)
N 20,852 1,645 3,193 20,464
# FIRMS 2,084 176 281 2,187
AR1 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000
AR2 0.524 0.795 0.134 0.155
HANSEN 0.175 0.945 0.997 0.171
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